READOUT: PRESIDENT OBAMA'S CALL WITH CHANCELLOR MERKEL REGARDING GREECE AND THE EUROZONE

FROM:  THE WHITE HOUSE
Readout of the President’s Call with Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany

The President spoke today with Chancellor Merkel of Germany regarding developments in Greece.  The two leaders agreed that it was critically important to make every effort to return to a path that will allow Greece to resume reforms and growth within the Eurozone. The leaders affirmed that their respective economic teams are carefully monitoring the situation and will remain in close touch.  The President also offered his condolences for the loss of German citizens in Friday’s tragic attack in Tunisia.

U.S.-GREECE DISCUSS DEFENSE ISSUES

FROM:  U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

Right:  Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Christine E. Wormuth welcomes Greece's Minister of Defense Panos Kammenos to the Pentagon May 20, 2015. During their meeting, Wormuth and Kammenos discussed security and defense issues of mutual concern, including trans-Mediterranean migration, terrorism, the Balkans, Libya, the Middle East, and Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine. DoD photo. 

Leaders Discuss U.S.-Greece Security, Defense Issues

DoD News, Defense Media Activity

WASHINGTON, May 21, 2015 – Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Christine E. Wormuth met yesterday with Greece's Minister of Defense Panos Kammenos at the Pentagon to discuss security and defense issues of mutual concern, according to a DoD news release.

Those issues included trans-Mediterranean migration, terrorism, Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine, the Balkans, Libya, and the Middle East, the release said. Wormuth thanked Greece for hosting U.S. forces at Souda Bay, Crete, and for its participation in operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, according to the release.

Greece's Support in Opposing ISIL

Wormuth also noted the important support Greece is providing the coalition in opposing the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the release added. She and Kammenos agreed that the security situation along NATO's southern flank is a growing concern and called for NATO to develop a southern strategy.

She also conveyed that Secretary of Defense Ash Carter is looking forward to working with Kammenos at the NATO Ministerial next month, the release said.

SECRETARY KERRY'S REMARKS WITH GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER NIKOS KOTZIAS

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Remarks With Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias
Remarks
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Treaty Room
Washington, DC
April 20, 2015

SECRETARY KERRY: Good afternoon, all. It’s my pleasure to welcome the Foreign Minister Kotzias of Greece. I think everybody knows what incredible, strong, and long ties the United States has with Greece, and obviously Greek-Americans make an enormous contribution to our country. We have a very large Greek-American community in the state I was privileged to represent in the Senate in Massachusetts, but in many parts of our country – New York, California, elsewhere.

So we have strong ties and we are NATO partners, and obviously we are in challenging times. We are very aware of the sacrifices the people of Greece have been called on to make because of the challenges of the economy and also the challenges of terrorism and counterterrorism, but particularly the economy right now. We’re confident about Greece’s ability with reforms and with effort to be able to chart a new course ahead. I would hope very much, Mr. Minister, that we have an ability to be able to maintain the strong U.S.-European partnership with respect to our support for Ukraine, the need to be able to encourage Russia in every way possible to live up to the Minsk agreement and to help bring about peace in the region, and also to work together on longer-term challenges like energy, energy supplies, and diversification for the region.

And our efforts on counterterrorism could not be more important together in the future. Obviously, we’re very concerned that those who have committed acts of terrorism who’ve been incarcerated need to remain incarcerated. And we hope that we can work through all of our policy issues, because the relationship between us is so important, and obviously we wish the new government in this moment of challenge we wish it well and we look forward to being supportive and being helpful in the days ahead. Thank you.

FOREIGN MINISTER KOTZIAS: Thank you, (inaudible). Thank you, Secretary Kerry. Thank you for your invitation to come here in Washington. I’m here as a friend – as a friend with somebody who’s working together with us for democracy and peace against terrorism (inaudible). And I hope that our relations will be deepened and that we will find new feat of cooperation.

I think I can – we can be sure that the new law in Greece about the prisoners will not let any terrorists become free. It will be not only a test of the detention of – the way of this detention, nobody will become free. I am very thankful for this invitation.

SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you, sir. Welcome.

FOREIGN MINISTER KOTZIAS: Thank you.

SECRETARY KERRY: Good to have you. Thank you. Thank you very much.

RECENT U.S. NAVY PHOTOS

 

FROM: U.S. NAVY

130524-N-JN142-296 SOUDA BAY, Greece (May 24, 2013) The Ohio-class guided-missile submarine USS Florida (SSGN 728) departs Souda harbor after a routine port visit. Florida, homeported in Kings Bay, Ga., is deployed conducting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Peggy Bebb/Released)

RECENT U.S. NAVY PHOTOS

FROM: U.S. NAVY
121211-N-XZ912-007 SOUDA BAY, Greece (Dec. 11, 2012) U.S. Coast Guard Cmdr. Adam Chamie and Hellenic navy Ensign Alexander Tsaltas conduct a boarding exercise aboard the Hellenic navy training ship Aris at the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center during Eurasia Partnership Capstone 2012 (EPC 12). Annually hosted by the U.S. Navy, EPC aims to increase maritime safety and security through workshops and seminars. Nations participating in EPC include Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Romania, Ukraine and the United States. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Christopher B. Stoltz/Released)

121207-N-ZQ794-281 PORTSMOUTH, Va. (Dec. 7, 2012) Eve, a World Wrestling Entertainment (WWE) diva, holds a .50-caliber machine gun aboard a Riverine Patrol Boat during a WWE tour of Coastal Riverine Force capabilities. WWE athletes visited Coastal Riverine Group 2 as part of the 10th annual WWE "Tribute to the Troops" in Hampton Roads. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Kay Savarese/Released)

 

RECENT U.S. NAVY PHOTOS

 
FROM: U.S. NAVY

121110-N-ZZ999-001
ARABIAN GULF (Nov. 10, 2012) An Army AH-64D Apache helicopter from the 3-159th Attack Reconnaissance Battalion lands on the flight deck of the afloat forward staging base (interim) USS Ponce (AFSB(I) 15), while Ponce conducts interoperability familiarization and integration training. USS Ponce, formerly designated as an amphibious transport dock ship, was converted and reclassified to fulfill a long-standing U.S. Central Command request for an AFSB to be located in the 5th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Intelligence Specialist Cedric Thomas/Released)

　

121112-N-MO201-273
SOUDA BAY, Greece (Nov. 12, 2012) The Los Angeles-class fast attack submarine USS Alexandria (SSN 757) departs Souda Bay, Greece. Alexandria is homeported in Groton, Conn., and currently deployed conducting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Paul Farley/Released)

USS Alexandria U.S. Navy photo by Paul Farley

PRESS ROUNDTABLE IN ATHENS, GREECE WITH PHILIP H. GORDEN

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Press Roundtable in Athens, GreecePress Availability
Philip H. Gordon
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Athens, Greece
July 27, 2012

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: Thank you. It’s very nice to be back in Athens. It’s nice to see some of you again. I think I’ve seen you on a number of occasions including in this very room.

