TWO BROTHERS SENTENCED FOR TERRORISM AND ASSAULT ON TWO U.S. MARSHALS

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Thursday, June 11, 2015
Qazi Brothers Sentenced on Terrorism Violations and Assault on Two Deputy U.S. Marshals
Younger Sibling Plotted to Attack New York City with a Weapon of Mass Destruction

Brothers Raees Alam Qazi, 22, and Sheheryar Alam Qazi, 32, both naturalized U.S. citizens from Pakistan, were sentenced today to 35 years and 20 years in prison for terrorism violations and assaulting two Deputy U.S. Marshals while in custody, announced Assistant Attorney General for National Security John P. Carlin, U.S. Attorney Wifredo A. Ferrer of the Southern District of Florida, Director Stacia A. Hylton of the U.S. Marshals Service and Special Agent in Charge George L. Piro of the FBI’s Miami Division.

Raees Qazi and Sheheryar Qazi were sentenced by U.S. District Court Judge Beth Bloom of the Southern District of Florida, and their prison term will be followed by a term of 10 years and five years of supervised release, respectively.

“With the sentences handed down today, Raees Qazi and his brother Sheheryar Qazi are being held accountable for their roles in a plot to conduct a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction in New York City and their assault on two federal officers during their pretrial detention,” said Assistant Attorney General Carlin.  “This case highlights our commitment to pursue any individuals who would seek to conduct an attack on U.S. soil or to injure law enforcement officials who risk their lives to protect us.  I want to thank the U.S. Marshals, agents, analysts, and prosecutors who are responsible for this successful result.”

“Protecting the homeland and our national security remains our number one priority,” said U.S. Attorney Ferrer.  “Today’s sentences demonstrate this Office’s unwavering commitment to work with our law enforcement partners to combat all forms of terrorism by proactively finding and prosecuting those who actively seek to kill or harm innocent citizens in the name of violent extremism.”

“Today’s sentencing of the Qazi brothers represents the final chapter for two men who wished to bring harm and mass destruction to Americans on U.S. soil,” said Director Hylton.  “Their sentences demonstrate that justice prevailed.  I am proud of our brave men and women who participated in this process, and thank the prosecutors who worked tirelessly for this successful conclusion.”

“The threat of a terrorist attack against innocent Americans is real as demonstrated by the actions of these two brothers,” said Special Agent in Charge Piro.  “The fact that their terrorist aspirations were cut short didn’t stop Raees and Sheheryar Qazi from attempting to use potentially lethal force against two U.S. Marshals while they were in custody.  This case highlights outstanding work and team effort of our South Florida Joint Terrorism Task Force.”

On March 12, 2015, Raees Alam Qazi pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to provide material support and resources to terrorists in preparation for the use of a weapon of mass destruction, one count of attempting to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization and one count of conspiring to assault a federal employee.  Sherheyar Alam Qazi pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to provide material support and resources to terrorists in preparation for the use of a weapon of mass destruction and one count of conspiring to assault a federal employee.

The brothers acknowledged during the plea hearing that Raees Alam Qazi was going to initiate an attack using a weapon of mass destruction in New York City and that he had been financially and emotionally supported by his older brother, Sheheryar Alam Qazi, who encouraged him to launch the attack.  Among other things, the brothers acknowledged that Sheheryar Alam Qazi had encouraged his younger brother to travel from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2011, and that when Raees Alam Qazi had been unsuccessful in his attempt to enter Afghanistan, he returned to his older brother.  The brothers acknowledged that Raees Alam Qazi had been trying to reach the “guys from Yemen” aka Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) on the internet and that they told him not to come to Afghanistan because there were enough people, but instead suggested they do something in the United States.  Raees Alam Qazi admitted that he had taken “hints” from an AQAP online publication entitled Inspire Magazine, including building an explosive device using Christmas tree light bulbs.  Raees Alam Qazi also conceded that he had used information in Inspire to communicate with AQAP, and that his communications with Al Qaeda dealt with his desires to launch an attack in the United States.

The brothers acknowledged that Raees Alam Qazi travelled to New York in November 2012 to conduct an attack with a weapon of mass destruction while Sheheryar Alam Qazi actively misled friends and family members about Raees Alam Qazi’s true whereabouts and activities.  The brothers acknowledged that Raees Alam Qazi called Sheheryar Alam Qazi from New York to notify him that he had not been successful in his task.  Sheheryar Alam Qazi encouraged Raees Alam Qazi to return to “practice over here [Florida] then you may return [to New York] you know…. I will give you complete freedom.”

The brothers additionally admitted their participation in a conspiracy to assault federal officers.  They conceded that on April 8, 2014, while being moved within the U.S. Courthouse complex in Miami, they simultaneously punched two Deputy U.S. Marshals in the face and struggled with them and attempted to use potentially lethal force on them.  Raees Alam Qazi and Sheheryar Alam Qazi acknowledged that while struggling with the Deputy U.S. Marshals, the defendants simultaneously exclaimed “Allahu Akbar,” an Arabic exhortation meaning “God is Great.”

The case was investigated by the FBI’s South Florida Joint Terrorism Task Force.  The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Karen E. Gilbert and Adam S. Fels of the Southern District of Florida, and Trial Attorney Jennifer E. Levy of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section.

DOJ ANNOUNCES CHARGES BROUGHT AGAINST CONSPIRATORS WHO PLOTTED WMD ATTACK ON U.S.

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
Thursday, April 2, 2015
Two Queens, New York, Residents Charged With Conspiracy to Use a Weapon of Mass Destruction
Defendants Allegedly Plotted to Construct an Explosive Device for Use in a Terrorist Attack on U.S. Soil

U.S. Attorney Loretta E. Lynch of the Eastern District of New York, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John P. Carlin, Assistant Director in Charge Diego G. Rodriguez of the FBI’s New York Field Office and Commissioner William J. Bratton of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) announced that earlier today, a criminal complaint was unsealed in federal court in the Eastern District of New York charging Noelle Velentzas and Asia Siddiqui with conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against persons or property in the United States.  The defendants’ initial appearances are scheduled for this afternoon before U.S. Magistrate Judge Viktor V. Pohorelsky of the Eastern District of New York.

As alleged in the complaint, the defendants have repeatedly expressed their support for violent jihad.  For instance, in or about 2009, Siddiqui published a poem in a magazine published by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula that exhorted readers to wage jihad and declared that there is “[n]o excuse to sit back and wait – for the skies rain martyrdom.”  More recently, Velentzas, who has characterized al-Qaeda founder Usama Bin Laden as one of her heroes, declared that she and Siddiqui are “citizens of the Islamic State” – a reference to the foreign terrorist organization that is also known as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).  Less than two weeks ago, Velentzas, asked whether she had heard the news about the recent arrest of a former U.S. airman who had attempted to travel to Syria to wage jihad and stated that she did not understand why people were traveling overseas to engage in jihad when there were more opportunities of “pleasing Allah” in the United States.

Since at least August 2014, the defendants have allegedly plotted to construct an explosive device for use in a terrorist attack on American soil.  In their self-proclaimed effort to “make history,” the defendants researched numerous explosive precursors.  For instance, they researched and acquired some of the components of a car bomb, like the one used in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; a fertilizer bomb, like the one used in the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City; and a pressure cooker bomb, like the one used in the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing.  The investigation recently revealed that the defendants possessed propane gas tanks together with instructions from an online jihadist publication for transforming propane tanks into explosive devices.

“We are committed to doing everything in our ability to detect, disrupt and deter attacks by homegrown violent extremists,” said U.S. Attorney Lynch.  “As alleged, the defendants in this case carefully studied how to construct an explosive device to launch an attack on the homeland.  We remain firm in our resolve to hold accountable anyone who would seek to terrorize the American people, whether by traveling abroad to commit attacks overseas or by plotting here at home.”  U.S. Attorney Lynch extended her grateful appreciation to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, which comprises a large number of federal, state and local agencies from the region, as well as to the NYPD Intelligence Division, for their assistance in the investigation.

“Velentzas and Siddiqui are alleged to have researched how to construct bombs as part of their conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction on American soil,” said Assistant Attorney General Carlin.  “Identifying and disrupting such threats to public safety, whether at home or abroad, is the number one priority of the National Security Division and our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities.  I want to thank the agents, analysts and prosecutors who are responsible for today’s charges.”

“The defendants allegedly plotted to wreak terror by creating explosive devices and even researching the pressure cooker bombs used during the Boston Marathon bombing,” said Assistant Director in Charge Rodriguez.  “We continue to pursue those who look to commit acts of terror and deter others who think they are beyond the reach of law enforcement.  I’d like to thank Commissioner Bratton and the New York City Police Department for their partnership on this case and so many others.”

“These defendants allegedly engaged in sustained efforts to obtain bomb-making instructions and materials, including using instructions provided by al-Qaeda’s online magazine,” said Commissioner Bratton.  “The work of the NYPD’s Intelligence Bureau, its undercover Detective, and the seamless collaboration with the Special Agents and Detectives of the Joint Terrorism Task Force and United States Attorney for the Eastern District should serve as a model for early detection and prevention of terrorist plotting.”

