BRIEFING: COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM IN 2014

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Counterterrorism: Briefing at the Release of Country Reports on Terrorism 2014
06/19/2015 01:12 PM EDT
Briefing at the Release of Country Reports on Terrorism 2014
Special Briefing
Tina S. Kaidanow
Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism
Washington, DC
June 19, 2015

(As Prepared)

Thank you all very much for coming. Today, the State Department is issuing Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, which fulfills an important congressional mandate and provides us with an opportunity to review the state of terrorism worldwide and define the nature and the scope of the terrorist threat. Doing so also allows us to assess our effectiveness and best calibrate our strategy and response. Reviewing how involved and engaged countries are in various aspects of their counterterrorism efforts – which comprises the bulk of this report – helps us make informed assessments about priorities and where to place resources in our various capacity building programs.

First, I would note that, according to the Statistical Annex prepared by the University of Maryland, the numbers of terrorist attacks in 2014 increased 35% and total fatalities increased 81% compared to 2013, largely due to activity in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Nigeria. More than 60% of all attacks took place in five countries: Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and Nigeria, and 78% of all fatalities due to terrorist attacks also took place in five countries: Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria. The increase in total fatalities was, in part, a result of certain attacks that were exceptionally lethal – in 2014, there were 20 attacks that killed more than 100 people, compared to two such attacks in 2013.

While I cite these statistics, which are compiled by the University of Maryland and are not a U.S. government product per se, I stress again that they do not provide the full context. Aggregate totals or numbers of attacks are not a particularly useful metric for measuring the aims of extremist groups, or of our progress in preventing or countering their activities.

To that end, I’d like to talk about the content of the report itself and some of the trends we noted in 2014.

Despite significant blows to al-Qa’ida’s (AQ) leadership, weak or failed governance continued to provide an enabling environment for the emergence of extremist radicalism and violence, notably in Yemen, Syria, Libya, Nigeria, and Iraq. We are deeply concerned about the continued evolution of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the emergence of self-proclaimed ISIL affiliates in Libya, Egypt, Nigeria and elsewhere, and tens of thousands of foreign terrorist fighters who are exacerbating the violence in the Middle East and posing a continued threat to their home countries.

The ongoing civil war in Syria has been a spur to many of the worldwide terrorism events we have witnessed. Since the report covers calendar year 2014, it notes that the overall flow of foreign terrorist fighter travel to Syria was estimated at more than 16,000 foreign terrorist fighters from over 90 countries as of late December – a number that exceeds any similar flow of foreign terrorist fighters traveling to other countries in the last 20 years. Many of the foreign terrorist fighters joined ISIL, which has seized contiguous territory in western Iraq and eastern Syria. Iraqi forces and the Counter-ISIL Coalition have dealt significant blows to ISIL, but it continues to control substantial territory.

As with many other terrorist groups worldwide, ISIL has brutally repressed the communities under its control and used ruthless methods of violence such as beheadings and crucifixions. Uniquely, however, it demonstrates a particular skill in employing new media tools to display its brutality, both as a means to shock and terrorize, but equally to propagandize and attract new recruits. Boko Haram shares with ISIL a penchant for the use of brutal tactics, which include stonings, indiscriminate mass casualty attacks, and systematic oppression of women and girls, including enslavement, torture, and rape.

Though AQ central leadership has indeed been weakened, the organization continues to serve as a focal point of inspiration for a worldwide network of affiliated groups, including al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula – a long-standing threat to Yemen, the region, and the United States; al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb; al-Nusrah Front; and al-Shabaab in East Africa.

We saw a rise in "lone offender attacks," including in Ottawa and Quebec in October and Sydney in December of 2014. In many cases it was difficult to assess whether attacks were directed or inspired by ISIL or AQ and its affiliates. These attacks may presage a new era in which centralized leadership of a terrorist organization matters less, group identity is more fluid, and violent extremist narratives focus on a wider range of alleged grievances and enemies. Enhanced border security measures among Western states since 9/11 have increased the difficulty for known or suspected terrorists to travel internationally; therefore, groups like AQ and ISIL encourage lone actors residing in the West to carry out attacks on their behalf.

ISIL and AQ affiliates, including al-Nusrah Front, continued to use kidnapping for ransom operations, profits from the sales of looted antiquities, and other criminal activities to raise funds for operational purposes. Much of ISIL’s funding, unlike the resources utilized by AQ and AQ-type organizations, did not come from external donations but was internally gathered in Iraq and Syria. ISIL earned up to several million dollars per month through its various extortion networks and criminal activity in the territory where it operated, including through oil smuggling. Some progress was made in 2014 in constraining ISIL’s ability to earn money from the sale of smuggled oil as a result of anti-ISIL Coalition airstrikes that were conducted on ISIL-operated oil refineries, but the oil trade was not fully eradicated.

ISIL and AQ were not the only serious threats that confronted the United States and its allies. Iran continued to sponsor terrorist groups around the world, principally through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). These groups included Lebanese Hizballah, several Iraqi Shia militant groups, Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jihad.

Addressing this evolving set of terrorist threats, and the need to undertake efforts that span the range from security to rule of law to efficacy of governance and pushing back on terrorist messaging in order to effectively combat the growth of these emerging violent extremist groups, requires an expanded approach to our counterterrorism engagement. President Obama has emphasized repeatedly that we need to bring strong, capable, and diverse partners to the forefront and enlist their help in the mutually important endeavor of global counterterrorism.

A successful approach to counterterrorism must therefore revolve around partnerships. The vital role that our partners play has become even clearer in the last year with the emergence of ISIL as the hugely destructive force in Iraq and Syria that I have described. We have worked to build an effective counter-ISIL coalition, a coalition that is clearly crucial because the fight against ISIL is not one the United States can or should pursue alone. More than 60 partners are contributing to this effort, which is multi-faceted in its goals – not only to stop ISIL’s advances on the ground, but to combat the flow of foreign fighters, disrupt ISIL’s financial resources, and counteract ISIL’s messaging and undermine its appeal, among other objectives. I would also highlight the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2178 in September as a particularly significant step forward in international efforts to cooperate in preventing the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to and from conflict zones.

The notion of finding and enabling partners, of course, is not new or limited to the counter-ISIL effort, and indeed many of our most significant counterterrorism successes in the past have come as a result of working together with partners on elements ranging from intelligence to aviation security.

The United States needs partners who can not only contribute to military operations, but also conduct arrests, prosecutions, and incarceration of terrorists and their facilitation networks. Addressing terrorism in a rule of law framework, with respect for human rights, is critical both for ensuring the sustainability of our efforts and for preventing the rise of new forms of violent extremism. Multilateral entities such as the United Nations and the Global Counterterrorism Forum can also play a critical role in promoting good practices and mobilizing technical assistance in this regard.

As we develop partnerships to disrupt terrorist plots and degrade terrorist capabilities, we also need partners – both governmental and non-governmental – who can help counter the spread of violent extremist recruitment and address the conditions that make communities susceptible to violent extremism. We must do more to address the cycle of violent extremism and transform the very environment from which these terrorist movements emerge. That is why we are committed to enlarging our strategy in ways that address the underlying conditions conducive to the spread, and not just the visible symptoms of, violent extremism. This was a major theme of the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) earlier this year, which brought together 300 participants from over 65 countries representing national and local governments, civil society, the private sector, and multilateral organizations. The Summit highlighted the especially vital role that partnering with civil society plays in our counterterrorism efforts.

