Showing posts with label FRANK ROSE. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FRANK ROSE. Show all posts

Friday, June 6, 2014

FRANK ROSE'S REMARKS ON MISSILE DEFENSE IN MAINZ, GERMANY

FROM:   U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Implementing Missile Defense in a Global Context

Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
3AF Missile Defense Conference
Mainz, Germany
June 17, 2014


Thank you for that kind introduction. It’s great to be back in Germany and I am particularly honored to address the 3AF Missile Defense Conference again this year.
In my remarks this morning, I would like to discuss three key issues:
  • First, the Obama Administration’s commitment to ballistic missile defense (BMD) and the Fiscal Year 2015 missile defense budget request;
  • Second, the significant progress the United States and our NATO partners are making in implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA); and;
  • Third, cooperation on missile defense with allies and partners outside of Europe.
The U.S. Missile Defense Budget
It is no secret that governments around the world, including the United States, are working very hard to do more with less. This, of course, includes our investments in our national security. Despite these challenges, you will see—and the proof is in the numbers—that the United States is continuing to ensure that our missile defense priorities are funded, on track and on budget.

In March of this year, President Obama released his Fiscal Year 2015 budget submission that aligns defense program priorities and resources with the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). I would like to highlight for you a few of the missile defense aspects of the President’s request.

Overall, the budget request provides $8.5 billion for our missile defense programs, including $7.5 billion for the Missile Defense Agency. With regard to U.S. homeland defense, the budget request provides funding to increase the number of long-range missile defense interceptors deployed in Alaska and California from 30 to 44 by 2017. The request also funds a number of other programs to enhance the long-range BMD system such as a new kill vehicle and a new long-range discrimination radar. With regard to regional missile defense, the budget continues to provide adequate funding to complete work on the missile defense base at Devesulu, Romania and provides additional funding of $225.7 million for the missile defense base at Slupsk in Poland. The request also includes $435.4 million for the procurement of SM-3 Block IB interceptors and $263.9 for continued development of the longer-range SM-3 Block IIA interceptor.

As you can see from these numbers, the United States continues to devote significant resources to our missile defense programs. These programs are an important part of ensuring the national security of the United States, as well as our allies and partners. With regard to the EPAA, this budget request clearly signals the importance the U.S. places on the program. We believe that the resources we are allocating to our missile defense programs demonstrate our commitment to establish ever more capable missile defenses, both in Europe and other regions, to address growing ballistic missile threats. As U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel noted in March 2013, the U.S. commitment to NATO missile defense and to the sites in Romania and Poland remains “ironclad.”

European Phased Adaptive Approach
Moving on, I would like to take a few moments to discuss the implementation of the President’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense. In 2009, when the President announced the EPAA, he noted that the EPAA will “provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America's Allies,” while relying on “capabilities that are proven and cost-effective.” And since then, we have been working hard to implement his vision—and we have made great progress in doing so. Earlier this month, President Obama noted in Poland that we are “on track” with the EPAA.

Phase 1 of the EPAA gained its first operational elements in 2011 with the start of a sustained deployment of an Aegis BMD-capable multi-role ship to the Mediterranean and the deployment of an AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey. With the declaration of Interim BMD Capability at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012, this radar transitioned to NATO operational control. As part of Phase 1, Spain agreed in 2011 to host four U.S. Aegis BMD-capable ships at the existing naval facility at Rota as a Spanish contribution to NATO missile defense, demonstrating its commitment to NATO’s collective defense. In February 2014, the first of four of these ships, USS Donald Cook, arrived in Rota. The next ship, USS Ross, is on its way now. The remaining two will deploy to Rota next year. In addition to their roles in NATO BMD, these ships will conduct maritime security operations, humanitarian missions, bi-lateral and multi-lateral training exercises, and they will support U.S. and NATO operations. By stationing these naval assets in Spain, we are placing them in a position to maximize their operational flexibility for missions in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

With regard to Phase 2, we have an agreement in force with Romania to host a U.S. Aegis Ashore site beginning in 2015. Last October, I had the honor of attending the ground-breaking ceremony at Deveselu Air Base to commemorate the start of construction for this site. When this site is operational, and combined with BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean, NATO will gain enhanced coverage from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East. I also had the opportunity last year to visit the Lockheed-Martin facility in Moorestown, New Jersey where they built the Aegis Ashore deck house and components destined for Romania. The deck house has been disassembled and is currently in transit to Romania.

In furtherance of Phase 2, on May 21, the United States successfully conducted the first flight test involving components of the Aegis Ashore system, including the SM-3 IB interceptor. During the test, a simulated ballistic missile target was acquired, tracked, and engaged by the Aegis Weapon System. A live target missile launch was not planned for this flight test.
Before moving on to Phase 3, I would like to stress that we remain on schedule for deploying the system to Romania, with the site becoming operational in 2015.

