Showing posts with label MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY. Show all posts
Showing posts with label MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 4, 2012

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL REMARKS ON MISSILE DEFENSE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY



Photo:  Missile Launch.  Credit:  U.S. DOD.
FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Missile Defense and European Security
Remarks Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance8th International Conference on Missile Defence
Paris, France
July 3, 2012
Thank you so much for inviting me to speak today. This venue provides an opportunity for constructive dialogue on missile defense, and in this context, I will share an update on the U.S. approach to missile defense. At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense policy issues, including missile defense. In that capacity, it was my responsibility to negotiate the details of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) agreements with Poland, Romania, and Turkey that will enable the United States to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach, the U.S. contribution to NATO missile defense. I will touch more on this later in my presentation, but suffice to say that I have been focused over the last couple of years on ensuring that we are able to meet the vision President Obama laid out in his 2009 announcement regarding the European Phased Adaptive Approach.

Missile Defense Policy
Today, there is a growing threat from short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to our deployed forces, allies, and partners. This threat is likely to increase in both quantitative and qualitative terms in the coming years, as some states are increasing their inventories, and making their ballistic missiles more accurate, reliable, and survivable.

Recognizing the seriousness of the ballistic missile threat, the United States seeks to create an environment, based on strong cooperation with allies and partners, which will diminish an adversary’s confidence in the effectiveness of ballistic missile attacks. This will devalue ballistic missiles and provide a disincentive for their development, acquisition, deployment, and use. To that end, President Obama has made international cooperation on missile defense a key priority, and we are pursuing a region-by-region approach based on the following three principles:

1) First, the United States will strengthen regional deterrence architectures built upon solid cooperative relationships with an eye toward efficiently incorporating assets and structures that our partners already have today or are seeking.

2) Second, the United States is pursuing phased adaptive approaches (PAAs) to missile defense within key regions that are tailored to their unique deterrence requirements and threats, including the scale, scope, and pace of their development, and the capabilities available and most suited for deployment. Specifically, we will phase in the best available technology to meet existing and evolving threats, and adapt to situations that evolve in the future.

3) Third, recognizing that our supply of missile defense assets cannot meet the global demand we face, the United States is developing mobile capabilities that can be relocated to adapt to a changing threat and provide surge defense capabilities where they are most needed.

Missile defense plays an important role in the broader U.S. international security strategy, supporting both deterrence and diplomacy. Missile defense assures our allies and partners that the United States has the will and the means to deter and, if necessary, defeat a limited ballistic missile attack against the U.S. homeland and regional ballistic missile attacks against our deployed forces, allies, and partners.

NATO and European Missile Defense
Today I will focus on our work in Europe, which continues to receive a great deal of attention. In order to augment the defense of the United States against a future long-range threat and provide more comprehensive and more rapid protection to our deployed forces and European Allies against the current short- and medium- range threat, President Obama outlined a four-phase approach for European missile defense called the European Phased Adaptive Approach or EPAA. Through the EPAA, the United States will deploy increasingly capable BMD assets to defend Europe against a ballistic missile threat from the Middle East that is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The EPAA is designed to protect our deployed forces and Allies in Europe, as well as improve protection of the U.S. homeland against potential ICBMs from the Middle East. As part of Phase 1, we have deployed to Turkey a missile defense radar, referred to as the AN/TPY-2 radar in support of NATO’s common missile defense efforts. Also, as part of Phase 1, the United States deployed a BMD-capable Aegis ship to the Mediterranean Sea in March of 2011, and has maintained a BMD-capable ship presence in the region ever since.

Slightly more than a year ago, we reached an agreement with Romania to host a U.S. land-based SM-3 BMD interceptor site, designed to extend missile defense protection to a greater portion of Europe. The land-based SM-3 system to be deployed to Romania is anticipated to become operational in the 2015 timeframe. We also reached an agreement with Poland to place a similar U.S. BMD interceptor site there in the 2018 timeframe, which will extend missile defense protection to all of NATO Europe. Spain has also agreed to host four U.S. Aegis destroyers at the existing naval facility at Rota. These multi-mission ships will support the EPAA as well as other EUCOM and NATO maritime missions.