In addition to counterterrorism assistance rendered in the fields of rule of law and countering recruitment, we provide a wide array of expertise and programmatic support for our partners to help them identify and disrupt the financing of terrorism, strengthen aviation and border security, and sharpen their law enforcement and crisis response tools to respond to the terrorist threat.

The terrorism challenges that we face continue to evolve at a rapid pace, and we cannot predict with precision what the landscape will look like one decade or even one year from now. However, we believe we can best protect America’s interests and people over the long run by engaging in robust diplomacy, expanding our partnerships, building bilateral and regional capabilities, and promoting holistic and rule of law-based approaches to counter terrorism and violent extremism. This remains our program of action over the months ahead.

And now, I invite your questions about the report and its findings.

SECRETARY KERRY'S REMARKS WITH PORTUGUESE MINISTER OF STATE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS RUI MACHETE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Remarks With Portuguese Minister of State and Foreign Affairs Rui Machete
Remarks
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Treaty Room
Washington, DC
April 21, 2015

SECRETARY KERRY: Good morning, everybody. Bom dia. It’s my pleasure to welcome Foreign Minister Machete here back to Washington, and I’m delighted to be able to have a chance to talk with him about important issues between our countries.

Portugal, as everybody knows, is an old and firm ally of the United States, a NATO ally. And we’re particularly grateful for Portugal’s many efforts of global responsibility, not the least of which now are their support in the coalition against ISIL, their commitment to counterterrorism, their support for sanctions with respect to the Russian activities in Ukraine and our efforts to try to implement the Minsk agreement, which we all believe will help to quiet things down and stabilize the region and be good for everybody. We also are grateful for their support for our efforts in Iraq. And there is a very significant effort by Portugal to exercise responsibility towards the environment, towards the oceans, particularly the Gulf of Guinea.

So we appreciate it – that leadership – very much. And I know recently Portugal, like other countries in Europe, has been making difficult economic choices. And I want to congratulate Portugal on the fact that it is growing. We want to see that continue. We have high hopes, but we welcome you here. So thank you very much. We’re happy to have you here.

FOREIGN MINISTER MACHETE: Thank you very much. For me, it’s a great pleasure to come back to Washington and to see John Kerry again. We will have to talk about important international issues such as terrorism, Iran and the nuclear negotiations, and to congratulate John Kerry by the results and the negotiable – strong-willed stand in which – with which he led the negotiations, with of course the problems of the Middle East and terrorism.

And we have to talk about the bilateral problems we have on agenda. We have some difficulties to settle, but they are not – this is natural among allies. So we expect to have a good conversation. Thank you.

SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you. Welcome. Thank you very much, everybody. Thank you.

U.S. STATEMENT ON COUTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN KENYA

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Kenya's Counterterrorism Efforts
Press Statement
Jen Psaki
Department Spokesperson
Washington, DC
December 19, 2014

The U.S. Government is firmly committed to supporting Kenya's efforts to defeat al-Shabaab and to ensure security of all of its citizens. We are disappointed, however, by the very limited time allowed for debate and consultation on the 2014 Security Laws (Amendment) Bill prior to its passage and enactment into law. We are also concerned about several provisions in the legislation, including those that appear to limit freedom of assembly and media, and access to asylum for refugees. As a key partner in the global effort to counter terrorism, we expect the Kenyan Government to ensure that its counterterrorism efforts live up to Kenya’s international commitments and its own constitution. Protecting Kenya’s constitution and upholding human rights, democracy, and international obligations are among the most effective ways to bolster security.

The U.S. Government is also seeking further information about the December 16 announcement by the Kenyan NGO Board to deregister hundreds of NGOs for failing to file their audited reports and another 15 for suspected links to terrorism. The 15 NGOs have not been identified. A strong civil society is vital to democracy, security, and prosperity. We urge the Government of Kenya to ensure the regulation of NGOs is transparent, fair, and grounded in clear criteria that do not limit free expression, association, or assembly.

REMARKS: SECRETARY KERRY AND PRESIDENT ABDEL AZIZ OF MAURITANIA

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Remarks With President of Mauritania Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz Before Their Meeting

Remarks

John Kerry

Secretary of State

Treaty Room

Washington, DC

August 4, 2014

---

SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you, Mr. President. Good afternoon. My great pleasure to welcome the President of Mauritania, President Aziz. He’s just flown in this afternoon. We’re very happy to welcome him here for the Africa Leaders Summit.

And it’s particularly a pleasure for me to welcome him not only because I can congratulate him on his recent reelection, but he has also been elected to be the leader of the African Union. He’s assuming the chairmanship of the African Union. So we look forward to working with him as a very key leader – (inaudible). We look forward to welcoming him as a key leader in the course of many of the efforts that we’re engaged in.

I also want to thank him for his leadership in helping to negotiate a ceasefire with the Government of Mali and three rebel groups in northern Mali. The United States is deeply engaged with the Government of Mauritania on counterterrorism initiatives, and we are involved through the Mauritanian military, working with them, helping to provide them with air capacity, training, advanced counterterrorism techniques, which enable the military to secure the borders and to react very quickly and decisively for any kinds of terrorist incursions.

We’re also assisting the Mauritanian Government with efforts to establish regional solutions to regional problems, and this is something that President Aziz is particularly focused on as the now chair of the African Union.

So Mr. President, thank you for taking time to come and visit. We’re delighted to have you here. Thank you.

PRESIDENT AZIZ: (Via interpreter) (In progress) between the United States and Africa. Many things will be done together to help our two groups (inaudible) the United States and Africa, especially with respect to bilateral relations between my country, the United States, and Mauritania. We are very satisfied with the state of our relations. The United States is helping us with capacity building. They are helping our armed forces and our security forces, especially in terms of its airborne components. This is producing very good results, and this has allowed us to secure our territory.

It is, indeed, true that we live in a very complex region, the Sahel region. Therefore, this cooperation is productive, beneficial, not only for our own country but also for the entire region, because the United States is also present throughout the region in Niger, in Mali, in order to assure security in the region. Because as you know full well, this is a region which is located in a very difficult situation from a security standpoint. There’s terrorism, which has been there for about a decade now. There’s a country, Mali, which has suffered from terrorism. We are in a region which has great difficulties due to terrorism, due to drug trafficking, due to hostage taking. And this has a deeply destabilized this region.

So yes, indeed today we are fighting against this and the support that we are getting from the United States is help that is quite timely and it impelled us to reinforce our capabilities. We are very thankful for this. And I do hope that as a result of this summit we’ll be able to work together on other issues that will allow Africa to develop itself further to fight against poverty in all of its forms, because unfortunately it’s poverty which is somewhat the cause of all the problems that we’re experiencing from a security standpoint.

Thank you.

BACKGROUND CONFERENCE CALL REGARDING PRESIDENT'S COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS AT WEST POINT

FROM:  THE WHITE HOUSE 

Background Conference Call on the President's Commencement Address at West Point

11:15 A.M. EDT

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I’ll just say a few things and then take your questions.  So in the President’s speech today he was focused on defining, as we come out of a period dominated by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, what the next phase of our foreign policy is, both as it relates to our counterterrorism mission and also our broader role in the world.  You heard him speak at length about that.  I’ll only comment on a number of things.