I am here to express our support and solidarity of the Greek people, and the Greek government as it undertakes some very difficult but we think really important economic reforms. We’re following these developments very closely and have a great stake in the outcome, not just for the sake of our friends and partners in Greece, but for the sake of the entire European area and the U.S. economy and the world economy. So we have great interest and we admire what the government is doing in undertaking, again, what we consider to be essential reforms, not just to convince world markets and European lenders of the soundness of the Greek economy, but for the sake of the Greek economy itself. In other words, we think these reforms are worth undertaking because they will lead to a more prosperous and sound Greek economy, let alone stabilize the eurozone.

We also appreciate Greece’s continued partnership with the United States on a number of regional and global issues, notwithstanding the economic difficulties. I had a chance to meet with the Foreign Minister. I also met earlier today with some of the other party leaders in the coalition. The latter mostly to talk about the economic situation, but obviously with the Foreign Minister, not just the economic situation but regional and global affairs. And as we discussed, world events don’t -- you don’t get to hit the pause button while you deal with the economy. There are still a lot of issues between Greece and Turkey and the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, so we exchanged views on those and I expressed our appreciation for Greece’s partnership in dealing with those, even as it faces the economic difficulties.

So again, a big agenda. It’s very important to the United States, so I came here to try to get a better understanding of what’s going on in Greece and the region. I’ll be going on to Turkey from here. But as I began with, I also came to express support for what the government and the people of Greece are doing.

With that, I’ll be happy to take any questions.

QUESTION: One of the priorities of the new Greek government in foreign policy is to declare the exclusive economic zone. Do you believe it can go ahead with this or before that have an agreement or something like that with Turkey?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: I think it’s important to avoid unilateral steps. The United States recognizes countries’ rights to declare exclusive economic zones but these things aren’t done in a vacuum and you’d have to understand the full context. We don’t think it would be in Greece’s interest to do it without full cooperation with neighbors including Turkey.

Fortunately you have mechanisms in place, and over the past number of years have developed bilateral channels in which these things can be discussed and I know that they have already contributed to progress and we would strongly encourage Greece to use those channels to have these conversations so that any steps in this area are done cooperatively in the interests of all parties.

They’re complicated issues and it’s not as simple as being able to declare an EEZ or not being able to declare an EEZ, and that’s precisely why it should be done cooperatively.

QUESTION: In order to get the economy started, which is the big issue for Greece, it is crucial to attract more and more investment. What do you believe should be the main reforms that Greece has to make in order to attract investment?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: That’s a good question, because attracting investment is clearly a critical aspect to turning the Greek economy around. You need foreign investment. I think frankly over the years there has been a perception in Greece that it wasn’t friendly enough to foreign investment, that there were too many rules, too much bureaucracy, too slow approval rates, and investors need certainty and transparency. They want to be sure what the rules are, the regulations -- that they’re not going to be changing. So I think creating a more investor-friendly climate is critical.

There are other less direct measures, but are still important measures, and those are the ones that I think the government is already working on in strengthening the overall economy so that you get growth and buying power, purchasing power, so that it’s worth making the investments. But I would start with the question of bureaucracy, rules and regulations. I think you can look at, there are rankings of countries in terms of, for example, how quickly an investment can be approved and I think Greece needs to advance on that list.

QUESTION: I will stick to the economy because that’s what’s troubling us. I don’t know if you could say a few words about the meetings that you had with the other two governmental partners. And we had the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury a few days ago and I was wondering, the idea is, especially ahead of the American elections, there is this notion and I think it’s understandable that the United States is beginning to lose patience not with Greece, but the way the European leaders are handling the crisis since Greece and Ireland are not a problem right now. Nothing compares to what will happen if Spain or Italy fail or these growing costs continue.

So it would be great if you would give us your insight on this, and what is worrying the United States, and apart from declarations of support, which are good, or that you have to do something. If you have any other idea of how you could convince the European leaders to move on the next step and do something decisive.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: Sure. As I said right from the start, we are following it extremely closely because we have such a great stake in the outcome. We have a great stake because we care about the hundreds of millions of people who live in Europe and their prosperity, but we also even have a more direct national interest at stake, our economy is so dependent on growth and stability and that of our largest trading and investment partner in the world by far. I think it’s accurate to say that some of the drag on the U.S. economy right now are questions about the eurozone, and so that’s why we’re so committed.

We acknowledge also that we don’t have a direct say in some of the key decisions to be made in Europe. The question of how big is the firewall or whether there are bailout funds or whether the ECB should be buying bonds at a certain level are not issues on which we get a vote. But because we are so engaged and so committed and so intertwined with Europe, we have views and we share those views and I can tell you at the highest levels, including our President there are regular conversations with European leaders about the way forward.

You mentioned American impatience. I wouldn’t describe it as impatience. I would acknowledge that --

QUESTION: Losing patience. I think it’s right.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: That’s different. Yes. We would like a comprehensive solution tomorrow or yesterday, but we also understand these are complicated decisions. They’re not easy. The reforms will take time. I think Angela Merkel but other leaders across Europe keep trying to explain that as well, that there is no magic bullet and there is no quick solution to this problem and we understand that. At the same time, we are urging leaders and I think have been for some time to be as decisive as possible as quickly as possible because the stakes are so great.

In terms of what -- you asked about my meetings with the party leaders and what needs to be done -- I would say I was encouraged from what I heard in the sense that the coalition members seemed determined to implement the agreements that have been reached. They seemed to have an appreciation that markets and governments need to see results and real efforts and structural reforms before they will respond positively. It goes back to the question that I was asked about investments.

Of course they took the opportunity to explain to me how difficult it was on the Greek people and the Greek economy, which we know and appreciate, but they also demonstrated a real understanding that only by taking these difficult measures will eurozone governments, the European Central Bank, and private investors be convinced that they can really put their money in Greece.

That’s what I encourage them to do as well, as quickly as possible and as decisively as possible, demonstrate in deed as well as in word, that there really is a new Greece, that Greece gets it, that it’s doing the things that are necessary to make clear that this is a place that you can really do business, and in this highly competitive globalized world there are a lot of places where you can send your money, as investors and hedge funds and others demonstrate every single day. And if they have the slightest doubts about a country’s ability to pay its debts or about what would be the fate of their investment, they’ll just go elsewhere.

That’s why it’s really incumbent on the country in question to take decisive, necessary measures. But as I say, from my meetings here I was convinced, I think it was in the first place encouraging to see the Greek people vote for parties that understood that, because the alternative would, in our humble estimation, really not serve Greece’s interests well. And it was encouraging to hear from those party leaders that they understand that and they’re determined to finish the job.