If convicted, both defendants face a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.  The charges in the complaint are merely allegations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

The government’s case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Alexander A. Solomon, Douglas M. Pravda and Jennifer S. Carapiet of the Eastern District of New York, with assistance provided by Trial Attorney Clement McGovern of the Justice Department’s National Security Division.

BROTHERS PLEAD GUILTY TO TERRORISM VIOLATIONS, ASSAULTING TWO U.S. MARSHALS

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
Thursday, March 12, 2015
Two Florida Brothers Plead Guilty to Terrorism Violations and Assault on Two Deputy U.S. Marshals
Younger Sibling Plotted to Attack New York City with a Weapon of Mass Destruction

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Carlin, U.S. Attorney Wifredo A. Ferrer of the Southern District of Florida, Director Stacia A. Hylton of the U.S. Marshals Service, Special Agent in Charge George L. Piro of the FBI’s Miami Field Office and members of the South Florida Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) announced today that Raees Alam Qazi and his brother, Sheheryar Alam Qazi, pleaded guilty to terrorism violations and to assaulting two Deputy U.S. Marshals while in custody.

During the hearing, the Qazi brothers acknowledged that Raees Alam Qazi, the younger brother, was going to initiate an attack using a weapon of mass destruction in New York City and that he had been financially and emotionally supported by his older brother, Sheheryar Alam Qazi, who encouraged him to launch the attack.

“With today’s guilty pleas, Raees Qazi and his brother Sheheryar Qazi are being held accountable for their roles in a plot to conduct a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction in New York City and their assault on two federal officers during their pretrial detention,” said Assistant Attorney General Carlin.  “This case highlights our commitment to pursue any individuals who would seek to conduct an attack on U.S. soil or to injure law enforcement officials who risk their lives to protect us.  I want to thank the many agents, analysts, and prosecutors who are responsible for this successful result.”

“The plot by Raees Qazi to perform a terrorist attack in New York City – and his older brother’s financial support of that plot – was intended to further Al Qa’ida’s message in the United States,” said U.S. Attorney Ferrer.  “The Qazi brothers later attacked federal law enforcement agents.  As today’s guilty pleas demonstrate, we will respond by holding those who plan terrorist acts on American soil accountable.  This case serves as an example of our commitment to protecting civilians from violent jihadi attacks.”

“Any attempt on the life of a law enforcement official is heinous,” said Director Hylton.  “To attempt to murder two Deputy U.S. Marshals while in a federal cellblock is a total disregard for life and the entire judicial process.”

“The Qazi brothers are a great example why the FBI’s number one priority is counterterrorism,” said Special Agent in Charge Piro.  “We remain committed in our steadfast efforts to detect, deter and disrupt every threat to the United States.”

Raees Alam Qazi, 22, and his brother, Sheheryar Alam Qazi, 32, were living in Oakland Park, Florida, in November 2012 when they were arrested and charged with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction (explosives).  In January 2015, a federal grand jury added additional terrorism charges and five counts of conspiracy, assault and attempted murder relating to an attack on two Deputy U.S. Marshals in April 2014 while the Qazis were in federal custody.

Raees Alam Qazi pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to provide material support and resources to terrorists in preparation for the use of a weapon of mass destruction, one count of attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization and one count of conspiring to assault a federal employee.  Under the terms of the plea agreement, the parties jointly agreed to recommend a 32-year prison sentence for Raees Qazi.

Sherheyar Alam Qazi pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to provide material support and resources to terrorists in preparation for the use of a weapon of mass destruction and one count of conspiring to assault a federal employee.  Under the terms of the plea agreement, the parties jointly agree to recommend a 17-year prison sentence for Sheryheyar.

The sentencing hearing for both brothers is currently set before U.S. District Judge Beth Bloom of the Southern District of Florida on June 5.

Raees Alam Qazi and Sheheryar Alam Qazi face a potential statutory maximum sentence of 35 years and 20 years, respectively.

The brothers are naturalized U.S. citizens from Pakistan.

MAN ARRESTED FOR TRYING TO ACQUIRE RICIN THROUGH THE "DARK WEB"

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
Tuesday, January 20, 2015
New York Man Indicted For Attempting to Acquire Deadly Toxin, Ricin

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John P. Carlin, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara for the Southern District of New York and Assistant Director-in-Charge George Venizelos of the FBI’s New York Office, announced today that a federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Cheng Le for attempting to acquire and distribute ricin and committing postal fraud.  Le was arrested on Dec. 23, 2014, by the FBI in Manhattan.  He was presented on a Complaint before the U.S. Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV on Dec. 24, 2014, and has been detained since his arrest.  He is expected to be arraigned on Friday, January 23, 2015, before the United States District Judge Alison J. Nathan.

“As alleged, Cheng Le attempted to acquire ricin, a potentially lethal toxin, through the Dark Web so that it could be used for deadly purposes,” said U.S. Attorney Bharara.  “Thankfully, with the help of our law enforcement partners he was intercepted and must now answer for his alleged crimes.”

“In the shadows of the Dark Web, criminals hide behind a veil of anonymity, sniffing out hidden opportunities to buy and sell illegal and potentially dangerous merchandise,” said Assistant Director-in-Charge Venizelos.  “As alleged, in this case, activity carried out in the marketplace served as a conduit for Le to obtain ricin. In his desire to acquire this potentially deadly toxin, he picked his own poison and now faces the consequences of the justice system.”

According to the Complaint, which was unsealed today in Manhattan federal court, and the indictment:

Ricin is a highly potent and potentially fatal toxin with no known antidote.  In December 2014, an individual (the Ricin Buyer) contacted an FBI online covert employee (the OCE) on an online forum.  During Dec. 2014, the Ricin Buyer exchanged a series of messages with the OCE, during which the Ricin Buyer explored the possibility of the OCE supplying the Ricin Buyer with ricin, for the Ricin Buyer to resell to at least one secondary buyer.

On or about Dec. 18, 2014, the Ricin Buyer directed the OCE to send a quantity of ricin to a particular postal box in Manhattan (the Postal Box).  The FBI later determined that the Postal Box belonged to Cheng Le.  Later that same day, FBI agents observed Le wear latex gloves while retrieving a package from the Postal Box (the Package) and mailing it at a nearby post office (the Post Office).  Law enforcement officers examined the Package, confirmed that it did not contain any hazardous materials, and determined that Le had listed a fake name as the Package’s return address.  A postal employee (the Postal Employee) informed the FBI that the Postal Employee had seen Le at the Post Office on multiple prior occasions and that Le has worn blue latex gloves on at least some of those occasions.

The FBI prepared a package (the Sham Shipment) that was consistent with the Ricin Buyer’s request to the OCE, which was then delivered to the Postal Box.  On Dec. 23, 2014, Le, wearing latex gloves, retrieved the Sham Shipment, opened it, and took the contents to his apartment, whereupon he was arrested by FBI agents.

*                      *                      *

The indictment charges Le, 21, in two counts.  Count One charges Le with attempting to possess a biological toxin for use as a weapon, and carries a maximum sentence of life in prison.  Count Two charges Le with using a fictitious name in furtherance of unlawful business involving the mail, and carries a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment.  The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by a judge.

Assistant Attorney General Carlin is grateful for the outstanding investigative efforts of the FBI, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and the United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS).  Le’s arrest is the result of the close cooperative efforts of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force—which consists of law enforcement officers of the FBI, NYPD, USPIS and other agencies.

The case is being prosecuted by the office’s Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit.  Assistant U.S. Attorneys Ilan Graff and Andrew D. Beaty are in charge of the prosecution, with assistance provided by Trial Attorney Joseph Kaster of the Justice Department’s Counterterrorism Section.

The charges contained in the indictment are merely accusations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE THEMATIC DISCUSSION REGARDING WMD

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Sixty-Ninth UNGA First Committee Thematic Discussion on Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

Remarks

Ambassador Robert A. Wood, Alternate Representative, Delegation of the United States of America

New York City

October 24, 2014

Mr. Chairman,

Last year the international community welcomed UN Security Council Resolution 2118 and the September 27th OPCW Executive Council decision that legally mandated the complete elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons program. These decisions were an historic and unprecedented achievement that allowed for the removal and verified destruction of Syria’s declared chemical weapons -- a significant step toward the complete dismantling of the Syrian chemical weapons program. This effort could not have been accomplished without the commitment and resolve of the international community. President Obama expressed his gratitude to the OPCW-UN Joint Mission and the entire international coalition for this extraordinary achievement. President Obama also made clear that the task of ensuring that Syria’s chemical weapons program has been entirely eliminated is far from over. Serious concerns remain; including Syria’s continued use of chemical weapons against the Syrian people in direct contravention of its obligations under Resolution 2118, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the decisions of the OPCW Executive Council.