The Obama Administration is implementing the EPAA within the NATO context. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government approved a new Strategic Concept and took the historic decision to develop the capability to defend NATO European populations and territory against the increasing threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation. The Allies also welcomed the EPAA as a U.S. national contribution to the new NATO territorial missile defense capability, in support of our commitment to the collective defense of the Alliance under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

At the Lisbon Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government also decided to expand the scope of the NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program to serve as the command, control, and communications network to support this new capability. NATO allies have committed to investing over $1 billion for command, control, and communications infrastructure to support NATO missile defense. NATO’s plan for missile defense is based on the principle that individual Allies will make voluntary national contributions of the sensors and interceptor systems, BMD capabilities that will be integrated into the NATO ALTBMD C2 backbone. As with any national contribution, Allies are responsible for the costs associated with their own contributions. NATO agreed at Chicago that only the command and control systems of ALTBMD and their expansion to territorial defense are eligible for common funding.

On May 20-21, the NATO Heads of State and Government met in Chicago for the NATO Summit and announced that NATO has achieved an interim BMD capability. This means that the Alliance has an operationally meaningful standing peacetime ballistic missile defense capability. NATO also agreed on the command and control procedures for ballistic missile defense, designated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) as the commander for this mission, and demonstrated an interoperable command and control capability. As with all of NATO’s operations, full political control by Allies over military actions undertaken pursuant to Interim Capability will be ensured.

To support this interim BMD capability, the United States will offer EPAA assets to the Alliance as voluntary national contributions to the BMD mission, and will welcome contributions by other Allies. For example, President Obama announced in Chicago that he has directed the transfer of the AN/TPY-2 radar deployed in Turkey to NATO operational control. The EPAA also includes BMD-capable Aegis ships that can perform many roles besides BMD. U.S. missile defense-capable ships in Europe are able to operate under NATO operational control when necessary.

These decisions have created a framework for Allies to contribute and optimize their own BMD assets for our collective defense, and the United States welcomes contributions from other Allies. We believe that NATO missile defense will be more effective should Allies decide to provide sensors and interceptors to complement the U.S. EPAA contributions. If Allies should decide to develop their own missile defense capabilities, that would create significant opportunities for European industries. In short, there is absolutely no requirement or assumption that NATO missile defense will be “made in the USA.” The only requirement is that the systems contributed by Allies be interoperable with NATO's missile defense command and control capability. Several NATO Allies possess land- and sea-based sensors that could be linked into the system, as well as lower tier systems that can be integrated and used to provide point defense. For example, the Netherlands has indicated that it will spend close to 250 million Euros to modify the radars on its frigates to detect and track ballistic missiles at long ranges and has indicated it will contribute its Patriot BMD systems to the NATO missile defense mission. There are potentially many more opportunities for joint development and procurement.

Russia
An update on missile defense cooperation with Europe should also include a discussion of our efforts to pursue cooperation with the Russian Federation. Missile defense cooperation with Russia is a Presidential priority, as it has been for several Administrations going back to President George H.W. Bush in the early 1990s.

When President Obama announced his new vision for missile defense in Europe in September 2009, he stated that “we welcome Russia’s cooperation to bring its missile defense capabilities into a broader defense of our common strategic interests.” Missile defense cooperation with Russia will not only strengthen our bilateral and NATO-Russia relationships, but also could enhance NATO’s missile defense capabilities. Successful missile defense cooperation would provide concrete benefits to Russia, our NATO Allies, and the United States and will strengthen – not weaken – strategic stability over the long term.

This means it is important to get the Russian Federation inside the missile defense tent now, working alongside the United States and NATO, while we are in the early stages of our efforts. Close cooperation between Russia and the United States and NATO is the best and most enduring way for Russia to gain the assurance that European missile defenses cannot and will not undermine its strategic deterrent.
Russia is not being asked to blindly trust us. Through cooperation, Russia would see firsthand that this system is designed for the ballistic missile threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, and that NATO missile defense systems will not undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent capabilities. Cooperation would send a strong message to proliferators that the United States, NATO, and Russia are working together to counter their efforts.

That said, Russia has raised the issue of wanting a legal guarantee with a set of “military-technical criteria” that could, in effect, create limitations on our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems against regional ballistic missile threats such as those presented by Iran and North Korea. We have made it clear that we cannot and will not accept limitations on our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our BMD-capable Aegis ships. These are multi-mission ships that are used for a variety of purposes around the world, not just for missile defense.

While we seek to develop ways to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, it is important to remember that under the terms of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO alone bears responsibility for defending the Alliance from the ballistic missile threat. This is why the United States and NATO cannot agree to Russia’s proposal for “sectoral” missile defense. Just as Russia must ensure the defense of Russian territory, NATO must ensure the defense of NATO territory. NATO cannot and will not outsource its Article 5 commitments.

We would, however, be willing to agree to a political framework for cooperation that includes a statement that our missile defenses are not oriented toward Russia. Any such statement would publicly proclaim our intent to work together and chart the direction for cooperation.