QUESTION: I would like to insist on the European economy matters. Are you worried about the possibility of a eurozone breakup and how possible do you find it? Because you see there were, even from German official, statements the past days about Greece leaving the eurozone, so --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: I would say a couple of things. First, we’re confident that the eurozone will stay together, that the governments have the commitment and the means to keep it together, and we believe that’s in our common interest. So we don’t want to see a breakup of the eurozone.

I would add that we’re not alone in thinking that. I think it’s worth pointing out that notwithstanding all of the questions about the viability of the eurozone, all of the costs involved to certain countries in keeping it going, all of the real pressures on certain members including Greece to do difficult things to stay in, notwithstanding all of that, every single member of the eurozone and governments across the European Union remain committed to it. If you want to simplify, both the lender countries and the debtor countries, they still remain committed. Even in Greece where we know you’ve borne great costs to do the necessary things to stay in, the Greek government is committed to it, and the Greek people voted consciously for parties who are also committed to it, notwithstanding the costs. I think that shows a real recognition of the values of preserving the eurozone.

You point to German leaders speculating about a breakup. If you listen carefully -- first of all the main German leader, the Chancellor, has been absolutely clear that she wants to preserve the eurozone and I think you see that in her actions when Germany puts up money to keep everybody in the eurozone -- and so what you’ve had is a couple of leaders most recently say they’re no longer appalled by the notion of one country leaving the eurozone. That’s still a very long way from saying we should abandon the eurozone, it’s not in our interest. On the contrary, I think all evidence points to a real recognition that it’s in everybody’s interests.

Then take I think even just yesterday Mario Draghi, head of the ECB, saying we’ll do -- you can check the quote exactly -- but something along the lines of whatever it takes. So I think there’s a recognition among all key actors that as painful and difficult as it is, it is really worth preserving. That will in itself I think help support the eurozone.

QUESTION: I would like to ask two questions. One is [inaudible] be positive on an extension of the Greek adjustment program from two years to four years so that it’s easier for the people to accept it. The second is the situation in Syria seems to get out of control. The Obama administration has shown that any action that could possibly be taken should be in a collective manner. But do you believe that the only way to do this is through the UN Security Council? Or possibly if the situation gets even worse we should explore other possibilities like a coalition of the willing?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: Thanks. Two separate things. First, on the question of an extension of the timetable for Greece’s program, that’s really between Greece and the Troika, which is the source of the original deal. It’s not for us to say what schedule it should be on.

That said, I would share my sense that the first thing Greece needs to do is demonstrate that it’s committed to the program and it is undertaking real reforms. I think, being perfectly frank, it’s too soon to start asking for an extension. Your election was what, less than two months ago. The government has started to undertake a number of important steps, but I think that receptivity in Europe to any talk of extensions now is premature. On what basis would they do that? So I don’t think it’s something that should be ruled out, but I think in terms of sequencing it should be first things first. Demonstrate over a period of time that you are genuinely committed to these difficult steps in implementing the program, and then on the basis of that effort I think the prospects for discussing timetables or flexibility would be much better than doing it in the other order.

As for Syria, we’re obviously very concerned about the situation in Syria. It has become clear to us for some time that there needs to be a political transition in Syria, that Syria will never be stable and peaceful under Assad who has used violence against his own people. And yes, we have gone to great efforts to work with the international community. This is not just a U.S. view. The international community, including most importantly all of Syria’s neighbors practically and the Arab League, are focused on a political transition as well.

Yes, our strong preference has been to work on it through the UN Security Council, that’s why we’ve been back to it three times for proposing different resolutions focused, as we say, on political transition. Unfortunately, every single time it didn’t pass in the Security Council because there was a veto by Russia and China, including most recently just two weeks ago, and, I might add, by nobody else. There were two abstentions and two vetoes. In the previous one it was 13 to 2. We regret that Russia and China have stood in the way of what clearly the rest of the international community believes to be the need for a resolution supporting political transition.

So yes, in that sense the Security Council route is blocked. We will continue to act with our international partners. There have been a number of meetings of the Friends of the Syrian People with participation of 40, 60, 80 countries and international entities, and we’ll continue to work through that channel and others to increase the pressure on the regime, change the balance on the ground, and support and coordinate the opposition so that when Assad does go, and he will, there is a better prospect for a more stable, inclusive government in Syria than otherwise. And we’re going to continue to work it. On that, we appreciate Greece’s support in those efforts.

QUESTION: Mr. Gordon, do you believe that the Greek-Turkish relations could be deteriorated, could be affected in some way because of the Syrian crisis and the complicated issues that emerge in the region with say the efforts of the Israeli and the [inaudible] to be more close to [inaudible], for example?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: I don’t see any reason why the developments in Syria should be harmful to Greek-Turkish relations. In fact I think Greek and Turkish interests in Syria, and even policy in Syria, is aligned, which is aligned with the United States as well, to increase pressure on Assad and foster a political transition and support the opposition. There’s no reason that Turkish policy in Syria should be a problem for Greece or vice versa.

I’m encouraged that even with other complicated things going on in the region and even with political change in Greece, the Greek-Turkish relationship seems to continue to improve. That’s an important factor of stability throughout this region, especially at a time when unfortunately the Turkey-Israel relationship is not improving, it remains frozen at best for the past couple of years. Obviously relations between Turkey and Cyprus are complicated and potential tensions over energy. So this is a region that needs more progress in bilateral and trilateral and quadrilateral relationships and it’s all the more important for Greece and Turkey to be preserving their relationship.

QUESTION: Are you now more optimistic about Greece’s future in the eurozone than you were before coming to Athens? And I’m wondering, if you had a vote, you said the U.S. is not a member of the eurozone. If you have a vote, what would you say to the Germans? We all see there is a strong conflict between the U.S. and Germany.

QUESTION: You have a vote in the IMF.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: We do have a vote in the IMF, and that’s really the only sort of direct way that we have a role. But the IMF is only one-third of the troika and we’re only, I won’t say one vote because we are more than one vote in the IMF, but one voice within the IMF.

On the first part of your question about optimism, I would just repeat what I said. I was encouraged to hear from the party leaders I met with their commitment to the reforms that we think are necessary to stabilize the Greek economy and to persuade markets and governments to work with Greece moving forward. That’s most critical of all, because obviously the coalition was elected to do certain things and it needs to stick with its agreements, it needs to demonstrate that, and so to hear directly from those party leaders that they get it, that they’re committed to doing it, they know how difficult it is, but they are not wobbling under these pressures is critically important. In that sense I am optimistic.

I think it matters less what I think than what the markets think and I think markets are voting in favor as well. You’ve seen some money start to flow back to Greece, whereas there was great question, especially the run-up to the election, that you would see bank runs and see money start to flow out. I think since the election of the government some of the steps that they’ve taken, people are more confident that Greece really is on the right track. So that is reassuring.