Mr. Chairman, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission, set up by the Director-General to establish the facts around allegations that chlorine has been used as a chemical weapon, has confirmed the use of such a chemical in its second report dated 10 September 2014. The United States commends the courage and dedication of the Mission and its professional and impartial efforts to ascertain the facts regarding chemical weapons use in Syria. We join the rest of the international community in strongly supporting the Director-General’s decision to have the Fact-Finding Mission continue its work.

This second report contains a compelling set of conclusions and evidentiary findings implicating the Syrian government in deadly chemical weapons attacks against three villages in northern Syria during April and May of 2014. The Fact-Finding Mission concluded that the testimony of primary witnesses and supporting documentation, including medical reports and other relevant information, constitutes a compelling confirmation with a high degree of confidence that chlorine was used as a weapon, systematically and repeatedly in the villages of Talmanes, Al Tamanah, and Kafr Zeta in northern Syria. The Fact-Finding Mission emphasized that “in describing the incidents involving the release of toxic chemicals, witnesses invariably connected the devices to helicopters flying overhead.” It is well known that the Syrian Government is the only party to the conflict in Syria possessing helicopters or any other aerial capability.

Mr. Chairman, the use of chlorine or any other toxic chemical as a weapon is a clear breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention and of Resolution 2118. Such a breach raises serious concerns about the willingness of Syria to comply with its fundamental treaty obligations not to possess or use chemical weapons.

We are also concerned about Syria’s declaration, as it contains gaps, discrepancies and inconsistencies which give rise to important questions and concerns about the declaration’s accuracy and completeness. We call on Syria to cooperate fully with the OPCW and promptly begin destruction of its remaining chemical weapon production facilities. The Syrian Arab Republic must provide the international community with credible evidence to support its assurances that it has fully abandoned its chemical weapons program. This cannot be achieved while use of chemical weapons continues and new allegations of such use continue to be made. Complete and accurate declarations must be provided, and destruction operations must be completed promptly and in full in order to prevent further use of chemical weapons against the Syrian people. The Syrian CW file remains open and will not be closed until all of these issues are addressed and Syria complies with its obligations under the CWC and UN Security Council Resolution 2118.

Mr. Chairman, on other CWC related matters, the United States looks forward to working closely with States Parties to meaningfully advance the work and recommendations of the Third Review Conference held in April 2013. While there is more work to be done in our efforts to further strengthen the implementation of the CWC, we remain encouraged by the progress made by the OPCW and its extraordinary efforts in working toward a world free of chemical weapons. The OPCW has accomplished a great deal and remains an indispensable multilateral body with a global responsibility.

For our part, the United States continues to act on opportunities to accelerate destruction and has safely destroyed almost 90 percent of our chemical weapons stockpile under OPCW verification. We continue our steadfast commitment to the CWC and will continue working in a transparent manner towards the complete destruction of our remaining chemical weapons.

The United States remains fully committed to the charge given in the preamble of the Chemical Weapons Convention, that all States Parties “determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the implementation of the provisions of this Convention….” We must stand together to make this goal a reality.

Mr. Chairman, as we pursue these important goals, we must not lose sight of the threat posed by biological weapons, whether in the hands of states or non-state actors. The Biological Weapons Convention bans the development, production, and stockpiling of such weapons. It embodies an aspiration as profound as that of the CWC: to completely exclude the possibility of biological agents and toxins being used as weapons. The United States strongly supports the BWC.

The 7th BWC Review Conference took steps to strengthen the Convention’s contribution to international security, establishing an ambitious agenda of important topics for ongoing work. But this agenda has not been matched by the resources or political will needed to deliver results. Even as we consolidate gains under the existing process, we must begin to look toward the 8th RevCon. What issues should we seek to address over the coming years, and how should we seek to address them?

Some will call – inevitably – for another effort to negotiate an all-encompassing supplementary treaty or protocol. We’ve been down that road. The problems are well known – and, despite the popular narrative, not limited to U.S. objections. Under this approach, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. This is a formula for years of inaction. The BW threat won’t wait for us.

There is a better way. We can strengthen our intersessional process. We can – like so many other international entities – adopt decisions on the things we agree upon, while continuing to discuss those on which we do not. And there IS agreement on a great deal. We agree on the need to strengthen national implementation; on the importance of international cooperation, especially to build nations’ capacity to address challenges to health security posed by infectious disease and toxins; on the need to give practical effect to the mutual assistance provisions of Article VII. And – even if we do not agree on how to go about it – we agree on the need to find ways to strengthen confidence that Parties to the BWC are living up to their obligations.

Mr. Chairman, we HAVE a treaty. We don’t need to wait for some distant day when the stars align and another one emerges – and the threats we face will most certainly not wait. Let’s take the tools that we have, strengthen them where necessary, and put them to use.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT TARGETS IRANIAN WMD PROLIFERATORS WITH SANCTIONS

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Additional Sanctions Imposed by the Department of State Targeting Iranian Proliferators

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

August 29, 2014

The Administration imposed sanctions today on a series of companies and individuals under various Iran-related authorities targeting those engaged in proscribed activities. These actions underscore U.S. resolve to enforce sanctions as the P5+1 and Iran work toward a comprehensive solution to address the international community’s concerns over Iran’s nuclear program. As part of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), which was extended in July, the P5+1 committed to providing Iran with limited, temporary, and targeted sanctions relief in return for important steps Iran took to constrain its nuclear program. The Department of State today imposed sanctions on a series of entities providing support to illicit Iranian nuclear activities. The Department of the Treasury announced additional actions under its authorities as well. Today’s actions target sanctionable activity beyond the scope of the relief offered to Iran as part of the JPOA.

Actions Targeting Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferators and Their Supporters

As part of these combined actions, the Department of State imposed sanctions on four companies pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 for engaging in or attempting to engage in activities that have materially contributed to, or posed a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of WMD or their means of delivery. The Department of State’s designations comprise Iran-based entities engaged in efforts to support the development of nuclear weapons, or elements of Iran’s program that could be used to produce nuclear weapons.

Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research:

The Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) is a Tehran-based entity that is primarily responsible for research in the field of nuclear weapons development. SPND was established in February 2011 by the UN-sanctioned individual Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who for many years has managed activities useful in the development of a nuclear explosive device. Fakhrizadeh led such efforts in the late 1990s or early 2000s, under the auspices of the “AMAD Plan, the MODAFL subsidiary Section for Advanced Development Applications and Technologies (SADAT) and Malek Ashtar University of Technology (MUT). In February 2011, Fakhrizadeh left MUT to establish SPND. Fakhrizadeh was designated in UNSCR 1747 (2007) and by the United States in July 2008 for his involvement in Iran’s proscribed WMD activities. SPND took over some of the activities related to Iran’s undeclared nuclear program that had previously been carried out by Iran’s Physics Research Center, the AMAD Plan, MUT, and SADAT.

Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute:

Iran’s Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute (NSTRI) implements projects in the nuclear field, specifically at Iran’s 40-megawatt heavy water research reactor at Arak (the IR-40) - a reactor that, as presently designed, would provide Iran the capability to produce plutonium from the reactor’s spent fuelthe could be used in nuclear weapons. NSTRI has engaged with Modern Industries Technique Company (MITEC), an Iranian entity is responsible for design and construction of the IR-40, to produce lead glass for the hot cell facilities at the IR-40. This project would allow Iran, when reprocessing spent fuel, to contain radiation using high-density concrete walls to enclose the primary containment area, known as a “hot cell.” Hot cells with thick radiation shielding and leaden glass for direct viewing are adequate for research-scale plutonium extraction. NSTRI is a subordinate to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), which is the primary Iranian organization responsible for nuclear technology research and development activities and was designated by the UNSC in resolution 1737 (2006) and by the United States in the annex to E.O. 13382. Further, MITEC was designated by the UNSC in resolution 1929 (2010) for its involvement in the design and construction of the IR-40, and by the United States pursuant to E.O. 13382 in November 2011 for providing services to the AEOI.

Jahan Tech Rooyan Pars and Mandegar Baspar Kimiya Company:

Jahan Tech Rooyan Pars (Jahan Tech) and Mandegar Baspar Kimiya Company (Mandegar Baspar) are Iran-based entities involved in the procurement of proliferation-sensitive material, specifically carbon fiber, for proscribed elements of Iran’s nuclear program. Since early 2010 and as recently as 2013, Jahan Tech and Mandegar Baspar have attempted to procure high-strength carbon fiber from Asia-based suppliers, some of which is controlled for export pursuant to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines and is proscribed for export to Iran by UNSCR 1737. Among other uses, high-strength carbon fiber is suitable for the production of advanced centrifuge rotors, as well as for forming components that increase the range and payload capability of ballistic missiles. The Panel of Experts established pursuant to UNSCR 1929 (2010) noted in its May 2014 report that Iran has been attempting to procure high-grade carbon fiber for use in manufacturing of some of its centrifuge rotors. The Washington Post in 2013 documented Jahan Tech’s efforts to acquire 100,000 highly specialized magnets used in centrifuge machines – a quantity that could outfit 50,000 new centrifuges. Iranian private sector firms should heed the risks incurred by conducting business with those who support Iran’s proscribed nuclear activities and choose to focus their activities on legitimate international commerce. The United States will continue to investigate additional companies making material contributions to the Iranian government’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery

Actions Targeting Persons Engaging with the Energy or Petrochemical Sectors of Iran

Also today, the Department of State imposed sanctions pursuant to the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA) on Goldentex FZE, a UAE-based company involved in providing support to Iran’s shipping sector.