First of all, as we laid out yesterday, we have a commitment now and a decision about how to wind down the war in Afghanistan that involves keeping a force of 9,800 U.S. servicemembers at the beginning of 2015, and then stepping down to a security presence in our embassy in Kabul, as we did in Iraq, by the end of 2016. 

Having made that decision and that announcement yesterday, today the President wanted to discuss the counterterrorism strategy that comes next, what replaces the approach that was focused on the large-scale deployments that we had in Iraq and Afghanistan.  And he made very clear that that approach needs to match our resources to the threat, which has changed as al Qaeda core has been severely degraded, but other al Qaeda affiliates and extremist groups have emerged in different parts of the region from South Asia to the Sahel. 

The President was very clear that the focus of our efforts must be capacity building.  We need to build essentially a network of partners across this region so that we can deal with the terrorist threat.  And we will support that series of partnerships in different ways.  In some instances, we will provide training and equipping.  In some instances, we will facilitate actions like we were doing in Mali for the French.  We have resources that range from intelligence to special operations to trainers.  And, of course, we will take direct action against a terrorist when it is necessary for our own security.

In order to provide funding and resources for this capacity building, the President announced that he will be working with Congress to establish a Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund of up to $5 billion.  And the purpose of this fund is to make sure that we have the resources available, and the flexibility available, to support all these different missions. 

We highlight the challenge of Syria as both a huge humanitarian crisis and a growing counterterrorism issue.  And the President indicated that this additional funding will support, for instance, Syria’s neighbors who are dealing with a terrorist threat that crosses borders.  He also made very clear that we will continue to find ways to support the Syrian opposition.  And we have, as we’ve told you, provided different types of support, including military support, to the Syrian opposition and we are doing more to increase that support.  And that’s something that we’re going to continue to do going forward.  And we will work with Congress, as he indicated, to find ways to increase that support for the Syrian opposition.

Beyond counterterrorism, he laid out his vision for U.S. leadership in the world, one that is rooted in the United States strengthening existing international institutions and norms, but also working to establish clear rules of the road for emerging challenges from cybersecurity to maritime issues to climate change.  And you heard him highlight two of our key priorities, Iran and Ukraine, where we have worked through collective action with the international community to achieve our objectives.

And, of course, you heard the President speak about our ongoing commitment to promote our values around the world, both through support for democratic transitions in countries like Burma and in the Middle East and North Africa, but also through an increased focus on broadening our relationships and networks with peoples around the world.

With that, I’m happy to move to questions about any elements of the speech or any of the policies that the President touched on. 

Q    On Syria, could you give some more details on what the President means when he says he will work with Congress to find ways to ramp up support for the opposition?  Is the administration considering an open effort by the U.S. military to train and arm in some way the opposition?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Yes, it’s a good question.  So, first of all, we have an ongoing effort to ramp up our support for the moderate opposition, and that is an effort that we coordinate very closely with our Arab partners and our European allies.  And we believe that the trajectory of that assistance has been upward and can make a real difference in strengthening the moderate opposition.

We also, as I indicated, are going to commit additional resources to the neighbors -- Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq -- who are dealing with both refugee and counterterrorism challenges.  But as we look for additional ways to strengthen the opposition, we want to review a variety of different options.  We believe, again, that strengthening the opposition is both the best counterweight to Assad and also the best counterweight to the extremist elements within Syria.  And we do want to work to review the possibility of the United States military participating in that effort.

I would draw your attention, for instance, to a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act, the NDAA, which indicates support for and authorities for the Secretary of Defense to provide military assistance to the vetted Syrian opposition.  I think that indicates an emerging view in Congress that is supportive of providing that type of authority for the United States military to participate in support for the opposition.

So this is a conversation that we want to have with Congress as they develop their approaches, as we develop ideas for how to increase resources that can flow to the Syrian opposition.  So this is something, again, we’ll be discussing with Congress in the coming weeks and months.  I think the basic principle is, what are the best ways for us to provide support to the Syrian opposition; what are the different means of doing so; how can we increase resources, as the President spoke about; and how do we explore areas like authorities that are within that provision that I think was an initiative of Carl Levin, but also then drew broad support in the Armed Services Committee -- I believe it passed 26 to 1 23-3.

So this will be an ongoing focus for us as we head into the summer.

Q    After listening to your answer just now it’s still not entirely clear to me whether the U.S. will train an armed Syrian opposition.  Are you able to give a yes or no answer to that?  And secondly, the President talked about giving more support to Syria’s neighbors.  Is there a monetary figure on that support?  Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  We have been very clear that we do provide military assistance to the Syrian opposition, the armed Syrian opposition.  We don’t detail the specifics of that support. 

What we’re saying today, in addition to that, is not only do we want to continue to increase the assistance that we provide to the Syrian opposition, but we do want to have this discussion with Congress about the potential for there to be a role for the U.S. military in that effort.  We would need authorities to do that, obviously, and that is what, for instance, is in the Levin provision that I mentioned.

So this is something that we have to work with Congress on going forward.  But again, we are, as we said, providing military assistance to the Syrian opposition, and it’s something that will continue to be a focus given both the need to counter Assad but also to deal with the counterterrorism challenge within Syria.

In terms of the neighbors, this would be a part of this fund, again, that is up to $5 billion to deal with different contingencies across the region.  So I don’t want to break down the specific dollar amounts for individual countries; that’s something that we’ll be reviewing within the administration and the Congress as well. 

But the fact is, we want a fund like this precisely so we have flexibility, so that if we need to surge particular resources to a particular counterterrorism partner we can do that, even as we have steady support in places like Yemen or Somalia for security forces and peacekeeping forces.

So it will be a part of that Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund that the President discussed today. 

Q    Just a little more on that counterterrorism fund.  You all are asking for that money.  What’s sort of the plan if Congress doesn’t go along and actually fund that counterterrorism fund?  Do you have a second idea how you want to approach that?  And would you call the section of the speech where the President talked about our role in the world being less effective if perception takes hold, that we are conducting surveillance against ordinary citizens, the Edward Snowden effect?  And how much did the Edward Snowden leaks play into how the speech was developed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Sure.  So on your first question, obviously, we need the support of Congress for any type of additional funding above and beyond what’s already established.  I think that, generally, we’ve had broad bipartisan support for counterterrorism missions in Congress, so we’re optimistic that this is the type of approach that can sustain that support as we discuss our overseas contingency funding with Congress in the coming weeks. 

Again, we also I think would say that this is substantially less funding than was required for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  So for instance, recently, at the height of the Afghan war, we were spending $10 to $15 billion a month in Afghanistan.  Part of what we’re able to do, even with the type of presence that we’re going to have in Afghanistan next year, is have a substantial drawdown in resources and funding dedicated to Afghanistan.  We want to take some of those resources and apply it to this type of fund for counterterrorism partnerships. 

That’s part of reallocating our resources across the region to match the threat.  The threat is not overwhelmingly in Afghanistan and Pakistan anymore; in fact, it’s much more dispersed.  This is an effort to reallocate resources to match the threat so that we’re spending less in Afghanistan and we’re able to dedicate more resources to the partnerships that the President talked about in the Middle East and North Africa.

On your second question, this is not a focus of the speech.  Obviously, the speech that the President gave at the Justice Department earlier this year dealt broadly with not just the disclosures by Mr. Snowden, but our approach to bulk collection and other intelligence activities.