As for the latter, I won’t speculate on -- you asked hypothetical membership in the European Union, but I think I’ve already said and the President and Secretary of Treasury and State have indicated the types of things that we think are necessary. We have urged more decisive action on the part of eurozone governments, I think we have stressed that while fiscal consolidation is critical, the entire weight of the reform effort can’t be borne by fiscal consolidation alone. You can’t just cut your way out of this crisis. I think that evidence over the past two years gives some credence to that notion, that there needs to be also an emphasis on growth, on liberalization and other structural reforms that will restore Europe to growth and competitiveness and jobs. I think that view is growing throughout the European Union, which we’re encouraged by.

We have urged that a substantial firewall be put in place not because we want it to be used, we don’t. The point of a firewall is precisely so that it will not have to be used and that you reassure markets that they can put their money somewhere and there’s less of a risk of default.

So I think in general while it’s not for us to give a precise prescription as to what Europeans should be doing, we’ve given general indications of what we think is the right direction. I think it’s fair to say that things have largely moved in that direction over time and they continue to do so, and if that balanced package continues to move forward, reforms and fiscal consolidation in the countries under pressure and solidarity and support from the countries in a position to do so, I think the future looks much more positive.

QUESTION: Are you worried about the moves of the Russian navy in the Eastern Mediterranean and the relation that [inaudible]has with Moscow ?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: On the first point, we’ve been very clear about the question of Russians arms deliveries to Cyprus -- Sorry, let me be clear, to Syria. I’m not breaking any news here. [Laughter].

QUESTION: [Inaudible].

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: Exactly. Russian arms deliveries to Syria which we think are only fueling a government that is using violence against its own people. And you heard Secretary Clinton talk about the attack helicopters that the Russians were planning to deliver. The Russians say they’re not signing new arms deals with Syria, just fulfilling old ones. Obviously we welcome that they’re not signing new ones but we regret that they’re fulfilling old ones because we think the last thing anyone needs is more arms in the hands of the Syrian government. So on that we’re clear.

Russia says it’s not taking sides, it wants to be balanced. But it’s hard for us to interpret arms deliveries to the Assad regime as anything else than supportive and lending legitimacy to a government that we think has clearly lost its legitimacy.

On Cyprus, I’m not sure if what you’re getting at is the loan question. We’re aware that Cyprus is considering a loan from Russia. It’s obviously up to the government of Cyprus where it gets its loans if it needs loans. We know they’re also obviously talking to the European Union and others. We would just hope that, there’s always a concern that financial dependency can lead to political dependency and that’s clearly something we wouldn’t want to see, but it’s really in the end a decision for the government of Cyprus if it wants to pursue a loan from some other sources.

QUESTION: Russians are concerned about the so-called Islamic bowl that emerged after Arab Spring in relations. How do you comment this [inaudible]?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: There are different aspects to it. You may be referring specifically to Egypt and the trend in Egypt, election of a Muslim Brotherhood government in the wake of the fall of the Mubarak regime.

I think the first thing to keep in mind on questions like this is a certain sense of humility about our own role in the future of this region. It’s not up to us. It wasn’t up to us whether Mubarak stayed in power or not. It wasn’t up to us who the Egyptians chose to represent them, and once Mubarak was gone we felt there should be free and fair elections and it’s up to the Egyptian people who to support and they supported a Muslim Brotherhood government, and we reached out to that government. Secretary Clinton was there within the past couple of weeks. And we’ll look forward to working with them.

So we stand by our principles in those terms. When it comes to what we want to see is rule of law, fair treatment of all citizens of the countries including women, minorities, transparent elections, peace with neighbors. And if a government is willing to abide by those principles, then it’s up to the people what government should be in place.

Russian concerns about extremism we share. That’s a difference that we have with them when it comes to Syria where they talk about the risks that if Assad goes you could have extremism and al-Qaeda. Obviously that’s something we’re concerned about as well, but in our view that’s all the more reason to accelerate the transition or put the opposition and strengthen those groups that support the principles that are dear to us, as opposed to either do nothing or support the Assad regime which we fear will just lead to ongoing violence, civil war, and precisely the extremism that they’re worried about.

Thanks everybody. It’s nice to talk to you.

QUESTION: You’re going to visit the Halki School?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: I am.

QUESTION: It’s the first time American officers visit the Halki?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: I think our current Ambassador was there during his current tenure. President Clinton went to the Halki Seminary. So it’s not the first and it’s just a continued --

QUESTION: You’re going to press [inaudible].

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: That’s my point about it being consistent with our longstanding policy. We’re encouraged by what we’ve heard out of Turkey in terms of hopes to open it. It’s been our longstanding position that it should be open, so it’s just an opportunity to express our support for that.

FACTS ABOUT GREECE FROM THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT

Map Credit:  U.S. State Department.
FROM:   U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
GREECE
Official Name: Hellenic Republic 


PROFILE
Geography
Area: 131,957 sq. km. (51,146 sq. mi.; roughly the size of Alabama).
Major cities: Capital--Athens. Greater Athens (pop. 3,566,060), municipality of Athens (772,072), Greater Thessaloniki (1,057,825), municipality of Thessaloniki (363,987), Piraeus (175,697), Greater Piraeus (466,065), Patras (171,616), Iraklion (137,711), Larissa (126,076).


Terrain: Mountainous interior with coastal plains; 1,400-plus islands.
Climate: Mediterranean; mild, wet winter and hot, dry summer.

People
Population (2010 est.): 11,295,002.
Population growth rate (2010 estimated): 0.1%.
Languages: Greek (official). English is the predominant second language.
Religions: Greek Orthodox (approximately 98% of citizens), with Muslim, Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, and other religious communities.
Education: Years compulsory--9. Literacy--97.5%. All levels are free.
Health: Infant mortality rate--5.43/1,000. Life expectancy--male 77.69 years, female 82.35 years.
Work force (2009 estimated): 5.0 million.



"Athens At Night From Space" Image courtesy of the Image Science & Analysis Laboratory, NASA Johnson Space Center 

Government
Type: Parliamentary republic.
Independence: 1830. National Day: March 25 (1821).
Constitution: June 11, 1975, amended March 1986, April 2001, May 2008.
Branches: Executive--president (head of state), prime minister (head of government).Legislative--300-seat unicameral Vouli (parliament). Judicial--Supreme Court, Council of State.
Political parties: Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), New Democracy (ND), Communist Party of Greece (KKE), Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), and Coalition of the Left (SYNASPISMOS).
Suffrage: Universal and mandatory at 18.
Administrative subdivisions: 13 peripheries (regional districts); 325 municipalities; two wider metropolitan area administrative councils to encompass the whole of the Attica region and the Thessaloniki agglomeration.