IFCA mandates, among other things, the imposition of sanctions on individuals and companies determined to have knowingly transferred to or from Iran significant goods or services used in connection with the energy or shipping sector of Iran, including the National Iranian Oil Company or the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC).

In addition, the Department of State took action to impose sanctions on Italy-based Dettin SpA pursuant to the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA), as amended by the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA). According to information available to the United States, Dettin SpA knowingly providing Iran’s petrochemical industry with goods and support whose value exceeded $250,000. Although the JPOA authorizes Iran to export petrochemicals, providing goods, services, and support for the maintenance or expansion of Iran’s domestic production of petrochemicals is not within the scope of sanctions relief under the JPOA and, therefore, remains sanctionable.

These sanctions send a clear message that the United States will act resolutely against attempts to circumvent U.S. sanctions. Individuals and companies providing support to illicit Iranian nuclear activities program or engaged in assisting Iran’s efforts to evade U.S. sanctions will face serious consequences.

Identifier Information

Name: The Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research
AKA: SPND
Address: Negarestan 3, off of Pasdaran Street, Tehran, Iran

Name: The Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute
AKA: NSTRI
AKA: Research Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology
AKA: Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute
AKA: Nuclear Science and Technology Research Center
Address: P.O. Box 11365-3486, Tehran, Iran
Address: P.O. Box 14399-51113, Tehran, Iran
Address: North Karegar Ave., P.O. Box 14399/51113, Tehran, Iran
Address: Moazzen Blvd. Rajaee Shahr, Karaj, Iran, P.O. Box 31485-498
Address: End of Karegare Shomali Street, P.O. Box 11365-3486, Tehran, Iran

Name: Jahan Tech Rooyan Pars
AKA: Jahan Tech Rooyan Pars Company
AKA: Jahan Tech
Address: B18, Takhte-e-Jamshid Building, Science and Technology Park, Shiraz, Iran

Name: Mandegar Baspar Kimiya Company
AKA: Mandegar Baspar Fajr Asia
AKA: Bardiya Tejarat Javid
Address: No. 510, 5th Floor, Saddi Trading Building, South SAA DI Street, Tehran, Iran

Name: Goldentex FZE
Address: M05 Bin Thani BLD, Sheikh Khalifah Bin Zayed Road, Burdubai, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Name: Dettin SpA
Address: Via Campania, 9 – 36015 Schio (4543N 11221E) Italy

U.S.-SOUTH KOREA WILL ESTABLISH "BILATERAL STRATEGY FOR TAILORED DETERRENCE"

FROM:  U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAGEL 

U.S., South Korea Announce 'Tailored Deterrence' Strategy

By Karen Parrish
American Forces Press Service

SEOUL, South Korea, Oct. 2, 2013 - The United States and South Korea today agreed to establish "a bilateral strategy for tailored deterrence against ... North Korean nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction," Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said during a press conference here today.

Hagel and his counterpart, South Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin, spoke to reporters after the 45th Security Consultative Meeting in the South Korean Ministry of Defense building this morning. The annual meeting brings together military and foreign affairs officials from the two nations to discuss alliance, peninsular, regional and global issues.

The tailored deterrence agreement will create a strategic, policy-level framework within the alliance for deterring specific threats, Hagel said, "and help us work together more seamlessly to maximize the effects of our deterrence."

Kim noted both sides have agreed on the need for a "more future-oriented and comprehensive strategic alliance."

In a joint communiqué issued after the meeting, Hagel and Kim condemned North Korea's December 2012 long-range missile launch and its February 2013 nuclear test, and "urged North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and to cease ... its nuclear programs immediately, including its nuclear activities at Yongbyon, uranium enrichment and construction of a light water reactor."

In his remarks, Hagel also emphasized North Korea's stockpiles of chemical weapons. "There should be no doubt that any North Korean use of chemical weapons would be completely unacceptable," he said.

The communiqué reaffirmed U.S. commitment to provide and strengthen deterrence for South Korea "using the full range of military capabilities, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities."

It also provides for a "comprehensive counter-missile strategy" to, Kim said, "detect, defend, deter and destroy" threats from the North Korean arsenal.

The agreement states South Korea will "continue to build reliable interoperable response capabilities and to develop the Korean Air and Missile Defense system" and that both sides will further interoperability of the alliance's command and control system.

Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also attended today's discussions. Other senior U.S. military leaders in the region were present as well, including Navy Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III, who leads U.S. Pacific Command, and the outgoing and incoming commanders of U.S. Forces Korea, United Nations Command and Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, Army Gen. James D. Thurman and Army Gen. Curtis "Mike" Scaparrotti. Their South Korean counterparts also attended.

Scaparrotti assumed the three-flagged South Korea-based command later in the day from Thurman, who is retiring.

Locklear and Thurman shared their views on regional issues yesterday with reporters traveling with Hagel before the change-of-command ceremony. Locklear noted that units from within his command train and conduct exercises regularly with South Korean forces, which he termed "highly capable and very professional."

Thurman, who has commanded the roughly 28,500 U.S. service members in South Korea for two and a half years, noted that during his tenure readiness across the joint and combined force has been his highest priority.

During his command, he said, South Korean military forces have continued to "demonstrate their expertise in the air, on the ground and in the maritime domains."

Thurman said he remains confident the allies can defend the peninsula, which has been in a state of suspended war since North and South Korea signed an armistice in July 60 years ago. The United States fought side-by-side with South Korean forces during that war, he noted, and the two countries signed a mutual defense treaty in 1953, 60 years ago yesterday.

Thurman said the alliance is based on shared values, combined hard work, and a collective commitment to stability involving the U.N. sending states, South Korea and the United States.

"Since the Korean War, the Republic of Korea has been one of the greatest success stories of our time," he said. "They went from a country that was torn apart by war ... [to] a very vibrant democracy, a global economic power, a vital security partner and a world leader."

That success, Thurman added, "is an important example of what a great alliance can accomplish together, and it is worth defending together."

PRESIDENT OBAMA TALKS ABOUT MIDDLE EAST IN UNITED NATIONS SPEECH

FROM:  U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT 
Obama Describes Core US Interests in the Middle East
By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Sept. 24, 2013 - In a speech at the United Nations today, President Barack Obama described key United States' interests in North Africa and the Middle East and made clear America is prepared to use force to back them up.

"The United States of America is prepared to use all elements of our power, including military force, to secure our core interests in the region," Obama told the General Assembly in New York.

The nation, he said, will confront external aggression against allies and partners in the region.

"We will ensure the free flow of energy from the region to the world," Obama said. While the United States is reducing its oil imports, the world still depends on Middle Eastern oil and gas. A severe disruption could destabilize the global economy.

"We will dismantle terrorist networks that threaten our people," the president said. "Wherever possible, we will build the capacity of our partners, respect the sovereignty of nations, and work to address the root causes of terror. But when it is necessary to defend the United States against terrorist attack, we will take direct action."

And, the United States will not tolerate the development or use of weapons of mass destruction. "Just as we consider the use of chemical weapons in Syria to be a threat to our own national security, we reject the development of nuclear weapons that could trigger a nuclear arms race in the region, and undermine the global nonproliferation regime," Obama said.

It is in U.S. interests to see a peaceful, prosperous, stable and democratic Middle East, Obama said, but the United States cannot force this.

"We can rarely achieve these objectives through unilateral American action, particularly through military action," he said. "Iraq shows us that democracy cannot simply be imposed by force. Rather, these objectives are best achieved when we partner with the international community and with the countries and peoples of the region."

The president illustrated the U.S. position using Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons and the Arab-Israeli conflict as examples.

"While these issues are not the cause of all the region's problems, they have been a major source of instability for far too long, and resolving them can help serve as a foundation for a broader peace," Obama said.

The United States and Iran have not had diplomatic relations since 1979. Mistrust between the two nations has developed over the years.

"This mistrust has deep roots," the president said. "Iranians have long complained of a history of U.S. interference in their affairs and of America's role in overthrowing an Iranian government during the Cold War. On the other hand, Americans see an Iranian government that has declared the United States an enemy and directly -- or through proxies -- taken American hostages, killed U.S. troops and civilians, and threatened our ally Israel with destruction."

Resolving the issue of Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons could go a long way toward an improved relationship between the two countries, Obama said.