During the G-20 Meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico, President Obama and President Putin announced in their June 18 Joint Statement that “despite differences in assessments, we have agreed to continue a joint search for solutions to challenges in the field of missile defense.”

The United States looks forward to continuing discussions with the Russian Federation to develop a mutually agreed framework for missile defense cooperation.

I want to close by noting the obvious which is that the worst-case scenario for dealing with missile threats is after a missile has launched. We are taking several steps diplomatically to counter missile proliferation and address missile programs of concern. We are working with the other 33 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Partners to create the global standard for controlling the transfer of equipment, software, and technology that could make a contribution to rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles. We also are working to support the efforts of the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), and are working through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to help partners improve their ability to stop shipments of proliferation concern. Those are just some of the efforts that are ongoing to address missile threats, and while we do this work quietly, these efforts are having an impact.

Conclusion
Let me conclude by saying that today’s ballistic missile threats continue to increase in number and sophistication. This increasing threat reinforces the importance of our collaborative missile defense efforts with allies and partners around the world, which not only strengthen regional stability, but also provide protection for our forces serving abroad and augment the defense of the United States.
Thank you for your time and attention.

Friday, April 13, 2012

STATE DEPARTMENT ON PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO MISSILE DEFENSE


FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
A U.S. State Department Perspective on the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense
Remarks Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Remarks to the Middle East Missile & Air Defense Symposium
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
April 12, 2012
As delivered
Thank you so much for inviting me to speak today. I am very pleased to have the opportunity to come to the United Arab Emirates to give remarks at this distinguished gathering of missile and air defense experts.

At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense policy issues, including missile defense. In that capacity, it was my responsibility to negotiate the details of the missile defense agreements with Poland, Romania and Turkey that will enable the United States to implement the missile defense plan for Europe that President Obama announced in September 2009 as a contribution to NATO missile defense. I will touch more on this later in my presentation, but suffice to say that I have been focused over the last couple of years on ensuring that we are able to meet the vision the President laid out in his 2009 announcement.

In my presentation today, I’d like to do two things. First, I would like to discuss some of the thinking behind the administration’s missile defense policy. Second, I’ll discuss how we are implementing that policy around the world.

Missile Defense Policy
Missile defense plays an important role in the broader U.S. international security strategy, supporting both deterrence and diplomacy. Missile defense assures our allies and partners that the United States has the will and the means to deter and, if necessary, defeat a limited ballistic missile attack against the U.S. homeland, our forward deployed troops, allies, and partners. Missile defense also may help constrain regional actors from trying to inhibit or disrupt the U.S. ability to come to the defense or assistance of its allies and partners.

The Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), released in February 2010, set out a new policy framework and committed the United States to pursue a phased adaptive approach (PAA) to missile defense within particular regions. The BMDR set out in detail the first regional application—in Europe. Much more recently, the President and Secretary of Defense announced in January of this year the U.S. Priorities for 21st Century Defense. This document provides strategic guidance to re-balance our efforts to emphasize the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions. It states, “U.S. policy will emphasize Gulf security, in collaboration with Gulf Cooperation Council countries when appropriate …” and also notes that “… Of particular concern are the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”

In its assessment of the threat, the BMDR noted that the threat from short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to our deployed forces, allies, and partners is growing, and this threat is likely to increase in both quantity and quality in the coming years. Many states are increasing their inventories, and making their ballistic missiles more accurate, reliable, mobile, and survivable. Trends in ballistic missiles show increased ranges, more advanced propellant systems, better protection from pre-launch attack, and the ability to counter BMD systems. The proliferation of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries in the region remains a source of concern as it could accelerate the development of more sophisticated systems.

Recognizing the seriousness of the ballistic missile threat, the United States seeks to create an environment, based on strong cooperation with allies and partners, which will eliminate an adversary’s confidence in the effectiveness of missile attacks and thereby devalue and provide a disincentive for the development, acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles. To that end, President Obama has made international cooperation on missile defense a key priority.

Recognizing that each region has unique deterrence and defense requirements due to differences in geography, history, and relationships, the United States is pursuing a region-by-region approach based on the following three principles:

First, the United States will deter adversaries through strong regional deterrence architectures built upon solid cooperative relationships with an eye toward efficiently incorporating assets and structures that our partners already have today or are seeking.

Second, the United States will pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) within key regions that is tailored to the threats unique to that region, including the scale, scope, and pace of their development, and the capabilities available and most suited for deployment. This approach means we will phase in and implement the best available technology to meet existing and evolving threats, and adapt to situations that evolve in an unforeseen manner.