Economy
GDP (2010): €227 billion (about $312 billion).
Per capita GDP (2010): $27,875.
Growth rate (2010): -3.5%.
Inflation rate (2010): 4.7%.
Unemployment rate (annual average, 2010): 12.5%.
Natural resources: Bauxite, lignite, magnesite, oil, marble.
Agriculture (3.3% of GDP): Products--sugar beets, wheat, maize, tomatoes, olives, olive oil, grapes, raisins, wine, oranges, peaches, tobacco, cotton, livestock, dairy products, rice, figs.
Manufacturing (17.9% of GDP): Types--processed foods, shoes, textiles, metals, chemicals, electrical equipment, cement, glass, transport equipment, petroleum products, construction, electrical power.
Services (78.8% of GDP): Maritime, transportation, tourism, communications, trade, banking, public administration, defense.
Trade: Exports (2010): $22 billion: manufactured goods, agricultural products, beverages, tobacco, petroleum products, cement, chemicals. Major markets--Germany, Italy, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Turkey, U.K., France, U.S., Romania, Spain. Imports (2010)--$64.55 billion: basic manufactures, food and animals, crude oil, chemicals, machinery, transport equipment.Major suppliers--Germany, Italy, China, France, Netherlands, U.S., Russia.

PEOPLE
Greece was inhabited as early as the Paleolithic period and by 3000 BC had become home, in the Cycladic Islands, to a culture whose art remains among the most evocative in world history. In the second millennium BC, the island of Crete nurtured the maritime empire of the Minoans, whose trade reached from Egypt to Sicily. The Minoans were supplanted by the Mycenaeans of the Greek mainland, who spoke a dialect of ancient Greek. During the Roman, Byzantine, and Ottoman Empires (1st-19th centuries), Greece's ethnic composition became more diverse. The roots of Greek language and culture date back at least 3,500 years, and modern Greek preserves many elements of its classical predecessor.

Eastern Orthodox Christianity is the dominant religion in Greece and receives state funding. During centuries of Ottoman domination, the Greek Orthodox Church preserved the Greek language and cultural identity and was an important rallying point in the struggle for independence. There is a centuries-old Muslim religious minority concentrated in Thrace and an estimated 300,000 legal Muslim immigrants living elsewhere in the country. Smaller religious communities in Greece include Old Calendar Orthodox, Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Mormons.

Greek education is free and compulsory for children between the ages of 6 and 15. Overall responsibility for education rests with the Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs. Private colleges and universities (mostly foreign) have campuses in Greece despite the fact that their degrees are not recognized by the Greek state. Entrance to public universities is determined by state-administered exams.

HISTORY
The Greek War of Independence began in 1821 and concluded in 1830 when England, France, and Russia forced the Ottoman Empire to grant Greece its independence under a European monarch.

At independence, Greece had an area of 47,515 square kilometers (18,346 square mi.), and its northern boundary extended from the Gulf of Volos to the Gulf of Arta. Under the influence of the "Megali Idea," which in its most broad interpretation meant the expansion of the Greek state to include all areas where significant Greek communities existed, Greece acquired the Ionian islands in 1864; Thessaly and part of Epirus in 1881; part of Macedonia, Crete, Epirus, and the Aegean islands in 1913; western Thrace in 1918; and the Dodecanese islands in 1947.

Greece entered World War I in 1917 on the side of the Allies. After the war, Greece took part in the Allied occupation of Turkey, where many Greeks still lived. In 1921, the Greek army marched toward Ankara, but was defeated by Turkish forces led by Kemal Mustapha Ataturk and was forced to withdraw. In an exchange of populations under the Treaty of Lausanne, more than 1.3 million refugees from Turkey poured into Greece, and nearly 800,000 Greek Turks were sent to Turkey. This large influx of people created enormous challenges for the Greek economy and society.

Greek politics, particularly between the two world wars, involved a struggle for power between monarchists and republicans. Greece was proclaimed a republic in 1924, but George II returned to the throne in 1935. A plebiscite in 1946 upheld the monarchy, which was finally abolished by referendum on December 8, 1974.

Greece's entry into World War II was precipitated by the Italian invasion on October 28, 1940. Despite Italian superiority in numbers and equipment, determined Greek defenders drove the invaders back into Albania. Hitler was forced to divert German troops to protect his southern flank and overran Greece in 1941. Following a very severe German occupation in which many Greeks died (including over 90% of Greece's Jewish community) German forces withdrew in October 1944, and the government-in-exile returned to Athens.

After the German withdrawal, the principal Greek resistance movement, which was controlled by the communists, refused to disarm. A banned demonstration by resistance forces in Athens in December 1944 ended in battles with Greek Government and British forces. Continuing tensions led to the outbreak of full-fledged civil war in 1946. First the United Kingdom and later the U.S. gave extensive military and economic aid to the Greek Government. In 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall implemented the Marshall Plan under President Truman, which focused on the economic recovery and the rebuilding of Europe. The U.S. contributed hundreds of millions of dollars to rebuild Greece’s buildings, agriculture, and industry.

In August 1949, the Greek national army forced the remaining insurgents to surrender or flee to Greece's communist neighbors. The insurgency resulted in 100,000 killed, 700,000 displaced persons inside the country, and catastrophic economic disruption. This civil war left Greek society deeply divided between leftists and rightists.

Greece became a member of NATO in 1952. From 1952 to late 1963, Greece was governed by conservative parties--the Greek Rally of Marshal Alexandros Papagos and its successor, the National Radical Union (ERE) of Konstantinos Karamanlis. In 1963, the Center Union Party of George Papandreou was elected and governed until July 1965. It was followed by a succession of unstable coalition governments.

On April 21, 1967, just before scheduled elections, a group of colonels led by Col. George Papadopoulos seized power in a coup d’état. The junta suppressed civil liberties, established special military courts, and dissolved political parties. Several thousand political opponents were imprisoned or exiled to remote Greek islands. In November 1973, following an uprising of students at the Athens Polytechnic University, General Dimitrios Ioannides replaced Papadopoulos and tried to continue the dictatorship.

In July 1974, the Greek junta sponsored a coup in Cyprus led by extremist Greek Cypriots against the government of President Makarios, citing his alleged pro-communist leanings and his perceived abandonment of enosis, or political union with Greece. Turkey, citing the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, intervened militarily to protect Turkish Cypriots. In a two-stage offensive, Turkish troops took control of 38% of the island. Almost all Greek Cypriots subsequently fled south while almost all Turkish Cypriots moved to the north.

Senior Greek military officers withdrew their support from the junta, which toppled. Leading citizens persuaded Karamanlis to return from exile in France to establish a government of national unity until elections could be held. Karamanlis' newly organized party, New Democracy (ND), won elections held in November 1974, and he became Prime Minister.

Following the 1974 referendum, the parliament approved a new constitution and elected Constantine Tsatsos as president of the republic. On January 1, 1981, Greece became the 10th member of the European Community (now the European Union--EU).