The United States is resolved to not allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons. "We are not seeking regime change and we respect the right of the Iranian people to access peaceful nuclear energy," the president said. "Instead, we insist that the Iranian government meet its responsibilities under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and U.N. Security Council resolutions."

On the Iranian side, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Hoseini-Khamenei has issued a fatwa against the development of nuclear weapons, and new Iranian President Hasan Rouhani has just recently reiterated that the Islamic Republic will never develop a nuclear weapon.

"These statements made by our respective governments should offer the basis for a meaningful agreement," Obama said. "We should be able to achieve a resolution that respects the rights of the Iranian people, while giving the world confidence that the Iranian program is peaceful. But to succeed, conciliatory words will have to be matched by actions that are transparent and verifiable. After all, it's the Iranian government's choices that have led to the comprehensive sanctions that are currently in place. And this is not simply an issue between the United States and Iran."

The president has directed Secretary of State John Kerry to pursue this effort with the Iranian government in close cooperation with the European Union, Russia and China.

The conflict between the Palestinians and Israel is also a flashpoint that needs to be dampened, the president said. "I've made it clear that the United States will never compromise our commitment to Israel's security, nor our support for its existence as a Jewish state," he said.

The United States also remains committed to the belief that the Palestinian people have a right to live with security and dignity in their own sovereign state, he said.

Now is the time for the entire international community to get behind the pursuit of peace in the area, Obama said. Israeli and Palestinian leaders are meeting. Current talks are focused on final status issues of borders and security, refugees and Jerusalem.

"So now the rest of us must be willing to take risks as well," the president said. "Friends of Israel, including the United States, must recognize that Israel's security as a Jewish and democratic state depends upon the realization of a Palestinian state, and we should say so clearly. Arab states, and those who supported the Palestinians, must recognize that stability will only be served through a two-state solution and a secure Israel."

The nations of the world must recognize that peace will be a powerful tool to defeat extremists throughout the region, and embolden those who are prepared to build a better future, Obama said.

Real breakthroughs on the Iranian nuclear program and Palestinian-Israeli peace would have a profound and positive impact on the entire Middle East and North Africa, the president said.

"But the current convulsions arising out of the Arab Spring remind us that a just and lasting peace cannot be measured only by agreements between nations," he said. "It must also be measured by our ability to resolve conflict and promote justice within nations. And by that measure, it's clear that all of us have a lot more work to do."

STATE DEPARTENT'S GOTTEMOELLER SPEAKS ON STRENGTHENING GLOBAL SECURITY

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Mobilizing Ingenuity to Strengthen Global Security
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
South by Southwest Conference (SXSW)
Austin, TX
March 8, 2013

Thank you so much for the introduction, Daniel and thank you all for being here. I’m really excited about being here in Austin at the South by Southwest Conference.

Now, I realize that being the government’s chief arms control negotiator might seem a little out of place here. What can the tech community do to help is get rid of the thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons still in the world? We worry about them getting into the hands of terrorists. Add to that the increased threat from chemical and biological agents – you can see the threat from CW in Syria -- and technologies that are easily switched from peaceful to threatening purposes. We have a big problem on our hands.

In truth, I came here for your help. The United States has laid out a comprehensive approach to dealing with these threats. But we need new ideas, and the information revolution is an obvious place to look. I hope you come away from this session energized to help us in our efforts to combat the threats of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

A Problem

Let me start by giving you a feel for our nuclear treaty verification problem. When signing our most recent treaty – New START – with the Russian Federation, the President said our next step would be to pursue reductions in all types of nuclear weapons, even nuclear weapons held in secret storage facilities. In the past, we focused on eliminating nuclear weapons on big missiles or bombers – items you could count from satellites in space. The idea was, eliminate the missile and you eliminate the threat of the warhead.

Now the President has said that is not good enough – if we’re worried terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weapons, we have to reduce and eliminate those weapons, even if they’re hidden away in storage. That is a big challenge for a nuclear arms controller: how can we monitor warheads, know where they are and that the other guys don’t have hidden stashes somewhere?

For bomb-making material, these challenges only increase. This stuff is portable and easy to hide. Major ports have radiation detectors, but these systems are very sensitive and can pick up the radioactivity coming from everyday items like bananas, kitty litter and porcelain toilets. Bet you didn’t know those things were radioactive.

For biological and chemical agents, the main problem comes from the dual-use nature of the work and technologies. How can we tell if work being done is good or bad? Or if we cannot, how do we build in activities to reassure people that the work being done is safe and peaceful?

So our goal is to devise and enhance systems for tracking and monitoring, as well as devise new ways to verify compliance with future agreements and treaties. Of course, as you who work in technology know, no system is ever 100% foolproof. To paraphrase Douglas Adams, foolproof systems tend to underestimate the ingenuity of complete fools and for that matter, highly-motivated cheaters.

How do we even come close to 100% verification? In the treaty context, we are looking for effective verification. Paul Nitze, a brilliant, esteemed national security expert and long-serving government official, explained effective verification as follows:

"[I]f the other side moves beyond the limits of the treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be able to detect such violations in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation."

That’s effective verification. Nitze’s definition has been and continues to be the benchmark for verifying arms control treaties. But the world is changing, as I’ve described, and with it, the nature of what we need to monitor and verify. To help us meet the challenges ahead, we need your help.

A Light Bulb

New information tools are popping up everywhere and their potential impact is magnified by the global connectivity of the Internet. Our new reality is a smaller, increasingly-networked world where the average citizen connects to other citizens in cyberspace hundreds of times each day. Today, any event, anywhere on the planet, could be broadcast globally in seconds. That means it is harder to hide things. When it is harder to hide things, it is easier to be caught. The neighborhood gaze is a powerful tool, and it can help us to verify the treaties and agreements we’ve created.

A New Plan

The way we at the State Department see it so far, there are two elements we are working with when it comes to incorporating the information age into WMD verification and monitoring – tools for inspectors and data acquisition and analysis.

Using Tools

First, it is already apparent that digital tools are revolutionizing the way diplomacy is conducted, much like the telegraph did in the 19th century. Email is a good example: it rapidly accelerated the pace of the negotiation of New START, in comparison with the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

Information technologies could also be useful in the hands of a WMD inspector. Smartphone and tablet apps could be created for the express purpose of aiding in the verification and monitoring process. For example, by having all safeguards and verification sensors in an inspected facility wirelessly connected through the cloud to the inspector’s tablet, he or she could note anomalies and flag specific items for closer inspections, as well as compare readings in real time and interpret them in context. In the 90’s, U.S. weapons inspectors in Russia had to be able to cross country ski to do their jobs. They had to ski around the perimeters of facilities searching for things – with the kinds of tablet apps I mentioned, perhaps we could make the cardio optional.

Using the Crowd

The second way we could incorporate the new tools of the information age into WMD verification and monitoring is by harnessing of the power of the crowd to generate data and then analyze it.

Already, critical information generated through social networking is being incorporated into local safety systems in the United States. RAVEN911—the Regional Asset Verification & Emergency Network—is a multilayer mapping tool that supports emergency first response in Cincinnati, Ohio and its regional neighbors. RAVEN911 uses live data feeds, geospatial imagery, and information gathered through Twitter and other public sources to provide details that cannot be shown on an everyday geographic map, such as the location of downed electric power lines and flooded roads. This helps emergency first responders get to where they need to go more quickly.

Sound far-fetched to extend such ideas to arms control? It shouldn’t. There are apps that can convert your smartphone camera into a radiation detector. Your tablet could help detect nuclear explosions! Tablets have tiny accelerometers installed – that’s what tells the tablet which way is up. But the accelerometers also have the capability to detect small earth tremors.

You can imagine a whole community of tablets, all containing an "earth tremor" app. Users are dispersed randomly around the country, their tablets connected to a centralized network. If the sensors all start shaking at once, you may have a natural occurrence – an earthquake – or you may have an illicit nuclear weapon test. Which is which would need to be confirmed with official sensors and analysis.

This kind of ubiquitous sensing I see as one of the most exciting areas for new arms control monitoring tools.

A Hitch?

So, we have a brand new set of exciting possibilities to pursue, but there is a hitch. For any of this to work, there are a lot of technical, legal, political, and diplomatic barriers ahead that would need to be overcome—never easy.

In the end, the goal of using information technology and social networks should add to our existing arms control monitoring and verification capabilities, not to supersede them.

A Challenge

Last summer, we launched our first Innovation in Arms Control Challenge and asked the American public, "How Can the Crowd Support Arms Control Transparency Efforts?" This challenge sought creative ideas from the public to use commonly available technologies to support arms control policy and education efforts.

We received interest from more than 500 people from across the United States with solutions that largely fell into four broad categories: smartphone apps, internet websites and games, sensor array schemes, and "big data" crunching.