And finally there is Phase 3. Phase 3 includes an Aegis Ashore site in Poland equipped with the new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, per the Ballistic Missile Defense agreement between the United States and Poland which entered into force in September 2011. This site is on schedule to be operational in 2018. The interceptor site in Poland is key to the EPAA. When combined with other EPAA assets, Phase 3, which begins in the 2018 timeframe, will provide the necessary capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all NATO European territory. So, as you can see; we are continuing to successfully implement the President’s vision for stronger, smarter and swifter missile defenses going forward.

NATO Cooperation
In addition to the support and burden sharing as part of the EPAA undertaken by Spain, Turkey, Poland and Romania, NATO Heads of State and Government noted at the Chicago Summit that there were potential opportunities for using synergies in planning, development, procurement, and deployment of NATO missile defense.
In our view, with this in mind, there are three approaches Allies can take to make valuable contributions to NATO BMD.
  • First, Allies can acquire fully capable BMD systems possessing sensor, shooter and command and control capabilities.
  • Second, Allies can acquire new sensors or upgrade existing ones to provide a key BMD capability.
  • Third, Allies can contribute to NATO’s defense by providing air defense capability for U.S. BMD ships underway on a NATO mission.
In all of these approaches, however, the most critical requirement is NATO interoperability. While acquiring a BMD capability is, of course, good in and of itself, without interoperability, its value as a contribution to Alliance deterrence and defense is significantly diminished. It is only through interoperability that the Alliance can gain the synergistic effects from BMD cooperation that enhance the effectiveness of NATO BMD, as well as the security of all NATO members through shared battle-space awareness and reduced interceptor wastage. Given the budget challenges many allies face today, this becomes even more imperative. Looking ahead, we are hopeful that missile defense will be a key deliverable at the Alliance’s Summit later this year in Wales.

Missile Defense Developments in Other Regions
Outside the NATO context, the United States is continuing to increase and deepen its cooperation with partners and allies around the world to protect people, forces, and assets from the growing ballistic missile threats that we face. As in Europe, we are tailoring our approaches to the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific so that they reflect the unique deterrence and defense requirements of each region.

In the Middle East, we are already cooperating with our key partners bilaterally and multilaterally through venues such as the recently established U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Strategic Cooperation Forum. At the September 26, 2013, Strategic Cooperation Forum (SCF), Secretary Kerry and his Foreign Ministry counterparts reaffirmed their intent, first stated at the September 28, 2012 SCF, to “work towards enhanced U.S.-GCC coordination on Ballistic Missile Defense.”

As you know, this is a time of profound change in that region and we are acutely aware of the daily threats and anxieties felt throughout the Gulf. Security cooperation has long stood at the core of the U.S.-Gulf partnership. The United States is not only committed to enhancing U.S.-GCC missile defense cooperation – we see it as a strategic imperative.

As stated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, a key objective of U.S. strategy is to expand international efforts and cooperation on ballistic missile defense. BMD cooperation contributes to regional stability by deterring regional actors, principally by eliminating their confidence in the effectiveness of their ballistic missiles, and assuring allies and partners of U.S. defense commitments while enhancing their ability to defend against these threats.
Less than two months ago I travelled to the Gulf to work toward enhanced U.S.—GCC coordination on ballistic missile defense. The message I delivered in the region was clear: the United States remains firmly committed to developing and deploying advanced missile defense capabilities around the world to protect our homeland, our deployed forces, as well as our friends and allies.

Several of our partners in the region have already expressed an interest in buying missile defense systems, and some have already done so. For example, the UAE has contracted to buy two THAAD batteries that, when operational, will enhance the UAE’s security as well as regional stability. The UAE also has taken delivery of its Patriot PAC-3 batteries, which provide a lower-tier, point defense of critical national assets. We look forward to advancing cooperation and interoperability with our GCC partners in the years ahead.

Additionally and separately, we are continuing our long-standing and robust cooperation with Israel on missile defense on key systems such as Arrow 3, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome.

In the Asia-Pacific, we are continuing to cooperate through our bilateral alliances. For example, the United States and Japan already are working closely to develop jointly an advanced interceptor known as the SM-3 Block IIA along with deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar to Japan, while continuing to work on enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces. With the Republic of Korea, we are continuing to consult closely as it develops the Korean Air and Missile Defense system, which is designed to defend the ROK against air and missile threats from North Korea.

No Constraints
Before I conclude, let me speak about missile defense and Russia. Russia continues to demand that the United States provide it with “legally-binding” guarantees that our missile defenses will not negatively impact its strategic nuclear deterrent. What the Russians really mean is that they want legally-binding limitations or constraints on U.S. missile defenses—defenses we and our partners and allies believe must be flexible and unconstrained in order to adequately protect ourselves from emerging ballistic missile threats. Such “legally binding guarantees” would create limitations on our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems against regional ballistic missile threats such as those we see evolving in the Middle East and North Korea. We have repeatedly made clear to the Russian government that the United States cannot and will not accept any obligations that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our BMD-capable Aegis ships.