Parliamentary elections were held March 8, 2004, and ND won 165 seats to the Panhellenic Socialist Movement’s (PASOK) 117; Konstantinos Karamanlis, ND leader and the nephew of the former prime minister of the same name, became Prime Minister. Karolos Papoulias was elected President by parliament in February 2005. On October 4, 2009, PASOK won an early parliamentary election with 160 seats to ND’s 91. PASOK leader George Papandreou succeeded Karamanlis as Prime Minister. On February 3, 2010, Papoulias was re-elected President by parliament with a majority of 266 votes out of 300. On November 11, 2011, Papandreou stepped down as prime minister to make way for a coalition government led by Lucas Papademos (PASOK).

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
Greece is a parliamentary republic and last amended its constitution in May 2008. There are three branches of government. The executive includes the president, who is head of state, and the prime minister, who is head of government. There is a 300-seat unicameral "Vouli" (legislature). The judicial branch includes a Supreme Court. Greece is implementing a program (“Kallikratis”) that reorganized and consolidated its system of local governments into 13 regional districts and 325 municipalities. Suffrage is universal at 18.

Domestic Terrorism
Terrorist activity in Greece decreased during 2011, continuing the trend of Greek authorities successfully dismantling groups that had been active from the 1970s to the late 2000s. In the summer of 2002, Greek authorities captured numerous suspected members of the terrorist group "November 17." In 2003, 15 members of the terrorist organization, which since 1975 had killed many prominent Greeks and five U.S. Mission employees, were found guilty and convicted of a number of crimes, including homicide. In 2007, an appellate court acquitted two of the defendants, but otherwise largely upheld the results of the initial trial, leaving the leadership of the defunct group serving multiple life sentences and others serving long prison terms. The defendants exhausted their appeals in the Greek legal system in 2010.

On January 12, 2007, terrorists fired a rocket-propelled grenade that struck the U.S. Embassy. The terrorist group Revolutionary Struggle later claimed responsibility for the act. Revolutionary Struggle also claimed responsibility for a number of other attacks on Greek officials, police, financial institutions, and other targets. In April 2010, police arrested six suspected members of Revolutionary Struggle, and discovered hideouts containing bombs, rocket launchers, attack plans, and other evidence connected with the group. An additional group, Sect of Revolutionaries, claimed responsibility for shooting attacks on police, including the murder of an anti-terrorist unit officer in June 2009, as well as the murder of a Greek journalist in July 2010. In March 2010, the "December 6" terrorist organization claimed responsibility for a bomb attack that killed a 15-year-old Afghan immigrant. In June 2010 an aide to the Minister of Citizen Protection was killed when he opened a package addressed to the Minister. A domestic terrorist group called Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei (SPF) claimed responsibility for a number of bomb attacks of varying size between 2008 and 2010. Authorities arrested 26 SPF suspects for offenses that included sending over a dozen parcel bombs to foreign embassies in Athens and political leaders in Europe in late 2010, and bombings at the residences of both ND and PASOK politicians. Six suspects have been convicted, another five were acquitted or charges dropped, and the rest are awaiting trial.

Principal Government Officials
President--Karolos Papoulias
Prime Minister--Lucas Papademos
Foreign Minister--Stavros Dimas
Minister of Defense--Dimitris Avramopoulos
Minister of Citizen Protection--Christos Papoutsis
Ambassador to the United States--Vassilis Kaskarelis
Ambassador to the United Nations--Anastasios Mitsialis

ECONOMY 
Greece adopted the euro (€) as its currency in January 2002. The adoption of the euro provided Greece (formerly a high inflation risk country under the drachma) with access to competitive loan rates and also to low rates of the Eurobond market. This led to a dramatic increase in consumer spending, which gave a significant boost to economic growth. Between 1997 and 2007, Greece averaged 4% GDP growth, almost twice the European Union (EU) average. As with other European countries, the financial crisis and resulting slowdown of the real economy have taken their toll on Greece’s rate of growth, which slowed to 2.0% in 2008. The economy went into recession in 2009 and contracted by 2.4% as a result of the world financial crisis and its impact on access to credit, world trade, and domestic consumption--the engine of growth in Greece.

High growth and low interest rates had masked major fiscal and structural weaknesses that were aggravated by the global financial crisis and ensuing recession. As a result of a high 2009 fiscal deficit (revised upward by Eurostat to 15.4% of GDP from 13.6% of GDP), mounting entitlement costs, and deteriorating competitiveness resulting from higher than Eurozone-average inflation and rigidities in product and labor markets, markets in early 2010 began to question the sustainability of Greece’s public debt (2009 debt revised upward by Eurostat from 115.1% of GDP to 126.8% of GDP). Ever-increasing market doubts and pressures resulted in higher and higher borrowing costs throughout the winter and spring of 2010. Eventually, unsustainable borrowing costs caused Greece to lose market access, forcing Prime Minister Papandreou on April 23, 2010 to request an emergency assistance program from his Euro-area partners and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In early May, the Greek parliament, Euro-area leaders, and the IMF Executive Board approved a 3-year €110 billion (about $145 billion) adjustment program to be monitored jointly by the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the IMF. Under the program, Greece has promised to undertake major fiscal consolidation and to implement substantial structural reforms in order to place its debt on a more sustainable path and improve its competitiveness so that the economy can re-enter a positive growth trajectory. Specifically, the 3-year reform program includes measures to cut government spending, reduce the size of the public sector, tackle tax evasion, reform the health care and pension systems, and liberalize the labor and product markets.

Since that time, the Greek Government has legislated a number of these important reforms and reduced the deficit from 15.4% of GDP in 2009 to 10.6% of GDP in 2010. Slow implementation of the reforms, along with a deeper than projected recession, led Eurozone leaders to a new agreement on October 26-27, 2011. It includes a “voluntary” nominal loss of 50% on private holdings of Greek Government debt (known as Private Sector Involvement, PSI) worth €100 billion (approx. $133 billion), an EU contribution to PSI of €30 billion (approx. $40 billion), and an additional €100 billion (approx. $133 billion) in official loans through 2014.

The global crisis and the consequent recession caused an increase in unemployment to12.5% in 2010 and to 20.7% as of March 2012. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Greece have dropped, and efforts to revive them have been only partially successful as a result of declining competitiveness and a high level of red tape and bureaucracy. At the same time, Greek investment in Southeast Europe and Turkey has increased, leading to a net FDI outflow in some years.

Greece has a predominately service economy, which (including tourism) accounts for almost 79% of GDP. In 2010, the Greek merchant navy was the largest in the world at 15.96% of the world's total capacity. Other important sectors include food processing, tobacco, textiles, chemicals (including refineries), pharmaceuticals, cement, glass, telecommunication and transport equipment. Agricultural output has steadily decreased in importance over the last decade, accounting now for only 3.3% of total GDP. The EU is Greece’s major trading partner, with more than half of all Greek two-way trade being intra-EU. Greece runs a perennial merchandise trade deficit, and 2010 imports totaled $64.5 billion against exports of $22 billion. Tourism and shipping receipts together with EU transfers make up for much of this deficit.