Our first prize winner is Ms. Lovely Umayam, a graduate student from the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. She developed "Bombshelltoe", an online education platform that examines the intersection of culture and nuclear issues in order to facilitate better public understanding. Mr. Allan Childers, an Aerospace/Defense industry consultant from Florida, was a runner-up with his proposal for a mobile application that provides a platform for users to connect and interact, as well as a rewards program for sharing information on various arms agreement regimes. Dr. Rudolph "Chip" Mappus, a research scientist at Georgia Tech Research Institute working on computational neurology and brain-machine interfaces, was also a runner up. He proposed a geographically-based online game about verifying treaty compliance that experts and everyday citizens could play together.

This challenge was a first step focused on public education, and I am excited about the results and our prizewinners. This spring we’re preparing to launch a second Innovation in Arms Control Challenge that will ask the American public to design an information technology tool that can aid arms control inspections, so please stay tuned to www.state.gov on that front. We would love to get submissions from SxSW Interactive attendees!

A Pitch

So now I am eager to hear from you. As many of you are aware, there is a grand tradition of citizen science in this country – two of the greatest were among our earliest diplomats: Thomas Jefferson and Ben Franklin. I hope that this State Department tradition continues as we tackle these enormous challenges. Experts like you, particularly experts outside of the Beltway, can help us think bigger and bolder. It is sometimes strange to think that the government helped plant the seed of the information revolution, but at times seems to have no clue about how to harvest its rewards. That is why speaking to people like you is so important.

Thanks again for your attention and I would now love to take some questions and even better – to hear some ideas!

PARTNERSHIPS TO COMBAT THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THREAT

Photo:  ICBM Test.  Credit:  U.S. Air Force.
FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
New Partnerships for Combating the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Remarks Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Joseph Rotblat Memorial Lecture, Hay Festival
Hay-on-Wye, Wales, United Kingdom
June 10, 2012

“Above all, remember your humanity.” Sir Joseph Rotblat recalled these words from the 1955 Manifesto of Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein when he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995, on behalf of the International Pugwash Movement. For Jo, they reflected very well the frame of mind we must have when we confront the problem of nuclear weapons.

I was honored to know Joseph Rotblat, and these words have stuck with me. When we talk about creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, we are not talking about some remote utopia, we are talking about preventing the use of the most powerful weapon ever conceived by man. We are talking about protecting humanity.

The idea of a world free of nuclear weapons is nothing new. It was upon us almost as soon as scientists realized the feasibility of nuclear weapons. Sir Joseph was one of this community. As a leader of the Pugwash Movement, he was instrumental in making nuclear elimination a legitimate topic for policymakers around the world. When he was pushing for reductions at the height on the Cold War, Jo saw an opening for conversation – not one in English and Russian across the negotiating table, but one in the universal languages of math and science, a conversation among scientists. This open forum for scientific dialogue, which became the Pugwash Movement, led to some of the first arms control and nonproliferation treaties.

Through his work, Sir Joseph played a big role in making the goal of “zero” an acceptable goal of security policy. Two years after his death, four venerable Cold Warriors – former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Senator Sam Nunn – published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journalcalling for a world without nuclear weapons. The group, often called “the Four Horsemen” saw it as “a bold initiative consistent with America’s moral heritage.” Two years later, President Obama spoke to thousands of people in Prague, stating that the United States would seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. That speech was the foundation for what we in Washington call the Prague Agenda.

Even with the massive shift in accepting nuclear elimination as a policy worth pursuing, Sir Joseph warned us, “the Cold War is over, but Cold War thinking survives.” When it comes to the next steps in nuclear reductions, this is undoubtedly true. In order to dismantle this dangerous legacy, we have to change the way we think about these weapons. And we have to be ready to challenge our notions of how they might be eliminated.

We are entering unknown terrain. As we steadily reduce nuclear weapons toward zero, the more cheating matters. Consider, if you will: if a country can stash away just a few nuclear weapons while others continue to eliminate them, that country can spring a significant and dangerous surprise on the world community. To counter this possibility, we will need innovative approaches. Finally to achieve zero, we will need a truly global effort involving thousands and thousands of people. I am guessing you are asking yourself, “How on Earth can an ordinary person such as I help with a problem like this?”

Joseph Rotblat considered this challenge decades ago. He developed the concept called “societal verification,” which he defined as the involvement of whole communities in monitoring compliance with treaties, in contrast to using the highly specialized teams of experts such as we use to verify the New START Treaty. Sir Joseph argued that technological verification of the New START kind was sufficient for reducing arsenals to lower numbers. However, the prospect of a state clandestinely acquiring only a few nuclear weapons in a disarmed world requires greater confidence and verification. Sir Joseph believed societal verification would bring us this increased confidence. Such a societal regime, he said, would be essential in achieving the goal of zero.

Today, we have the information revolution to lend to this task, and Sir Joseph’s concept is closer to reality. Our enviornment today is a smaller, increasingly-networked world where the average citizen connects to others in cyberspace hundreds of times each day. We exchange and share ideas on a wide variety of topics. Citizens are armed with more information tools than ever before. Why should we not put this vast problem solving entity to good use?

Think about this: Any event, anywhere on the planet, has the potential now to be broadcast globally in mere seconds. The implications for arms control monitoring and verification are compelling. It is harder to hide things nowadays. When it is harder to hide things, it is easier to be caught. The neighborhood gaze is a powerful tool.

The Possibilities
Open source information technologies can improve arms control verification in at least two ways: either as a way of generating new information, or as analysis of information that already is out there.

Let me give you some examples, to give you an idea what I’m talking about.
In 2009, in recognition of the 40th anniversary of the Internet, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) held a competition where 10 red weather balloons were moored at visible fixed locations around the continental United States. The first team to identify the location of all 10 balloons won a sizable cash prize--$40,000. Over 4,300 teams composed of an estimated 2 million people from 25 countries took part in the challenge. A team from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology won the challenge, identifying all of the balloon locations in an astonishing time of 8 hours and 52 minutes. Of course, to win in such a short time or complete the challenge at all, the MIT team did not “find” the balloons themselves. They tapped into social networks using a unique incentive structure that not only incentivized people to identify a balloon location, but also incentivized people to recruit others to the team. Their win showed the enormous potential of social networking, and also demonstrated how incentives can motivate large populations to work toward a common goal.

Social networking is already being incorporated into local safety systems. RAVEN911—the Regional Asset Verification & Emergency Network—is a multilayer mapping tool that supports emergency first response in Cincinnati, Ohio. RAVEN911 uses live data feeds and intelligence gathered through Twitter to provide details that cannot be given on an everyday geographic map, such as the location of downed electric power lines and flooded roads. Authorities are cooperating with communities in Southwestern Ohio, Southeastern Indiana and Northern Kentucky to develop and implement this emergency management system, in order to help fire departments assess the risks and potential dangers before arriving on the scene of an accident. This open source system gives emergency responders a common operating picture, to better execute time critical activities, such as choosing evacuation routes out of flooded areas.

In addition to collecting useful data, the ability to identify patterns and trends in social networks could aid the arms control verification process. In the most basic sense, social media can draw attention to both routine and abnormal events. We may be able to mine Twitter data to understand where strange effluents are flowing, to recognize if a country has an illegal chemical weapons program; or to recognize unexpected patterns of industrial activity at a missile production plant. In this way, we may be able to ensure better compliance with existing arms control treaties and regimes such as the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The synergy is stunning: private citizens may contribute to monitoring for illicit weapons of mass destruction wherever they are found.

Now, how could approaches such as this work specifically in the arms control context? I’ve been thinking about the notion of verification challenges.

Let’s just imagine that a country, to establish its bona fides in a deep nuclear reduction environment, may wish to open itself to a verification challenge, recruiting its citizens and their i-Phones to help prove that it is not stashing extra missiles in the woods, for example, or a fissile material production reactor in the desert. Of course, some form of international supervision would likely be required, to ensure the legitimacy of the challenge and its procedures. And we would have to consider whether such a challenge could cope with especially covert environments, such as caves or deep underground facilities.


Sound far-fetched? Just consider that even today, tablets such as your iPad have tiny accelerometers installed – that’s what tells the tablet which way is up. But the accelerometers also have the capability of detecting small shakes, like an earth tremor.

Now, imagine a whole community of tablet users, all containing an “earth shake” app, dispersed randomly around the country, and connected into a centralized network node. An individual shake could be something as simple as bumping your iPad on a table. But a whole network of tablets, all shaking at virtually the same time? That tells you that something happened; knowing where all the tablets are and the exact time they started shaking can help you to geo-locate the event. It could be an earthquake, or it could be an illegal nuclear test. Of course, other sensors and analysis would have to be brought to bear to figure out the difference.

This is called “ubiquitous sensing,” that is, collecting data and basic analysis through sensors on smartphones and other mobile-computing devices. These sensors would allow citizens to contribute to detecting potential treaty violations, and could build a bridge to a stronger private-public partnership in the realm of treaty verification.