What the President was making a point of today is we must hold ourselves to high standards as a part of maintaining American leadership; that the legitimacy that the United States has to lead the world flows from the fact that we don’t act outside of the international standards that we’ve helped to establish, and that the confidence of other nations and people that work with us is rooted in their belief that the United States has a commitment, for instance, to the rule of law and to human rights.

And again, as a part of that, we do believe that we need to give greater confidence to not just the American people, but to foreign publics as well, that the United States is not engaged in bulk collection for the purpose of conducting surveillance on ordinary people; they were focused on threats.  And so we’re taking a number of steps that the President outlined earlier this year to give those additional protections to citizens in other countries to provide assurances about what our intelligence is focused on and what it’s not focused on.

So this is going to be a significant focus for us in the next two and a half years.  And it’s a part of how we lead not just through our extraordinary capabilities in areas like intelligence, but in our commitment to use those capabilities in a way that people have confidence is not violating their privacy unnecessarily. 

Q    It’s a two-parter.  On climate change, since it’s a mention in the national security context, I’m wondering whether the administration is considering or committed to both framing the rollout of coal stuff and other climate change stuff in a national security framework, and also using that as sort of executive power authorization to do climate change policy. 

And then, I’m sorry to beat the dead horse -- I’m just a little slow -- on the Syria consideration of U.S. military to do some of the rebel training, can you review real quickly what you think Hagel can do now and what you think it is that he needs congressional authority to do?  And would the training be in Syria or in neighboring countries? 

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  On the climate change issue, I think, broadly, climate change is a challenge that cuts across many different areas.  One of those is national security, because, as the President said, this is going to pose increasing national security dangers to the United States, and we’re going to be called upon to respond to conflicts or situations that have connections to climate change.  You can’t draw a red line, but clearly there has been an uptick in extreme weather events. 

When there’s a typhoon in Southeast Asia, when there’s a tsunami, the U.S. military is often called in for disaster response.  As the President referenced today, when there are refugees or conflicts over basic resources like food and water, that ultimately can have a bearing on national security.  So there’s a very clear intersection, we believe, between a changing climate and our national security interests. 

I think what’s important to note here is that our efforts domestically do intersect with our leadership internationally.  Next year, we are aiming to conclude a global climate framework agreement that has been a process of negotiation since Copenhagen in 2009.  Any successful international climate agreement is going to depend on many nations, including the United States, making commitments to reduce their emissions.  So in other words, actions that nations take domestically are going to have to be a part of how we build an international response, because everybody has to step up to the plate.  Of course, one of the things we said is we’re willing to take steps to reduce our emissions, but we need countries like China and India that are emerging emitters to take steps as well.

So the Climate Action Plan that we’ve developed over the course of the last year or so informed America’s commitment that we can then make as we pursue this type of global climate agreement.  These are steps that are important to take in their own right for the sake of the American people, and they’re also steps that will allow us to meet the types of commitments that we made in Copenhagen, whether you’re talking about fuel efficiency standards or coal-fired power plants. 

I won’t get into the specifics of those development elements beyond saying that they do intersect with the way in which we’re going to lead, as the President said, in pursuing this global climate framework agreement next year.  And that’s a big piece of business for us, and it’s going to demand U.S. leadership -- because, frankly, this is not the type of agreement that’s going to work if it’s only a handful of nations.  We really need the entire international community to make their commitments, to stand by those commitments in a transparent manner.  And that’s what we’ll be pursuing.

On Syria, I think if you look at the different options for providing assistance, the U.S. military would need certain additional authorities and resources to be able to step up with assistance to the Syrian opposition.  And you see in the language of the Levin provision that just moved through committee the types of authorities to the Secretary of Defense that would enable him to provide assistance to the vetted Syrian opposition. 

So that is something where there needs to be coordination and a dialogue between the administration and Congress.  That’s a discussion that’s ongoing that we’ll continue to have.  And again, that is one option available for looking at ways to increase support to the Syrian opposition.  We’re working across many lines of effort.  We provide many types of assistance, from humanitarian to nonlethal, to the types of military support we’ve indicated, to the Syrian opposition.  That’s one area where we want to explore whether we can come to some understanding with Congress about the best way to maximize our resources and to get additional support to the Syrian people.

Q    To continue on this same subject of the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund, first, do you envision that as being both a Title 10 and Title 50 available fund -- in other words, able to do both types of CT missions? 

Second, you’ve talked a lot about the role that the military might play in Syria, and you seem to be focusing on a training role.  But can you envision emerging from these discussions with Congress something broader in which the military would assist in some ways in providing greater security in the zones that the opposition now holds in the north and south? 

And finally, you’ve said again and again we’re going to have discussions with Congress, we have to talk about this with Congress.  Has the administration itself made up its mind what it wants to propose yet?  It sounds to me as if you haven’t. 

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  So on your first question, this is military funding title, so this would not get at the intelligence community; this would be for security support for a range of different purposes.  The President said a couple of examples today where we’ve dedicated some resources.  We dedicate resources to Mali to facilitate French actions with intelligence, with logistical support that is essential for their operations.  We train Yemeni security services.  We provide support to AMISOM in Somalia.  We equip Iraqi security forces. 

So these are all different missions that have a common thread of building capacity for partners, and the assistance would take place in that context.  The intelligence community has a separate budgeting process.

On Syria -- and your question overlaps with part of Margaret’s -- look, no, this is not -- we’re talking specifically about assistance to the opposition; we’re not talking about activities within Syria by the United States military.  That is not something that we’re contemplating. 

So I think the way to characterize the last part of your question is that we have decided that we need to continue to find ways to increase support to the opposition.  We have different ways to do that, both through our own actions, to the manner in which we collaborate with allies and partners in Europe and the Gulf, and we also want to consider whether an approach that involves the U.S. military could add to that capability.

So I think we’re looking across many different means that we have to provide this assistance.  And this is an additional option that we want to pursue with Congress and make a determination then about whether it’s the best way to increase that support.

But I think irrespective of that, clearly our trajectory is more support to the neighbors, more support to the opposition, more coordination with, for instance, the countries in the London 11, and then consideration of this additional alternative means of providing support to the opposition. 

Q    Yes, let me try this one more time, because I don’t think we’re getting a straight answer here.  Is it safe to say the White House has not decided whether to endorse the Senate language here?  Because that’s really the only thing on the table in Congress, and they’re quite clear that they have the Pentagon train and support and provide assistance to the rebels.  Have you not decided that yet?  Is that where we are? 

And if that’s the case, what do you say to critics who say, listen, you should have trained and armed the rebels two years ago when the entire national security establishment said, do so.  So what do you say to them that this whole notion of coordinating and dialogue is just delaying?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Well, first of all, we have been providing assistance to the opposition for some time now.  So we’re not at a standing start here when it comes to support for the armed opposition in Syria. 

With respect to the Levin provision, clearly we think that it puts forward a good concept, which is why we made a point today of indicating the fact that we want to pursue these discussions with Congress.  The fact of the matter is this is not something we can do alone as an administration; this is something that we have to do in partnership with Congress.  So I think that’s why we want to see this discussion move forward between the executive branch and the legislative branch. 