Third, in order to meet a global demand for missile defense assets that will continue to exceed supply, the United States will develop mobile capabilities that can be relocated to adapt to a changing threat, or provide surge defense capabilities where they are most needed.

Missile defense is an integral part of a comprehensive U.S. effort to strengthen regional deterrence architectures. As I mentioned, this plays a central role in the new strategic guidance the Department of Defense released in January 2012.

Europe
Let me now discuss our efforts in Europe, which have received a great deal of attention. In order to augment the defense of the United States and provide more comprehensive and more rapid BMD protection to our European Allies and U.S. deployed forces, in 2009 President Obama outlined a four-phase implementation plan for European defense. Through the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), the United States will deploy increasingly capable BMD assets to defend European population and territory against a ballistic missile threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic area that is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively. At the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon Allies welcomed the EPAA as the U.S. contribution to the NATO missile defense capability.

Our NATO Allies also have systems that they can contribute to the collective defense. Some of our Allies, for example, have Aegis ships with advanced sensor capabilities that could provide valuable contributions even without SM-3 interceptors. Our Allies also possess other land- and sea-based sensors that could be linked into the system, as well as lower tier systems, such as PATRIOT, that can be integrated and used to provide point defense.

EPAA Phase 1 gained its first operational elements in 2011 with the start of a sustained deployment of an Aegis BMD-capable multi-role ship to the Mediterranean. The deployment of an AN/TPY-2 missile defense radar in Turkey was the other key part of EPAA Phase 1.

For Phase 2 of the EPAA, we have an agreement with Romania to host a U.S. land-based SM-3 interceptor site beginning in the 2015 timeframe. This site would provide protection against medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.
We also have an agreement with Poland to place a similar U.S. SM-3 interceptor site there in the 2018 timeframe for Phase 3 of the EPAA.
Finally, with respect to Phase 4, the Department of Defense has begun concept development of a more advanced interceptor for deployment in the 2020 timeframe that will enhance our ability to counter medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and potential future ICBM threats to the United States from the Middle East.

Russia
An update on missile defense should also include a mention of our efforts to pursue cooperation with Russia. Missile defense cooperation with Russia is a Presidential priority, and we believe it is in everyone’s interest. When President Obama announced his new vision for missile defense in Europe in September 2009, he stated that “we welcome Russia’s cooperation to bring its missile defense capabilities into a broader defense of our common strategic interests.” Missile defense cooperation with Russia will not only strengthen our bilateral and NATO-Russia relationships, but could enhance NATO’s missile defense capabilities. Successful missile defense cooperation would provide concrete benefits to Russia, our NATO Allies, and the United States and will strengthen - not weaken – strategic stability over the long term.

This means getting Russia inside the missile defense tent now, working alongside the United States and NATO, while we are in the early stages of our efforts. This way Russia will be able to see NATO missile defense with its own eyes. Close cooperation with the United States and NATO by Russia is the best and most enduring way for it to gain the assurance that European missile defenses do not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent. Through this cooperation, Russia would see firsthand that this system is designed for the threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, and that NATO missile defense systems will not threaten Russia’s strategic nuclear capabilities. This cooperation is essential to convince Russia that the NATO system does not undermine Russian strategic deterrence. Cooperation will also allow Russia to see that the EPAA is designed to be flexible. Should the ballistic missile threat from nations like Iran change, increasing or decreasing, our missile defense system can be adapted accordingly.

Russia has raised the issue of a legal guarantee with a set of “military-technical criteria” that could, in effect, create limitations on our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems. We certainly cannot accept limitations on our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our Aegis ships. These are multi-mission ships that are used for a variety of purposes around the world, not just for missile defense. We also will NOT accept limitations on the capabilities, and numbers of our missile defense systems. We would be willing to agree to a political framework including a statement that our missile defenses are not directed at Russia. In fact, this is what we have been saying all along: any statement will be politically binding and it would publicly proclaim our intent to cooperate and chart the direction for cooperation, not limitations. Our cooperation with Russia will not come at the expense of our plans to defend against regional ballistic missile threats or for the defense of the U.S. homeland.