Would private citizens be willing to participate in such a community? We’ve never tried it in the arms control setting, but consider the SETI on-line community – the Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence community – with somewhere between 300,000 and 3 million active users worldwide. It may not be an accident that the scientist who proposed the tablet seismography concept to me is an astrophysicist who worked with SETI. He knows the value of citizen participation.

The Challenges Ahead
Of course, for any of this to work, there are technical, legal and political barriers ahead that would need to be overcome—no easy feat to be sure.
On the technical front, it would be necessary to work together to make sure nations cannot spoof or manipulate the public verification challenges that they devise. We also have to bear in mind there could be limitations based on the freedoms available to the citizens of a given country.

On the legal front, there are many questions that must be confronted about active vs. passive participation. How can we prevent governments from extracting information from citizens without their knowledge, or manipulating results collected in databases? Further, in some circumstances, how can active participants be sheltered from reproach by authorities? It may be possible, through careful handling and management, to mask sources, even if locations are public.

On the political front, we cannot assume that information will always be so readily available. As nations and private entities continue to debate the line between privacy and security, it is possible to imagine that we are living in a golden age of open source information that will be harder to take advantage of in future. In the end, the goal of using open source information technology and social networks should be to add to our existing arms control monitoring and verification capabilities, not to supersede them.

It is also important to remember that while we spend a lot of time focusing on nuclear weapons, the other weapons of mass destruction—particularly biological weapons—pose even greater challenges for arms control policy, because they are inherently dual use assets and, thus, difficult to disentangle from normal industrial or commercial processes. Here, too, we need creative thinking about how to facilitate transparency in the biotech sector without compromising sensitive research and industrial practices, or proprietary information.

Joining Forces
Even with the great ideas and fool-proof planning, another issue that we have to consider is how do we create, organize and, when necessary, fund efforts such as these. Developing partnerships among government, civil society groups, philanthropic organizations and private businesses will be the key to moving ahead.

These alliances, sometimes surprising and uncommon, can produce some extraordinary results. The makers of the first artificial heart worked with National Air and Space Administration ( NASA) engineers to develop the technology. Surgeons created arthroscopic methods for heart surgery by talking to engineers who fix jet engines.

We are now just starting to brainstorm about ideas for our partnerships in the arms control arena. The idea of public verification challenges needs developing by considering a straightforward question: Can a government actively enlist its public to help prove it is in compliance with its arms control and nonproliferation obligations?

Closing
Since this is an ideas festival, I have come to the right place. We need your ideas. We need your ideas if we are to take the dream of Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein, Sir Joseph Rotblat, and so many more, and turn it into reality. We need scientists, diplomats, teachers, religious leaders, soldiers and advocates working together, but most importantly, we need young people. Young adults finishing their undergraduate studies this year have lived their entire lives in the years since the Cold War ended, yet they have inherited thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons. We need to spur their interest–and creativity– in solving the problem of combating weapons of mass destruction. Approaching the rising generation on this issue through the lens of the information age may be one way to engage them. I do believe that our young will rise to the occasion and respond to President Obama’s words, spoken in Seoul earlier this year:

“I see the spirit we need in this endeavor -- an optimism that beats in the hearts of so many young people around the world. It’s that refusal to accept the world as it is, the imagination to see the world as it ought to be, and the courage to turn that vision into reality.”

I think he is right, and I intend to help them on their way.
Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to your questions.

STATE DEPARTMENT FACTS ABOUT THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME

FROM: U.S STATE DEPARTMENT                                           PHOTO:  U.S. AIR FORCE

Formed by the (then) G-7 industrialized countries in 1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal political understanding among states that seek to limit the proliferation of missiles and related technology; it is not a treaty. Since its creation, 27 additional countries have joined the MTCR, and many other countries have adhered unilaterally to the MTCR Guidelines or otherwise control exports of MTCR Annex items.
Originally focused on restricting exports of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and related technology, the Regime expanded its scope in 1993 to cover unmanned delivery systems capable of carrying all types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) -- chemical, biological, and nuclear. In 2002, the MTCR Partners (members) made terrorism an explicit focus of the Regime. Both of those steps were in direct support of the WMD nonproliferation objectives of the Biological Weapons Convention, Chemical Weapons Convention, and Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The MTCR seeks to limit the risks of proliferation of WMD by controlling transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons. More broadly, the MTCR Guidelines (export control policies) and Annex (list of export-controlled items) have become the international standard for responsible missile-related export behavior. The MTCR and its Annex were implicitly endorsed in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 of 2004, which affirms that the proliferation of WMD delivery means constitutes a threat to international peace and security and requires all UN Member States to establish domestic controls against such proliferation. The MTCR Annex also forms the basis of the list of missile-related items prohibited from being transferred to Iran under UNSCRs 1737 and 1929, and to North Korea under UNSCR 1718.
Over the course of the Regime’s 25-year history, the efforts of MTCR member countries have reduced the number of countries possessing missiles capable of delivering WMD, the global inventory of such missiles, and the number of countries interested in acquiring such missiles. The establishment by MTCR member and adherent countries of missile-related export controls has significantly reduced the availability to proliferators of support from the countries possessing the most and best technology. The export controls, information-sharing, and patterns of cooperation fostered by the MTCR also have resulted in the interdiction of numerous shipments of equipment intended for missile programs of concern. All of these measures have made it more difficult, time-consuming, and costly for proliferators to produce or acquire WMD capable missiles.

As it has done since 1987, the United States will continue to work through the MTCR to reduce the global missile proliferation threat by restraining the missile-related exports of an expanding number of countries and by increasing the pressure on proliferators to abandon their missile programs. The United States continues to encourage all non-member countries to support the MTCR’s efforts and to unilaterally abide by MTCR standards in the interest of international peace and security.

The MTCR currently has 34 members: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

STATE DEPARTMENT ON PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO MISSILE DEFENSE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
A U.S. State Department Perspective on the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense
Remarks Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Remarks to the Middle East Missile & Air Defense Symposium
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
April 12, 2012
As delivered
Thank you so much for inviting me to speak today. I am very pleased to have the opportunity to come to the United Arab Emirates to give remarks at this distinguished gathering of missile and air defense experts.

At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense policy issues, including missile defense. In that capacity, it was my responsibility to negotiate the details of the missile defense agreements with Poland, Romania and Turkey that will enable the United States to implement the missile defense plan for Europe that President Obama announced in September 2009 as a contribution to NATO missile defense. I will touch more on this later in my presentation, but suffice to say that I have been focused over the last couple of years on ensuring that we are able to meet the vision the President laid out in his 2009 announcement.

In my presentation today, I’d like to do two things. First, I would like to discuss some of the thinking behind the administration’s missile defense policy. Second, I’ll discuss how we are implementing that policy around the world.

Missile Defense Policy
Missile defense plays an important role in the broader U.S. international security strategy, supporting both deterrence and diplomacy. Missile defense assures our allies and partners that the United States has the will and the means to deter and, if necessary, defeat a limited ballistic missile attack against the U.S. homeland, our forward deployed troops, allies, and partners. Missile defense also may help constrain regional actors from trying to inhibit or disrupt the U.S. ability to come to the defense or assistance of its allies and partners.

The Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), released in February 2010, set out a new policy framework and committed the United States to pursue a phased adaptive approach (PAA) to missile defense within particular regions. The BMDR set out in detail the first regional application—in Europe. Much more recently, the President and Secretary of Defense announced in January of this year the U.S. Priorities for 21st Century Defense. This document provides strategic guidance to re-balance our efforts to emphasize the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions. It states, “U.S. policy will emphasize Gulf security, in collaboration with Gulf Cooperation Council countries when appropriate …” and also notes that “… Of particular concern are the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”

In its assessment of the threat, the BMDR noted that the threat from short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to our deployed forces, allies, and partners is growing, and this threat is likely to increase in both quantity and quality in the coming years. Many states are increasing their inventories, and making their ballistic missiles more accurate, reliable, mobile, and survivable. Trends in ballistic missiles show increased ranges, more advanced propellant systems, better protection from pre-launch attack, and the ability to counter BMD systems. The proliferation of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries in the region remains a source of concern as it could accelerate the development of more sophisticated systems.

Recognizing the seriousness of the ballistic missile threat, the United States seeks to create an environment, based on strong cooperation with allies and partners, which will eliminate an adversary’s confidence in the effectiveness of missile attacks and thereby devalue and provide a disincentive for the development, acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles. To that end, President Obama has made international cooperation on missile defense a key priority.

Recognizing that each region has unique deterrence and defense requirements due to differences in geography, history, and relationships, the United States is pursuing a region-by-region approach based on the following three principles:

First, the United States will deter adversaries through strong regional deterrence architectures built upon solid cooperative relationships with an eye toward efficiently incorporating assets and structures that our partners already have today or are seeking.

Second, the United States will pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) within key regions that is tailored to the threats unique to that region, including the scale, scope, and pace of their development, and the capabilities available and most suited for deployment. This approach means we will phase in and implement the best available technology to meet existing and evolving threats, and adapt to situations that evolve in an unforeseen manner.