European Union (EU) Membership 
Greece has been a major net beneficiary of the EU budget; in 2009, EU transfers accounted for 2.35% of GDP. From 1994 to 1999, about $20 billion in EU structural funds and Greek national financing were spent on projects to modernize and develop Greece's transportation network in time for the Olympics in 2004. The centerpiece was the construction of the new international airport near Athens, which opened in March 2001 soon after the launch of the new Athens subway system.

EU transfers to Greece continue, with approximately $24 billion in structural funds for the period 2000-2006. The same level of EU funding, $24 billion, has been allocated for Greece for 2007-2013. These funds contribute significantly to Greece's current accounts balance and further reduce the state budget deficit. EU funds will continue to finance major public works and economic development projects, upgrade competitiveness and human resources, improve living conditions, and address disparities between poorer and more developed regions of the country. The EU plans to phase them out in 2013.

U.S.-Greece Trade 
In 2010 the U.S. trade surplus with Greece was $880.2 million. There are no significant non-tariff barriers to American exports. U.S. exports to Greece were $1.6 billion, accounting for 2.5% of Greece's total imports in 2010. The top U.S. exports remain defense articles, although American business activity is expected to grow in the tourism development, medical, construction, food processing, and packaging and franchising sectors. U.S. companies are involved in Greece's ongoing privatization efforts. Further deregulation of Greece's energy sector and the country's central location as a transportation hub for Europe may offer additional opportunities in electricity, gas, refinery, and related sectors.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Greece's foreign policy is generally aligned with that of its EU partners. Greece maintains full diplomatic, political, and economic relations with its Southeast European neighbors, except with the Republic of Macedonia (see below), and has played an important role as a leader of the region's Euro-Atlantic integration process. It provides peacekeeping and training contingents for Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Prominent issues in Greek foreign policy include Balkan integration and the name dispute with Macedonia, Greek-Turkish differences in the Aegean, the reunification of Cyprus, illegal migration, Turkish accession to the EU, regional energy development, Middle East relations, including strengthening ties to Israel, international peacekeeping operations, and Greek-American relations.

Energy
Greece enjoys a geostrategic position for the transit of oil and gas from Caspian Basin and western Asia producers to the consumers of that energy in Europe. Greece is seeking to become an energy hub for these resources and has undertaken policies to that end. Taking advantage of its geographic position, Greece has identified four regional energy projects as top priorities. Greece, along with Turkey and Italy, is a partner of the ITGI (Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy) gas pipeline that, if fully realized, would transport up to 11 billion cubic meters of mostly Azerbaijani (and possibly other) gas to southern Europe by 2012. The ITGI currently transmits about 0.75 billion cubic meters of gas from Turkey to Greece; however, Turkey and Azerbaijan need to conclude a gas transit and pricing agreement before the full potential of the project can be realized. An ancillary project to ITGI is the IGB (Interconnector Greece- Bulgaria), which is a gas pipeline spur, linking ITGI with the Bulgarian market.

Greece also has been discussing for many years the development of an oil pipeline to transport Russian oil between the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgas and the Greek port of Alexandroupolis on the Aegean coast. The purpose of the project is to reduce oil tanker ship traffic from the Black Sea through the crowded Bosporus strait, reducing the risk of environmental degradation and speeding the flow of oil to Western markets. The Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline currently is being held up by an incomplete environmental impact assessment for the Burgas terminal area. In 2007, Greece signed an agreement with Russia to participate in the proposed Russian South Stream natural gas pipeline, which would run along the Black Sea seabed and emerge in Bulgaria, eventually passing through Greece. This megaproject remains in the conceptual stages with challenges associated with the technical feasibility of transiting the Black Sea, and questions regarding the available sources and quantities of gas to fill the pipeline.

In August 2011, the Ministry of Environment, Energy, and Climate Change, through the recently established agency “Greek Regulatory Corporation for Hydrocarbons SA”, conducted an international public invitation for participation in non-exclusive seismic surveys for hydrocarbon.

Peacekeeping Operations
Greece has supported NATO’s presence in Afghanistan since NATO took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003. Greece has contributed approximately 75 trainers to the NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan, maintains a small headquarters element with ISAF in Afghanistan, and completed a 6-month command rotation of Kabul airport in October 2010. Greece provided over €72 million (about $96 million) in development and humanitarian aid to Afghanistan between 2002 and 2009.

Greece’s special political and economic relationships with countries in the Balkans play an important role in reinforcing democratic development there. The country has made positive contributions to Balkans reconciliation through its involvement in the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), NATO’s long-running (and now concluded) SFOR mission in Bosnia, and SFOR’s follow-on mission, the EU’s operation “Althea.” There are presently 44 staff members in Althea and over 200 Greek troops in Kosovo.

Greece has been an active participant in NATO’s Ocean Shield counter-piracy operation providing protection for World Food Program chartered and merchant vessels off the coast of Somalia, and routinely contributes to NATO maritime operations. Greece previously led, and it continues to participate in, the European Union’s “Atalanta” counter-piracy missions. The U.S. Navy’s naval support base at Souda Bay on the island of Crete provides operational and logistical support to European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), the U.S. Fifth and Sixth fleets, and NATO forces engaged in missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and the Middle East. Souda played an important support role for NATO forces during Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011.

U.S.-GREECE RELATIONS
Greece is an important partner of the United States on many policy priorities. As a leader in the region, Greece has also been an ally to the U.S. in promoting Balkan stability and economic development, supporting Turkey’s bid for accession to the European Union, and supporting the diversification of Europe’s energy supplies. Greece’s geostrategic position also makes it an important ally in engagement and dialogue with the Muslim world. As an entry point into the Schengen visa area for migrants from the Middle East, North and Sub-Saharan Africa, and Southwest Asia, Greece is committed to the humanitarian treatment of migrants but also an improvement in conditions in countries of origin that would ease the pressures for migration.

An estimated three million Americans resident in the United States claim Greek descent. This large, well-organized community cultivates close political and cultural ties with Greece. There are approximately 90,000 to 100,000 American citizens resident in Greece. Greece has the seventh-largest population of U.S. Social Security beneficiaries in the world.

In 1953, the first defense cooperation agreement between Greece and the United States was signed, providing for the establishment and operation of American military installations on Greek territory. The United States closed three of its four main bases in the 1990s. The current mutual defense cooperation agreement provides for the continued operation by the United States of a naval support facility at the strategically located deep-water port and airfield at Souda Bay in Crete.

Greece was admitted to the Visa Waiver Program in 2010.