And we also want to make sure that wherever we land in terms of those discussions, that it fits appropriately into our broader strategy as it relates to how we’re working with the partners in the Arab World, how we’re working with our allies.  All these pieces need to fit together.

So this would be an additional piece, and we’re looking carefully at it.  We do think that language in the Levin provision is positive and puts forward a good concept, but we want to take the time necessary to ensure that we get this right and that we fold this into a broader strategy that supports our objectives inside of Syria. 

Q    On Syria, again -- what’s the White House’s sense of timing on this, with increasing evidence that the opposition is losing militarily after the fall of Aleppo?  What’s the timeframe for making a decision and actually beefing up military assistance if that’s indeed what the White House wants to do?  Is there a sense of urgency here? 

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  There are two questions here.  We are beefing up our assistance.  That is an ongoing process.  So resources are reaching the opposition, resources are reaching the armed opposition.  Coordination has improved with our partners in the Arab World, particularly in the Gulf. 

So there is that upward trajectory already.  That’s not in question at all.  And additional funding that can support that effort and support the neighbors is a focal point of how we look at building partnerships across the region, which is what the President said today. 

Then there’s the separate question of simply what additional authorities might be necessary for the U.S. military to participate in our efforts.  And that’s the question that we’ll be pursuing in the coming weeks.  But again, that doesn’t foreclose the fact that we are working this already, we are increasing our support already, we are coordinating better with partners already.  That’s going to continue to be the case no matter what. 

Q    I wanted to just turn to China and ask you, what is the message to China here?  I mean, we heard the President talk about the use of military action to defend the security of U.S. allies, which of course includes Japan and the Philippines.  But he also called out the U.S. Senate for not ratifying UNCLOS.  So what’s the message to China?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  The message is that the United States is going to support basic international rules of the road that should apply to everyone.  And we’ve said many times our Asia rebalance strategy is not aimed at China.  It’s focused on strengthening U.S. engagement in the region, but also strengthening the rules of the road across the region -- whether it’s on trade through the Trans-Pacific Partnership, whether it’s on maritime security where we would like to see disputes resolved consistent with international law.

So the bottom line is that the United States would like to see China act consistent with those rules of the road.  And we believe that they have an opportunity to do so, for instance, through negotiation of a code of conduct with the ASEAN countries or through taking the different claims that are at stake in the South China Sea to international law and dispute resolution.  At the same time, though, we are going to be very clear that we object to bigger nations bullying smaller ones; that the United States is going to support those nations that abide by rules of the road and work to isolate those nations that don’t. 

So for China we would like to see them as a part of an Asia Pacific community that is adhering to high standards of trade, that is resolving disputes peacefully, consistent with international law, that is respecting basic rules and norms.  But if China acts outside of those norms, as they’ve done, for instance, on cyber issues, we’re going to call them out.

With respect to the Law of the Sea, the President made very clear that part of how the United States shows our own commitment to those rules and norms is by upholding them ourselves.  And we act consistent with the Convention on the Law of the Sea, but it would send an important message for the Senate to ratify it, because that is the means by which we want to see disputes resolved. 

So, again, we lead on behalf of an international order that can uphold peace and security both by what we do in regions like the Asia Pacific and on issues like trade and cyber and maritime, but we also have to lead on behalf of that international order through our own example.  And that’s why we believe the Senate has long passed the time when they should have ratified the Law of the Sea.

Q    Just one subject that the President didn’t bring up and I was hoping you might be able to lend some clarity to would be the status of -- about a year ago, the President called for a review and even repeal of the AUMF.  I’m wondering whether the administration is planning to send Congress specific language in terms of fixing it, any timetable in terms of when they want to work with Congress in terms of getting that repealed.  And if you could provide a little bit of maybe a window into the administration’s thinking in terms of how to approach this subject.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Yes, I’d say a couple of things.  The point the President made at NDU is that we shouldn’t just have open-ended authorities for the use of military force that continue indefinitely; that we shouldn’t be in a permanent war here; that the AUMF in 2001 was written for a specific purpose and time.  And I think in terms of the timeframe, we look at the end of 2014 as a very important milestone as our combat mission comes to a close in Afghanistan and as our mission shifts there.  And so we look at a whole host of issues as intersecting with the end of 2014. 

The AUMF, which was written in the context of us going to Afghanistan -- we’ll want to talk to Congress about the AUMF as we approach the end of the year.  That’s a good time to have that discussion because we will be pivoting from where our combat mission is today and the type of role we’ll be playing in Afghanistan after 2014.  

GTMO is another issue that is relevant here.  GTMO was opened, after all, when we went into Afghanistan.  And the initial detainee population was heavily weighted with people who were taken off the battlefield in Afghanistan.  So we believe, again, as we bring our combat mission to an end in Afghanistan, that this is an appropriate year to make a redoubled effort to close GTMO.  So this is the context for how we’re approaching the AUMF as well.  I think this is a discussion we’ll have as we get closer to the end of the year.

I think in terms of what we’re looking for, we’re not looking for simply layering on more and more and more authorities within the existing AUMF.  The point here is to not just keep expanding some universal AUMF that applies to every challenge.  As the President said at NDU, what we want to do is narrow and refine authorities so that they’re focused on specific groups that do pose a direct threat to the United States.  And so that’s the approach that we would take into this discussion, which is how do we make sure that we have authorities that are focused on those groups who pose a direct threat to the United States and not simply stacking on additional authorities in the existing AUMFs. 

So this will be a part of how we wind down the war in Afghanistan and pivot to a more sustainable and focused counterterrorism effort across the region. 

Thanks, everybody, for getting on the call.  We can stay in touch on these issues.  And the only thing I’d say in closing is we said to you, I think, in the run-up to this that we weren’t solely focused on one speech here.  The President will obviously be going to Europe next year -- or next week.  In Poland, he’ll be able to talk about our commitment to European security, our commitment to NATO and our NATO allies.  He’ll have a G7.  He’ll speak at Normandy.  Other members of the administration will talk about different elements of our foreign policy priorities.  The President laid out I think a pretty clear roadmap of the types of issues he wants to get done in the next two and a half years. 

And I think you’ll hear different administration figures speak to different pieces of that agenda in the coming weeks as well.  So we’ll look forward to staying in touch.

MS. HAYDEN:  Thanks, everyone, for joining us.  Again, a reminder this call is on background to senior administration official.  And, as he noted, feel free to be in touch with us with other questions you have.  But everyone have a great day.  Thanks.

END
11:55 A.M. EDT

REMARKS: SECRETARY OF STATE KERRY WITH SINGAPOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER SHANMUGAM

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Remarks With Singaporean Foreign Minister K. Shanmugam Before Their Meeting

Remarks

John Kerry

Secretary of State

Treaty Room

Washington, DC

May 12, 2014

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SECRETARY KERRY: Good afternoon, everybody. My pleasure to welcome the foreign minister of Singapore, Foreign Minister Shanmugam. He is probably the first person, I think – one of the first people I talked to when I first became the Secretary, and we have had the pleasure of working in a number of different meetings and fora in the Asia Pacific, elsewhere.
I want to thank him and Singapore for their strong strategic partnership with the United States. There are many issues of concern where we think alike and we work in partnership. One of the most recent, obviously, is the Chinese challenge to the Paracel Islands. And we are particularly concerned – all nations that are engaged in navigation and traffic within the South China Sea, the East China Sea, are deeply concerned about this aggressive act. We want to see a code of conduct created; we want to see this resolved peacefully through the Law of the Sea, through arbitration, through any other means, but not direct confrontation and aggressive action.