As far as where things stand today regarding our discussions with Russia on missile defense, Russia’s intervention into the crisis in Ukraine, in violation of international law, has led to the suspension of our military-to-military dialogue and we are not currently engaging Russia on the topic of missile defense.

Conclusion
Let me conclude by saying that we have made a great deal of progress on missile defense over the past several years.

Thanks to the important work of our NATO Allies, implementation of the EPAA and NATO missile defense is going well. We are continuing to engage productively with our partners and allies in the Middle East and East Asia. And, as I noted earlier, Congress has continued to provide sufficient funding for missile defense programs, even in these times of tight budgets.
For our part, we look forward to continuing these successes and working with our allies and friends around the world to deepen our cooperation, both diplomatic and military, in pursuit of ensuring that missile defense remains a key part of deterring and defending against ballistic missile threats.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.

Saturday, May 17, 2014

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROSE'S REMARKS ON MISSILE DEFENSE AND GULF SECURITY

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Gulf Cooperation Council and Ballistic Missile Defense

Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Peter Huessy Breakfast Series; Capitol Hill Club
Washington, DC
May 14, 2014


Thank you, Peter, for that kind introduction and for hosting me again at this series.
I’m very happy to be with you today to address our efforts in working with Gulf Cooperation Council to enhance Ballistic Missile Defense cooperation in the region, as I have just recently returned from the Middle East Missile & Air Defense Symposium in Abu Dhabi.
In my remarks this morning, I’d like to accomplish two things. First, I’d like to share with you a bit about my most recent discussions on missile defense with our partners in the Gulf. Second, I’d like to outline the key takeaways from my latest trip to the region, chief among them is the progress that has been made in developing regional missile defenses with the Gulf Cooperation Council. After that, I’m happy to take your questions.

U.S. Commitment to Gulf Security, Including Missile Defense

As you know, this is a time of profound change in that region. We are experiencing perhaps an unprecedented moment of engagement and dialogue with nations around the world. At the same time, we are also acutely aware of the daily threats and anxieties felt throughout the Gulf.
As you also know, security cooperation has long stood at the core of the U.S.-Gulf partnership. The United States is not only committed to enhancing U.S.-GCC missile defense cooperation – we see it as a strategic imperative.

As stated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, a key objective of U.S. strategy is to expand international efforts and cooperation on ballistic missile defense. BMD cooperation contributes to regional stability by deterring regional actors, principally by eliminating their confidence in the effectiveness of their systems, and assuring allies and partners both of the U.S. commitments and by enhancing their ability to defend against these threats should they become necessary.

The message I delivered in the region was clear: the United States remains firmly committed to developing and deploying advanced missile defense capabilities around the world to protect our homeland, our deployed forces, as well as our friends and allies who depend on us for security.

It’s worth mentioning that U.S.-GCC security cooperation extends well beyond the topic of today’s discussion, or BMD. Maritime security is an important focus, given the massive commercial and energy resources that traverse the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. And U.S. and Gulf experts are now meeting as a group to exchange best practices on counterterrorism and border security, within which cyber security is becoming an increasingly prominent topic. Stated plainly, we are committed to working with our GCC partners to strengthen multilateral defense cooperation as an important complement to our strong bilateral partnerships in the region. To help reach that goal, in December 2013 President Obama designated the GCC eligible for Foreign Military Sales. Among other benefits, this designation helps lay the groundwork for the GCC states to address regional ballistic missile defense through multilateral procurement.
That’s the same designation we’ve given NATO, allowing the GCC to invest in shared systems for mutual defense, even as the United States continues a strong bilateral defense partnership with each individual GCC member state. And it demonstrates our commitment to the U.S.-Gulf Partnership, and our ultimate commitment to see the Gulf become a stronger, more capable partner in confronting the many challenges to our shared interests in the region. Earlier today, Secretary Hagel met with his Gulf counterparts in Jeddah for the first ever U.S.-GCC Defense Ministerial, which likewise signals U.S. intent to strengthen and deepen our bilateral and multilateral ties in this critical region.

Progress on Regional Missile Defense

The President’s address at the United Nations General Assembly last fall reaffirmed our continued commitment to Gulf security. Indeed, my principal takeaway from the trip was that our security commitments and partnerships in the Gulf are more extensive today than ever before.
As I discussed several weeks ago in Abu Dhabi, the March 2012 launch of the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, or SCF, has enhanced our partnership on policies that advance shared political, security, military, and economic objectives in the Gulf, including intensified efforts on ballistic missile defense cooperation.