Third, in order to meet a global demand for missile defense assets that will continue to exceed supply, the United States will develop mobile capabilities that can be relocated to adapt to a changing threat, or provide surge defense capabilities where they are most needed.

Missile defense is an integral part of a comprehensive U.S. effort to strengthen regional deterrence architectures. As I mentioned, this plays a central role in the new strategic guidance the Department of Defense released in January 2012.

Europe
Let me now discuss our efforts in Europe, which have received a great deal of attention. In order to augment the defense of the United States and provide more comprehensive and more rapid BMD protection to our European Allies and U.S. deployed forces, in 2009 President Obama outlined a four-phase implementation plan for European defense. Through the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), the United States will deploy increasingly capable BMD assets to defend European population and territory against a ballistic missile threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic area that is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively. At the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon Allies welcomed the EPAA as the U.S. contribution to the NATO missile defense capability.

Our NATO Allies also have systems that they can contribute to the collective defense. Some of our Allies, for example, have Aegis ships with advanced sensor capabilities that could provide valuable contributions even without SM-3 interceptors. Our Allies also possess other land- and sea-based sensors that could be linked into the system, as well as lower tier systems, such as PATRIOT, that can be integrated and used to provide point defense.

EPAA Phase 1 gained its first operational elements in 2011 with the start of a sustained deployment of an Aegis BMD-capable multi-role ship to the Mediterranean. The deployment of an AN/TPY-2 missile defense radar in Turkey was the other key part of EPAA Phase 1.

For Phase 2 of the EPAA, we have an agreement with Romania to host a U.S. land-based SM-3 interceptor site beginning in the 2015 timeframe. This site would provide protection against medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.
We also have an agreement with Poland to place a similar U.S. SM-3 interceptor site there in the 2018 timeframe for Phase 3 of the EPAA.
Finally, with respect to Phase 4, the Department of Defense has begun concept development of a more advanced interceptor for deployment in the 2020 timeframe that will enhance our ability to counter medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and potential future ICBM threats to the United States from the Middle East.

Russia
An update on missile defense should also include a mention of our efforts to pursue cooperation with Russia. Missile defense cooperation with Russia is a Presidential priority, and we believe it is in everyone’s interest. When President Obama announced his new vision for missile defense in Europe in September 2009, he stated that “we welcome Russia’s cooperation to bring its missile defense capabilities into a broader defense of our common strategic interests.” Missile defense cooperation with Russia will not only strengthen our bilateral and NATO-Russia relationships, but could enhance NATO’s missile defense capabilities. Successful missile defense cooperation would provide concrete benefits to Russia, our NATO Allies, and the United States and will strengthen - not weaken – strategic stability over the long term.

This means getting Russia inside the missile defense tent now, working alongside the United States and NATO, while we are in the early stages of our efforts. This way Russia will be able to see NATO missile defense with its own eyes. Close cooperation with the United States and NATO by Russia is the best and most enduring way for it to gain the assurance that European missile defenses do not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent. Through this cooperation, Russia would see firsthand that this system is designed for the threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, and that NATO missile defense systems will not threaten Russia’s strategic nuclear capabilities. This cooperation is essential to convince Russia that the NATO system does not undermine Russian strategic deterrence. Cooperation will also allow Russia to see that the EPAA is designed to be flexible. Should the ballistic missile threat from nations like Iran change, increasing or decreasing, our missile defense system can be adapted accordingly.

Russia has raised the issue of a legal guarantee with a set of “military-technical criteria” that could, in effect, create limitations on our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems. We certainly cannot accept limitations on our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our Aegis ships. These are multi-mission ships that are used for a variety of purposes around the world, not just for missile defense. We also will NOT accept limitations on the capabilities, and numbers of our missile defense systems. We would be willing to agree to a political framework including a statement that our missile defenses are not directed at Russia. In fact, this is what we have been saying all along: any statement will be politically binding and it would publicly proclaim our intent to cooperate and chart the direction for cooperation, not limitations. Our cooperation with Russia will not come at the expense of our plans to defend against regional ballistic missile threats or for the defense of the U.S. homeland.

Asia-Pacific
In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States is committed to working with our allies and partners to strengthen stability and security in the region.
Japan is one of our closest allies, a leader in missile defense within the region, and one of the United States’ closest BMD partners. The United States and Japan have made significant strides in interoperability. The United States and Japan regularly train together, and our forces have successfully executed cooperative BMD operations. Japan has acquired a layered integrated BMD system that includes Aegis BMD ships with Standard Missile 3 interceptors, Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) fire units, early warning radars, and a command and control system. We also worked cooperatively to deploy a forward-based X-band radar in Japan. One of our most significant cooperative efforts is the co-development of a next-generation SM-3 interceptor, called the Block IIA. This co-development program represents not only an area of significant technical cooperation but also the basis for enhanced operational cooperation to strengthen regional security.
The Republic of Korea (ROK) is also a key U.S. ally and, recognizing the North Korean missile threat, the United States stands ready to work with the ROK to strengthen its BMD capabilities. We are working together to define possible future ROK BMD requirements and the United States looks forward to taking further steps to build upon this ongoing missile defense cooperation.

Australia signed a BMD Framework MOU with the U.S. in July 2004, making it one of the first U.S. partners on BMD. Australia has been a strong supporter of bilateral technology cooperation with the United States and the Nimble Titan series of multilateral missile defense wargames. We continue to consult with Australia bilaterally regarding missile defense cooperation. Similar to some of our Allies in Europe, Australia has a class of surface combatants – the Air Warfare Destroyer – that uses the Aegis Combat System that could be upgraded in the future to provide a missile defense capability.

The Middle East
I am sure that today’s audience is most interested in our missile defense cooperation in the Middle East. In this region, the United States has had a continuous missile defense presence and seeks to strengthen cooperation with its partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The importance of this issue was demonstrated by the prominence it received by Secretary Clinton and her GCC counterparts in the first ministerial meeting of the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum in Riyadh on March 31 of this year. A number of states in the region already deploy PATRIOT batteries and are exploring purchases of some missile defense capabilities under the auspices of the foreign military sales (FMS) program.

The UAE continues to be a leader in the field of ballistic missile defense. On December 25, 2011, the UAE became the first international partner to purchase the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or “THAAD,” system from the United States. This robust area defense capability, in conjunction with the acquisition of PAC-3 point defense systems, will provide the UAE with a layered missile defense capability, ensure interoperability with United States forces, and contribute to regional stability. These purchases highlight the strong ties and common strategic interests between the United States and the UAE.
As our partners acquire greater missile defense capabilities, the United States will work to promote interoperability and information sharing among the GCC states. This will allow for more efficient missile defenses and could lead to greater security cooperation in the region. As Secretary of State Clinton said in Riyadh at the GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, “we believe strongly that, in addition to the bilateral military cooperation between the United States and every member nation of the GCC, we can do even more to defend the Gulf through cooperation on ballistic missile defense.”

In sync with our BMD cooperation goals, we’re also working hard to prevent missile proliferation. The U.S. actively participates in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which serves as the global standard for controlling the transfer of equipment, software, and technology that could make a contribution to the development of WMD-capable missile and unmanned aerial vehicle delivery systems. We are also working through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and other counter-proliferation activities to help partners improve their ability to stop shipments of proliferation concern. These are just some of our ongoing efforts to tackle the missile threat and prevent missile proliferation. While much of this work is performed quietly, the impact of all of these efforts is of crucial importance to international peace and security.

Conclusion
While the title “Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense” is perhaps a new conceptual way of thinking about our efforts in Asia and the Middle East, our partnerships in missile and air defense are certainly not new. Our cooperation here in the Middle East has been strong, and continues to be dynamic and productive. As we continue to strengthen cooperation here, we know there is a strong foundation to build on. We welcome your thoughts on how this can all be done in a regional context that bolsters regional stability. We believe that better insights into each other’s operational concepts and the possibility of greater interoperability are a few of the key elements of this endeavor.

The January 2012 “Priorities for the 21st Century Defense” make it clear that we will be rebalancing our efforts to emphasize the Middle East. Over the coming months, I would hope that we will be able to offer more details on those efforts, particularly as they apply to ballistic missile defense.

The increasing threat associated with the proliferation of ballistic missiles reinforces the importance of continuing and strengthening our collaborative missile defense efforts. However, beyond bilateral cooperation, we need to develop regional missile defense architectures that will enable us to leverage our bilateral cooperation so that nations share BMD-related information and capabilities on a multilateral basis. While we think about what a phased adaptive approach would look like in the Middle East, we recognize that each region has unique factors that will likely shape our approach in ways that are different from our approach in other regions. Each region has unique threats, capabilities, history, and geography. Our allies and partners in the Middle East have their own BMD assets, their own ways of integrating them into their defense structures and each of our efforts brings different advantages to the missile defense table. We need to work together to determine how we can fully leverage those advantages to protect ourselves.
Thank you for your time and attention. I look forward to your questions.