In addition, we have enormous interests in terms of our economies and other interests. We work on counternarcotics, we work on counterterrorism, and particularly of great interest to both of us is the economic relationship. We have some 2,000 American businesses that are based in Singapore. Singapore is an enormous port, as everybody knows. It’s critical to the trade and commerce in the region. We have had a free trade agreement with Singapore for some period of time now, and that really was the precursor to the thinking about the TPP, Trans-Pacific Partnership, where again, Singapore has been deeply engaged, very involved in helping to shape it, showing leadership for which we are very appreciative.

In addition to that, we are engaged with the U.S.-Asia Pacific Comprehensive Energy Pact Partnership. And this is vital to our ability to be able to attract capital and fund renewable fuel projects, long-term clean energy projects for the future.

So I’m delighted to welcome the foreign minister here today, and we look forward to having a fruitful conversation. Thank you very much.

FOREIGN MINISTER SHANMUGAM: Thank you, Secretary Kerry. We have had – I met Secretary Kerry last year. We have had a great set of interactions. Singapore and U.S., we are old friends. Very strong partnership, very strong security relationship, and we have very similar ideas on a broad range of issues, as Secretary Kerry has said.

I want to talk to Secretary Kerry about both our bilateral issues – there are no issues, but how to take the partnership further, and also on regional issues, and also on the TPP, which Secretary Kerry spoke about. Today, 560,000 American jobs are dependent on exports to ASEAN alone, and ASEAN attracts nearly U.S. $200 billion of investments, the largest in all of Asia. One in three American jobs are dependent on exports to Asia. So the TPP has tremendous economic consequences for the U.S. and for our region, and I hope to speak with Secretary Kerry and others on the importance of making substantial progress, which is the President’s determination.

And on regional issues, on South China Sea issues, we have – I’ve just come from the ASEAN meeting. ASEAN foreign ministers issued a statement. We do not want tension. We want a code of conduct to be progressed with. We need a situation where parties resolve their disputes and differences in a way that’s acceptable to all, and I’m sure we’ll have good discussions. Thank you.

SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you.

FOREIGN MINISTER SHANMUGAM: Thank you.

LISA MONACO'S REMARKS ON COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

FROM:  THE WHITE HOUSE 

Remarks by Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Lisa O. Monaco

As Prepared for Delivery
“Countering Violent Extremism and the Power of Community” 

Harvard Kennedy School Forum
Tuesday, April 15, 2014 

Thank you so much, Farah [Pandith], for your kind introduction, and for your service to our country as the first Special Representative to Muslim communities during your time at the State Department, and as a leading advocate for a community of voices to counter extremism. 

I want to thank everyone at the Harvard Kennedy School for doing so much to develop our future public servants and political leaders, and I’m honored to be with you today.  It’s an honor to be part of the great Forum tradition.  I’d like to thank my colleague Deputy Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, as well as Jeffery Brown from the Ten Point Coalition and Haris Tarin from the Muslim Public Affairs Council for joining me for what I am sure will be an excellent discussion.         

Of course, we’re here today because of a tragedy.  This morning I joined Vice President Biden at the memorial service marking the anniversary of the Boston Marathon bombings – marking one year since we were shocked by those awful images at the finish line; one year since we lost Krystle Campbell, Lingzi Lu, eight-year-old Martin Richard and Officer Sean Collier – all innocent lives and all lost far too soon.  It’s been one year since we saw how Boston responds in the face of terrorism—with resilience and resolve and unbending strength. 

When the bombs went off, I had been President Obama’s chief advisor on homeland security and counterterrorism for just a few weeks.  It was a deeply personal introduction to the demands of this job.  I was raised a few miles from here—in Newton.  I went to high school in the shadow of Fenway Park and then made the long trek down Storrow Drive to come here for college.  Growing up, I spent every Patriot’s Day lining that marathon route – usually at the crest of Heartbreak Hill – cheering on the runners and taking part in a great Boston tradition.  And last year, my twin brother was there in the crowd, alongside thousands of other Bostonians.  It was not only an attack on the homeland; it was an attack on my hometown.   

We’ve faced violent expressions of extremism throughout our history, including 19 years ago this week in Oklahoma City.  And, sadly, we continue to face it, as we saw just two days ago in Overland Park, Kansas, when a gunman—allegedly a white supremacist with a long history of racist and anti-Semitic behavior—opened fire at a Jewish community center and retirement home, killing three.  And, while the American people continue to stand united against hatred and violence, the unfortunate truth is that extremist groups will continue targeting vulnerable populations in an effort to promote their murderous ideology.  

That’s why stemming domestic radicalization to violence has been a key element of our counterterrorism strategy from day one.  President Obama has been laser-focused on making sure we use all the elements of our national power to protect Americans, including developing the  first government-wide strategy to prevent violent extremism in the United States.  At the same time, we recognize that there are limits to what the federal government can do.  So we must rely on the partnership of those who are most familiar with the local risks, those who are in the best position to take action—local communities. 

Local communities are the most powerful asset we have in the struggle against violence and violent extremism.  We’ve crunched the data on this.  In the more than 80 percent of cases involving homegrown violent extremists, people in the community—whether peers or family members or authority figures or even strangers—had observed warning signs a person was becoming radicalized to violence.  But more than half of those community members downplayed or dismissed their observations without intervening.  So it’s not that the clues weren’t there, it’s that they weren’t understood well enough to be seen as the indicators of a serious problem. 

What kinds of behaviors are we talking about?  For the most part, they’re not related directly to plotting attacks.  They’re more subtle.  For instance, parents might see sudden personality changes in their children at home—becoming confrontational.  Religious leaders might notice unexpected clashes over ideological differences.  Teachers might hear a student expressing an interest in traveling to a conflict zone overseas.  Or friends might notice a new interest in watching or sharing violent material. 

The government is rarely in a position to observe these early signals, so we need to do more to help communities understand the warning signs, and then work together to intervene before an incident can occur, while always respecting our core commitment to protecting privacy and civil liberties.  During the past several years, that’s what we’ve attempted to do. 

We’ve built partnerships and expanded our engagement with communities across the nation, especially those that may be targeted by extremist groups.  We are working to improve our understanding of how and why people are drawn to violence.  And we have made it a priority to uphold and defend the qualities from which we draw strength—our openness, our diversity, and our respect for the equal rights of all Americans.

We know all too well that Muslim-American, Sikh-American, Arab-American communities and others, including Jewish-Americans, have been victimized by violence that is rooted in ignorance and prejudice, in suspicion and fear.  American Muslims and Americans of all faiths have enriched our way of life – contributing to our safety and security as patriotic service members, police, firefighters, first responders.  Violent extremism is not unique to any one faith.  And, as Americans, we reject violence regardless of our faith. 

Here in Massachusetts, over the past decade, government and law enforcement officials have built a dialogue to reinforce that shared commitment to non-violence and to build trust with a range of Boston-area communities.  The local U.S. Attorney’s office brings together representatives from federal agencies with community leaders, some of whom I just had the opportunity to meet.   I can tell you, the benefits go both ways.  Law enforcement is better able to understand the specific challenges these communities face, and community participants can bring their concerns directly to the government.  We all care about keeping our families and neighborhoods safe.  