Asia-Pacific
In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States is committed to working with our allies and partners to strengthen stability and security in the region.
Japan is one of our closest allies, a leader in missile defense within the region, and one of the United States’ closest BMD partners. The United States and Japan have made significant strides in interoperability. The United States and Japan regularly train together, and our forces have successfully executed cooperative BMD operations. Japan has acquired a layered integrated BMD system that includes Aegis BMD ships with Standard Missile 3 interceptors, Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) fire units, early warning radars, and a command and control system. We also worked cooperatively to deploy a forward-based X-band radar in Japan. One of our most significant cooperative efforts is the co-development of a next-generation SM-3 interceptor, called the Block IIA. This co-development program represents not only an area of significant technical cooperation but also the basis for enhanced operational cooperation to strengthen regional security.
The Republic of Korea (ROK) is also a key U.S. ally and, recognizing the North Korean missile threat, the United States stands ready to work with the ROK to strengthen its BMD capabilities. We are working together to define possible future ROK BMD requirements and the United States looks forward to taking further steps to build upon this ongoing missile defense cooperation.

Australia signed a BMD Framework MOU with the U.S. in July 2004, making it one of the first U.S. partners on BMD. Australia has been a strong supporter of bilateral technology cooperation with the United States and the Nimble Titan series of multilateral missile defense wargames. We continue to consult with Australia bilaterally regarding missile defense cooperation. Similar to some of our Allies in Europe, Australia has a class of surface combatants – the Air Warfare Destroyer – that uses the Aegis Combat System that could be upgraded in the future to provide a missile defense capability.

The Middle East
I am sure that today’s audience is most interested in our missile defense cooperation in the Middle East. In this region, the United States has had a continuous missile defense presence and seeks to strengthen cooperation with its partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The importance of this issue was demonstrated by the prominence it received by Secretary Clinton and her GCC counterparts in the first ministerial meeting of the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum in Riyadh on March 31 of this year. A number of states in the region already deploy PATRIOT batteries and are exploring purchases of some missile defense capabilities under the auspices of the foreign military sales (FMS) program.

The UAE continues to be a leader in the field of ballistic missile defense. On December 25, 2011, the UAE became the first international partner to purchase the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or “THAAD,” system from the United States. This robust area defense capability, in conjunction with the acquisition of PAC-3 point defense systems, will provide the UAE with a layered missile defense capability, ensure interoperability with United States forces, and contribute to regional stability. These purchases highlight the strong ties and common strategic interests between the United States and the UAE.
As our partners acquire greater missile defense capabilities, the United States will work to promote interoperability and information sharing among the GCC states. This will allow for more efficient missile defenses and could lead to greater security cooperation in the region. As Secretary of State Clinton said in Riyadh at the GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, “we believe strongly that, in addition to the bilateral military cooperation between the United States and every member nation of the GCC, we can do even more to defend the Gulf through cooperation on ballistic missile defense.”

In sync with our BMD cooperation goals, we’re also working hard to prevent missile proliferation. The U.S. actively participates in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which serves as the global standard for controlling the transfer of equipment, software, and technology that could make a contribution to the development of WMD-capable missile and unmanned aerial vehicle delivery systems. We are also working through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and other counter-proliferation activities to help partners improve their ability to stop shipments of proliferation concern. These are just some of our ongoing efforts to tackle the missile threat and prevent missile proliferation. While much of this work is performed quietly, the impact of all of these efforts is of crucial importance to international peace and security.

Conclusion
While the title “Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense” is perhaps a new conceptual way of thinking about our efforts in Asia and the Middle East, our partnerships in missile and air defense are certainly not new. Our cooperation here in the Middle East has been strong, and continues to be dynamic and productive. As we continue to strengthen cooperation here, we know there is a strong foundation to build on. We welcome your thoughts on how this can all be done in a regional context that bolsters regional stability. We believe that better insights into each other’s operational concepts and the possibility of greater interoperability are a few of the key elements of this endeavor.

The January 2012 “Priorities for the 21st Century Defense” make it clear that we will be rebalancing our efforts to emphasize the Middle East. Over the coming months, I would hope that we will be able to offer more details on those efforts, particularly as they apply to ballistic missile defense.

The increasing threat associated with the proliferation of ballistic missiles reinforces the importance of continuing and strengthening our collaborative missile defense efforts. However, beyond bilateral cooperation, we need to develop regional missile defense architectures that will enable us to leverage our bilateral cooperation so that nations share BMD-related information and capabilities on a multilateral basis. While we think about what a phased adaptive approach would look like in the Middle East, we recognize that each region has unique factors that will likely shape our approach in ways that are different from our approach in other regions. Each region has unique threats, capabilities, history, and geography. Our allies and partners in the Middle East have their own BMD assets, their own ways of integrating them into their defense structures and each of our efforts brings different advantages to the missile defense table. We need to work together to determine how we can fully leverage those advantages to protect ourselves.
Thank you for your time and attention. I look forward to your questions.



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