U.S. OFFICIAL SPEAKS AT THE ECONOMIST'S INVESTMENT ENERGY SUMMIT IN ATHENS

FROM U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Remarks at The Economist's Investment Energy Summit
Remarks Richard Morningstar
Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy The Economist Conference
Athens, Greece
March 28, 2012
Thank you for inviting me to speak at The Economist’s Investment Energy Summit in Athens. I will jump right into the details, as I know we all want to eat.
Let me just briefly outline our overall policy with respect to Eurasia, and then I'll get into some of the specifics, particularly relating to the Southern Corridor and the Eastern Mediterranean.

First, we encourage the development of new oil and gas resources while at the same time promoting efficiency and conservation in the use of all of our energy resources. Because there is a world market for oil, new production contributes to meeting growing demand anywhere in the world, including in the United States. When we're talking about natural gas in this neighborhood, whether it's the Caspian region, the Mediterranean, Iraq, Russia or Central Asia, it's unlikely that any of that gas is ever going to reach the United States. But it's still important, because it's going to add to the international gas supply. Additional supply in one place naturally frees up supply in another, and as the market for liquefied natural gas continues to grow, we can start to think about gas moving around markets in much the same way oil does. One item that may not be for debate today, but it's going to be interesting looking down the road several years, is whether fixed pipelines become somewhat archaic, given the ultimate development of liquefied natural gas and unconventional gas. I think there will always be fixed pipeline, but there is going to have to be more flexibility in take or pay contracts.

Second, we want to assist Europe in its quest for energy security. One might ask, why does the United States care about European energy security? You are 4,000 miles away. Europe is our partner in any number of different areas. The U.S. and Europe have the world’s largest trade and investment relationship. We have an interest in an economically strong Europe. Europe has a major interest in an economically strong United States. And energy security is a major factor in the economy of any country. And in spite of all the difficulties we're facing in the world today, we can't forget the relationship between energy security and a strong economy.

Of course, Europe is composed of many different states, and energy security is a more pressing issue to some than others. Some countries in Europe do not have a diverse energy mix and depend largely or, even in a few cases, entirely on a single supplier and transport group. So, our aim is to encourage the development of a balanced and diverse energy strategy with multiple energy sources, with multiple routes to market – a competitive, efficient market which offers the best prices for consumers. We say this for all countries. It's not just Europe. It's for the United States; it's for Russia. For example, if Europe wants to diversify its energy supply, Russia should be diversifying its consumers as well.

The third component of our policy is our desire to help Caspian, Central Asian and Middle Eastern - and Eastern Mediterranean - countries find new routes to market for their hydrocarbons. We want to help foster economic growth and prosperity in all of these countries. By expanding export routes, they can increase competition for their resources, demand a fair price and create strong links to the global economy. And most of all, I think maybe the most important part of this prong of our strategy is that we are not in a zero-sum game with Russia. We only care that these countries should be able to make their own choices as to how they deal with their energy resources.

While by no means our only interest, the Southern Corridor is a key component of our Eurasian Energy policy. The Obama administration strongly supports the establishment of the Southern Corridor to bring natural gas to Europe via Turkey from the Caspian and potentially other sources beyond Europe's southeastern frontiers. Gas from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz (SD) field represents the first significant volumes available to supply the Southern Corridor. Development of the second phase of Shah Deniz is well under way. The Shah Deniz consortium recently narrowed the field to three potential pipelines a scalable Nabucco, SEEP, and TAP. Nabucco West is a modified version of the Nabucco project which would be built to accommodate the current gas production realities of SD II, while also having the capabilities to expand when more gas becomes available in the future. TAP would bring Caspian gas through Greece, Albania, and Italy via the Adriatic Sea. They're all vying for the right to ship Shah Deniz gas into the EU. I recognize that there are issues. BP has also suggested the SEEP pipeline, which stands for Southeastern Europe Pipeline. This possibility would provide for a capillary approach, combining existing pipelines and new construction, throughout the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

We support the Southern Corridor, which will consist of one or more pipeline projects that are commercially viable and strategically significant. A full Nabucco would be a highly desirable political and strategic option, but as with any pipeline it must be able to demonstrate commercial viability. There will ultimately be large amounts of gas to ship through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey to Europe. We support any pipeline through the Southern Corridor that provides gas to the most vulnerable countries in Europe and that includes concrete, written guarantees that the pipeline will be expanded as more gas becomes available. Additional gas will become available; it's just a question of when. If TAP is ultimately selected, it is generally accepted that it would have to be done in conjunction with an interconnector to SE Europe.

I would like to make one more point regarding Europe. The most important thing that Europe can do – more so than any pipeline or any single gas field - is what Europe does itself with respect to liberalizing its market, with respect to creating interconnectors between countries, by looking at alternative sources of energy, whether it be shale or renewables, by taking advantage of opportunities to improve energy efficiency, by increasing LNG facilities, by increasing storage facilities, doing all the things that are necessary for Europe to have its own balanced and diverse energy policy.

Moving beyond the Southern Corridor, recent, large finds in the Eastern Mediterranean are very important, new components for diversification and energy security for countries in the region and elsewhere in Europe. These developments are complementary to the Southern Corridor. With these valuable finds come some serious political considerations and risks, as well as a variety of legal issues. Yet, at the same time, there is much to gain for all stakeholders.

As to Cyprus, as we have repeatedly said, the United States recognizes Cyprus’ right to drill in its offshore zone. We also believe American companies bring unparalleled world-class experience in offshore exploration, and we support their bids to do work in this region, as we do in other regions. As we have also said, we believe that any potential revenue from future oil and gas resources in Cyprus should be equitably shared between both communities. Our key message to both the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey reflects our long-standing policy, which is to support the Cypriot-led efforts under UN auspices to reunify the island into a bizonal, bicommunal federation and encouraging the two sides to come to a peaceful settlement - this issue could help us get there. This would allow all of Cyprus and other countries to share in the benefits of the Eastern Mediterranean.

In addition, Israel’s significant offshore natural gas finds, including the Tamar Leviathan field – one of the largest offshore gas finds of the past decade – have put Israel on the hydrocarbon map and initiated significant changes in Israel’s energy economy and investment and energy policies. The gas will significantly enhance Israel’s energy security, and Israel is presently examining export potential, including LNG.

Greece also is working to identify potential hydrocarbons for exploitation. The Greek government has announced tenders for seismic studies and hydrocarbon exploration onshore, in the Ionian Sea, and south of the island of Crete.

Having said all of this – the issues in the Eastern Mediterranean go beyond Cyprus, go beyond Israel, and affect the whole region. There are a myriad of legal issues, including law of the sea questions, and political issues that will have to be resolved. At the risk of oversimplifying, I would make the following conclusions. Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean is a good thing. It helps to create diversification and helps Europe, but most of all it helps the region. All countries from Egypt and all the way around the Mediterranean to Turkey and Greece will benefit. There are multiple pots of gold in the Eastern Mediterranean. If equitable solutions are found, all will gain. If not, nobody will reap the full benefits. Voices should be kept low; the parties involved should look reasonably at their interests and talk to each other so that solution can be found and all can benefit.
Thank you.