These connections were critical in the chaotic days after the bombing – helping to minimize the potential for backlash against Muslim and Sikh communities.  In Malden, after a local Muslim woman was assaulted, purportedly in retribution for the bombings, the Department of Justice Community Relations Service worked with local officials to request additional security for the local mosque.  The Malden Chief of Police personally stood watch the first night.

Still, despite the broader security improvements we’ve put in place since 9/11, despite our outreach to reduce the risk of radicalization to violence, more work remains.  We need a comprehensive prevention model that allows us to work with communities and intervene with at-risk individuals before violent extremism takes root.  And we need to meet the evolving challenge, including terrorists’ use of the internet to recruit those who are most vulnerable to violent extremist ideologies, whether it be from neo-Nazis or groups like al-Qaeda.

So today, as we honor the memory of all those who were killed and injured one year ago, we recommit ourselves to building greater resilience into our communities to resist the pull of violent extremism.  We will continue to work closely with community leaders, local law enforcement and partners outside government who work with at-risk populations every day.  Faith leaders, school teachers, police chiefs – and especially mothers and fathers and families – will always be the best positioned to identify individuals in a community who might be susceptible to radical messages and violence—and to help them resist hateful ideologies.  So we must do more to connect those leaders to resources they need to be part of a comprehensive approach.  Let me just briefly describe a few of the steps we’re taking along those lines. 

First, the Department of Homeland Security is building partnerships with key cities across the country to establish a locally-based envoy dedicated to coordinating government engagement on the threat of homegrown violent extremism.  Piloted in Los Angeles, this effort has already helped focus our resources and strategic efforts by streamlining federal, state, and local outreach.  And tonight I’m proud to announce that the next such DHS envoy will be based in Boston. 

Second, DHS is also going to make more resources available to officials countering violent extremism in their communities.  Every year, DHS offers hundreds of millions of dollars in grant money to local law enforcement to bolster homeland security at the municipal and county level.  Now, in addition to preparing to respond to an attack once it’s happened, state and local officials can apply for these grants to explicitly develop models for preventing violent extremism in their communities, drawing on the expertise of social service providers, education administrators, mental health professionals, and religious leaders. 

Finally, I want to mention the expertise developing right in your backyard.  With support from the Department of Justice, the Children’s Hospital of Boston is studying why some Somali refugees embrace violent extremism, while others move towards gangs and crime and still others channel their energies into non-violent activism.  The answers to these kinds of questions will be essential to developing more effective models of intervention. 

And here at Harvard, the Berkman Center is establishing a new research network dedicated to understanding and ultimately preventing radicalization to violence on the internet.  Hate speech and extremism take on complex new dimensions and dangers when conducted online, and this will be a valuable asset as we strive to identify more effective ways to intervene and to address violent extremism in the internet age.   

During the past year, Boston has been a crucible for our nation-wide efforts to counter violent extremism and enhance our focus on resilience.  The bombings brought into sharp relief what we have been doing well and where we still need to hone our efforts.  The programs that are operating here set the example for cities across the nations.  And—as a Boston-girl, I say this with absolutely no surprise—the strength of the people of Boston made it wicked clear that this city and this country cannot be intimidated by the ideologies of hatred and violence that poison the hearts of a few disturbed individuals.  We reject that thinking.  And when people gather next Monday—in numbers as great and as proud as ever—to celebrate the running of the 118^thBoston Marathon, it will also show that we reject the fear terrorism seeks to breed.  It will show the true depth of what it means to be Boston Strong.  Thank you. 

PRESS AVAILABILITY: SECRETARY KERRY AND ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER LAMAMRA

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Joint Press Availability With Algerian Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra

Press Availability

John Kerry
Secretary of State

Algiers, Algeria

April 3, 2014

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QUESTION: (Via interpreter, in progress) – makes a lot (inaudible) in the field of counterterrorism. However, we have two unshakable principles. The first one is noninterference in the states first, and the second one is the nonintervention of our army outside our territories. So how could we serve stability in this context and as part of these two principles?

SECRETARY KERRY: Merci. We have great respect for Algeria’s principle of noninterference. At the same time, terrorism doesn’t know any borders. Terrorism moves indiscriminately across borders without regard to international lines or rules of law. And there is only one way to respond between states who are joined together in the principle of fighting against terrorism, and that one way is cooperation.

We have to cooperate. I think Algeria completely understands that and is dedicated and committed to it. Algeria has been a very strong partner bilaterally and multilaterally in countering terrorist threats and in building a regional and international capacity to be able to do that. And Algeria’s one of the original key founders of the Global Counterterrorism Forum. It’s co-chair of the Sahel Region Capacity Working Group. And we really applaud the leadership of Algeria.
What we’re here to talk about today and what we have talked about is: How do we cooperate even further? How do we take this cooperation to be able to be more effective in providing the kind of stability that your question just asked about? So the United States, the UN, the G7 endorse the practices that are now known as the Algiers Memorandum. And we have, I think, very strong exchanges today with Algerian security services, law enforcement, their justice sectors, covering a wide range of questions.

Algeria is also a member of the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership, which is our primary vehicle – the United States State Department’s primary vehicle to support long-term capabilities of the countries in the West and North Africa to face the AQIM threat. So we’re building that capacity and I believe that Algeria’s noninterference principle that you asked about does not stand in the way at all of our capacity to build additional cooperative initiatives, and particularly to build a full-fledged security cooperative relationship, which is what we came here to talk about today. We’ve made progress on that and we’re very pleased with it.

FOREIGN MINISTER LAMAMRA: (Via interpreter) Thank you, John. As far as these complex issues are concerned, I can simply add to what the Secretary of State has just said. The issues of international terrorism at the level of doctrine and policies, the objective and principles of international cooperation are clear-cut on behalf of the protection of human life and dignity. At the operational level, it is necessary for efficiency purposes not to go into the details as far as international cooperation is concerned.

However, I would like to mention that the – for the countries of the region, can – we are available to support all the neighboring countries in terms of information, the exchange of experiences, equipment, and (inaudible), a stakeholder as totally involved in the field of counterterrorism. We have made huge sacrifices in fighting against terrorism, as you know.

MODERATOR: Another question? Scott from – our guest, the American side, from our – according --

MS. PSAKI: Scott Stearns from VOA.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on the Middle East, you spoke today – here today and in Brussels about the limits of being a facilitator and about bringing the horse to water, saying today that the leaders need to know that now is the time to drink. Have you had any indication from Prime Minister Netanyahu or President Abbas that they are ready to drink?

And Mr. Minister, could you tell us specifically: What is it that you would like to see from the United States to help with security assistance, especially along the border with Mali? Thank you.

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, Scott, let me say that I have been in direct touch this morning with our team on the ground in Israel, and they worked literally until 4:00 in the morning in direct discussions between Israelis and Palestinians, with the United States present, in an effort to try to move the process forward. I think it is a critical moment, obviously. The dialogue remains open. There was progress made in narrowing some of the questions that have arisen as a result of the events of the last few days, but there’s still a gap, and that gap will have to be closed and closed fairly soon.

So I will be in touch this afternoon with both leaders, but again, it’s really their decision that has to be made. They understand what the choices are. They understand what the stakes are. And they understand each of them, their own limits and dynamics. So we are urging them to find the compromise that is critical to being able to move forward.