At his first Forum last September, Secretary of State John Kerry, my boss, made clear that a top U.S.-GCC priority would continue to be enhancing ballistic missile defense cooperation, including the eventual development of Gulf-wide coordinated missile defense architecture. And we can expect BMD to have been a primary focus at today’s inaugural U.S.-GCC Defense Ministerial.

Burden Sharing

It was clear from my discussions with our partners in the region that the GCC shares our goal of building an effective regional defense against the threat of ballistic missiles, and is willing and ready to defend its own security future.
Several of our Gulf state partners expressed an interest in buying missile defense systems, and some have already done so. For example, the United Arab Emirates has contracted to buy two THAAD batteries that, when operational, will enhance the U.A.E.’s security as well as regional stability. The U.A.E. also has taken delivery of its Patriot PAC-3 batteries, which provide a lower-tier, point defense of critical national assets.

Saudi Arabia is in the process of upgrading its existing Patriot PAC-2 batteries to the PAC-3 configuration. Kuwait also is upgrading its existing batteries to PAC-3, and in December 2013 signed an offer for two additional PAC-3 batteries.

These procurements demonstrate our GCC partners’ determination to provide for their own defense, and when combined with our regional BMD capabilities, represent a significant contribution to regional stability at a time when our own defense spending is under fiscal pressure.

Our GCC partners are investing billions of dollars in missile defense purchases. In today’s austere budget environment, these investments can help achieve greater economies of scale.

Military and Diplomatic Coordination

And I’ll close by looking ahead towards next steps on BMD in the region.
Effective ballistic missile defense is not based on military might alone. Advanced, interoperable systems to intercept and destroy attacking missiles must be combined with diplomatic cooperation and coordination.

Ballistic missiles can destabilize and weaken a region due to their short flight times and potentially devastating consequences. WMD armed missiles in particular can have broad consequences not only within a targeted country but within a region, as the effects of a successful attack are not always limited to that country. And even conventionally armed missiles can be a significant military threat.

But ballistic missiles are also a weapon of choice for an adversary that wants to gain political influence over its regional neighbors. We have seen ballistic missile test firings used as a tool to intimidate, blackmail, or coerce a country’s neighbors.

The nature of the ballistic missile threat means that the United States, and the GCC, must be prepared both diplomatically and militarily well before the first missile is launched.

The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense work as active partners in the Strategic Cooperation Forum to emphasize the need for planning, both diplomatic and military, when it comes to ballistic missile defense.

In fact, our dialogues within the SCF include representatives from the Defense Department and U.S. Air Forces Central Command for one clear reason: because ballistic missile defense requires a whole-of-government approach.

To facilitate further a dialogue with our Gulf partners on BMD issues, President Obama obtained authority from Congress expanding the authority of the U.S. Air Force to conduct integrated air and missile defense training at the U.S.-U.A.E. Integrated Air and Missile Defense Center, which is located in the United Arab Emirates. These integrated defense trainings are uniquely positioned to play a key role in advancing regional BMD policies, procedures, and cooperation.

At a strategic level, we must continue to encourage better planning and preparation among both our military leaders and our senior diplomats. It should also be our shared task with the Gulf to develop strategic communications plans and ensure close and effective consultations with regional partners to advance our joint security and prosperity.

The U.S.-Gulf partnership can therefore bring together the strength of our combined forces with the skill of our strategic planning. We will be much more successful in advancing our shared interests by working together than by going it alone.

Missile Defense Cooperation with Israel

And finally, I want to note that our cooperation with the GCC states will in no way detract from the separate, robust U.S.-Israel BMD cooperation program. Since 2003, the Department of Defense, with the help of Congress, has provided nearly $2.5 billion to Israel to help develop a number of missile defense systems including Iron Dome, Arrow, and David's Sling. This includes $440 million in FY 13 alone. Throughout the development of these systems, our goal has been to ensure there are no shortages in these important systems and that U.S. investments meet Israel's security needs and production capacity.

The President's budget requests $96.8 million in FY15 for Arrow and David’s Sling, and $176 million for Iron Dome. By the end of FY15, the United States will have provided over $875 million in funding for Iron Dome.

Conclusion

In conclusion, ballistic missile defense issues cross military and, most importantly for us at the State Department, diplomatic equities. Moving forward, we hope to encourage deepened understanding and engagement in the Gulf on the need to combine diplomatic and military knowledge and expertise to address the full range of issues on effective missile defenses and strengthen the larger strategic deterrent architecture.

The United States will continue to work closely with each of our partners in the GCC to help them strengthen their capacity. Enhanced missile defense capabilities among the GCC not only protect our partners from the growing regional threat, but strengthened regional deterrence architecture ultimately keeps our interests, and our homeland, secure.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.

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