One of the important things I want to say about this moment: The fight right now, the disagreement between them, is not over the fundamental substance of a final status agreement. It’s over the process that would get you there and what you need to do in order to be able to continue to negotiate. It would be a tragedy for both of them, we would say, for them to lose the opportunity to get to those real issues that are the differences of a final status agreement.

A fight over process, how to get into a negotiation, should not stop you from getting into that negotiation. And so I hope that they will consider that very, very carefully. President Obama believes very strongly that the role of the United States to help the parties come together is a critical role. He is committed to his efforts and my efforts on behalf of him and the United States to play this role without any fear, because we believe that it’s the right thing to do. President Obama believes that it is important for the United States to try to help the parties make peace.
But as he himself would agree, in the end, the leaders have to make the decisions to do so. We will continue to do everything in our power to try to bring them together, to find a place of reasonableness, to encourage them to compromise, show ways in which they might do so. But in the end, they are the ones who have to say yes, and that’s where we are.

FOREIGN MINISTER LAMAMRA: If I may, John, just to make a short comment on the Middle East, I think a week or so ago, we were having our Arab summit in Kuwait. And the ministers of foreign affairs of the group had a chance to be briefed by President Mahmoud Abbas about the status quo of the diplomatic effort at that time. What I want to say is that at that time, the president referred to the fact that he had some 38 interactions with you, John, and he described that as really a clear demonstration of the commitment by the Secretary of State and President Obama to achieve lasting peace for the region and justice for the Palestinian people.

So the whole group were very appreciative of this effort, and we were hoping that it would reach fruition and it will indeed have the desired outcome that we are all hoping for and praying for. President Mahmoud Abbas requested a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the Arab world to be held on the 9^th of April in Cairo. We intend to go and we’ll definitely listen to President Mahmoud Abbas about the nitty-gritty of these discussions, and I’m sure that because it is our longstanding position to favor peace, stability, security, global peace, I believe that the Arab world will again express appreciation and support to your efforts, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY KERRY: And I --

FOREIGN MINISTER LAMAMRA: It’s not --

SECRETARY KERRY: I’m sorry, I thought you were finished. I didn’t mean to --

FOREIGN MINISTER LAMAMRA: No, I thought I would go to the Arab question, but please --

SECRETARY KERRY: No, no, please.

FOREIGN MINISTER LAMAMRA: Please, go, go.

No, regarding what is expected on the part of USA as far as the fight against terrorism in the Sahel region is concerned, I believe that today, the time has come for us to consolidate the achievements of the war against terrorism in northern Mali. I believe that we need to help in the rebuilding state institutions, law enforcement agencies, the national armed forces of Mali, and also in encouraging the regional efforts aiming at putting together regional security arrangements under the African Union initiative.

Eleven countries in the region have launched what we call the Nouakchott Process in order to help to assist each other in monitoring borders, in sharing intelligence, and this is a good occasion for the region to show by itself that indeed, we can do our best to fight and defeat terrorism in the Sahel region with clearly the required assistance on the part of the international community. If we were to ask specifically about what the U.S. can do, because nobody else could do it, it’s, for instance, sharing electronic intelligence with the armed forces and security agencies in the region. One example, but this is a qualitative edge that only the U.S. can provide. Thank you.

SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you for that comment, Ramtane. Let me – just a quick addendum to that. I just want to – maybe I don’t have to say this, but I’ll just say it. If this was an easy thing to do, it would have happened a long time ago. It’s difficult because it is a very difficult conflict with deep-rooted historical levels of mistrust and huge narrative issues on both sides that are deeply emotional and go to the core of both people’s identity and aspirations.
It’s as tough as it gets. And the one thing that stands out to me is this: If it’s tough today, I have not met anybody anywhere who believes it’s going to get easier next week or next year or in the future. And that’s why I think this is so important. Both sides – neither side can achieve what it wants staying away from the negotiating table. There’s only one way to resolve that, and that’s through negotiation. And so my hope, along with the foreign ministers and everybody, I think, in the world, is that the parties will not lose an opportunity to negotiate.

FOREIGN MINISTER LAMAMRA: Thank you, sir.

MS. PSAKI: Thank you, everyone.

WHITE HOUSE ISSUES U.S.-EU COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION FACT SHEET

FROM:  THE WHITE HOUSE 

FACT SHEET: U.S.-EU Counterterrorism Cooperation

The United States and the European Union are committed to working together to protect our citizens against terrorist attacks.  We work in close cooperation, bilaterally and multilaterally, to safeguard the security of our citizens in keeping with our shared values and to offer assistance to other countries to build their own capacity.

Collaboration in the Global Counterterrorism Forum Framework

The United States and the EU are among the most active members of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), a multilateral counterterrorism body with 30 worldwide members, designed to address counterterrorism threats and build international capacity.  The United States and the EU jointly support work in all areas of the two working groups focused on Africa:

• Horn of Africa Region Capacity-Building Working Group:  focuses on law enforcement, criminal justice and the rule of law, border management, countering violent extremism, and countering terrorist financing.  
• Sahel Region Capacity-Building Working Group:  focuses on police cooperation, building legal and judicial cooperation, border security, community engagement to counter extremism, and countering terrorism financing. 

The United States and the EU also continue to collaborate on three GCTF-inspired institutions, and will serve on the governing boards of and provide financial support to all three institutions:

• Hedayah:  Hedayah is the first and only international center of excellence on countering violent extremism (CVE).  We will jointly support Hedayah’s efforts, and the United States is funding curriculum development and CVE training.
• Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund:  This fund, a public-private global venture, will support grassroots efforts to counter violent extremism.  The United States and EU have committed to supporting this fund’s development and operations. 
• International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law:  Headquartered in Malta, this institute will train criminal justice officials in North, West, and East Africa, with a particular focus on countries in transition, to counter terrorism and handle transnational security challenges while respecting human rights.  The United States and the EU have agreed to provide resources and technical support.

Cooperation on Countering Violent Extremism and Foreign Fighters

We share a common understanding of how terrorists exploit underlying conditions to recruit others to their cause.  The United States and EU have increased transatlantic cooperation on both stemming the flow of foreign fighters and reintegrating them when they return.  We aim to counter violent extremism by providing positive alternatives to communities most at risk of recruitment and radicalization to violence; counter terrorist narratives; and build the capacity of government and civil society to counter violent extremism.

• Balkans:  The United States and the EU are committed to building the capacity of Balkan governments and civil society to counter violent extremism – from counter-messaging/counter-recruitment to the reintegration of returning fighters.
• Dutch-Moroccan-led Foreign Fighter Project:  We jointly support a year-long GCTF initiative, launched February 19, led jointly by Morocco and the Netherlands, to address the phenomenon of foreign fighters.
• U.S. Regional Strategic Initiative Foreign Fighter Project:  The United States, with EU support, will complement the Dutch-Moroccan initiative by focusing on implementation of the Rabat Good Practices to address the criminal justice aspects of prevention, disruption, and prosecution of foreign fighters, mainly focused on the Balkans, Maghreb, and Sahel countries.

Coordination on Combating Terrorist Organizations

We are committed to preventing and countering efforts by terrorists and their networks to travel freely in our territories and finance their illicit activities.  We are continuing this work with the European Union and will rely on a number of critical agreements to accomplish this.